Bidding Game

2016 ◽  
pp. 17-26
Author(s):  
Shreekant W Shiralkar
Keyword(s):  
Bidding Game

Land bidding game with conflicting interest and its quantum solution

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (05) ◽  
pp. 1750034 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haozhen Situ ◽  
Ramón Alonso-Sanz ◽  
Lvzhou Li ◽  
Cai Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Bell Inequalities ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Bidding Game ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
The Common ◽  
Quantum Solution

Recently, the first conflicting interest quantum game based on the nonlocality property of quantum mechanics has been introduced in A. Pappa, N. Kumar, T. Lawson, M. Santha, S. Y. Zhang, E. Diamanti and I. Kerenidis, Phys. Rev. Lett. 114 (2015) 020401. Several quantum games of the same genre have also been proposed subsequently. However, these games are constructed from some well-known Bell inequalities, thus are quite abstract and lack of realistic interpretations. In the present paper, we modify the common interest land bidding game introduced in N. Brunner and N. Linden, Nat. Commun. 4 (2013) 2057, which is also based on nonlocality and can be understood as two companies collaborating in developing a project. The modified game has conflicting interest and reflects the free rider problem in economics. Then we show that it has a fair quantum solution that leads to better outcome. Finally, we study how several types of paradigmatic noise affect the outcome of this game.

A Bidding Game with Heterogeneous Players

2014 ◽  
Vol 163 (3) ◽  
pp. 1018-1048 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Bressan ◽  
Deling Wei
Keyword(s):  
Bidding Game ◽  
Heterogeneous Players

A Bidding Game for Italian Households’ WTP for RES

2012 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Bigerna ◽  
Paolo Polinori
Keyword(s):  
Bidding Game

Reach for the Stars: A Strategic Bidding Game

Economica ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 68 (272) ◽  
pp. 489-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynne M. Pepall ◽  
Daniel J. Richards
Keyword(s):  
Bidding Game ◽  
Strategic Bidding

The Bidding Game: Competitive Funding Regimes and the Political Targeting of Urban Programme Schemes

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER JOHN ◽  
HUGH WARD ◽  
KEITH DOWDING
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Models ◽  
Public Welfare ◽  
Competitive Bidding ◽  
The Political ◽  
Bidding Game ◽  
Tobit Models ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
Competitive Funding ◽  
Official Evaluation

Public bodies adopt procedures for the competitive bidding for funds in the belief that they improve public welfare, while critics regard such practices as a waste of resources and open to political manipulation. We test the operation of a competitive bidding regime through Tobit models of data drawn from successful and unsuccessful bids in four years of the Single Regeneration Budget programme in England. We derive hypotheses from a model of competitive bidding, the official evaluation of the programme and the pork-barrel literature. Our data and statistical models show that successive rounds did not greatly improve the quality of the bids, did not systematically reward needy communities and diverted resources to ministers' parliamentary seats in some regions.

Comparison of four contingent valuation methods to estimate the economic value of a pneumococcal vaccine in Bangladesh

2008 ◽  
Vol 24 (04) ◽  
pp. 481-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebekah R. Heinzen ◽  
John F. P. Bridges
Keyword(s):  
Pneumococcal Vaccine ◽  
Demand Curve ◽  
Dichotomous Choice ◽  
Elicitation Method ◽  
Payment Card ◽  
Bidding Game ◽  
Elicitation Methods ◽  
Demand Curves ◽  
Elicitation Format ◽  
Choice Method

Objectives:To compare four contingent valuation elicitation methods as a means to estimate the value of a pneumococcal vaccine in Bangladesh and to test if the elicitation methods are subject to bias and if they produce valid responses.Methods:Three hundred sixty-one households with at least one child under 5 years of age were recruited in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Subjects were cluster-randomized to various elicitation methods: open-ended, dichotomous choice (at one of two asking prices), payment card (one of two cards with differing ranges). The dichotomous choice method was then followed up with a bidding game methodology, with the dichotomous choice price acting as the starting price for the bidding game. Analysis focused on summary statistics, demand curve estimation and multivariate regression analysis to test for validity and bias.Results:Thirty-one households refused to participate, leaving a total of 330 participating households (a 91.4 percent response rate). Willingness to pay estimates varied significantly across the methods (p< .001), with average estimates varying between $2.34 and $18 (US). The open-ended elicitation method was found to produce highly inflated values that were insensitive to construct validity tests. The dichotomous choice method produced quantity (demand) estimates rather than value estimates, and there was some evidence of yea saying. The payment card elicitation method was found to be affected by range bias. The bidding game elicitation method was found to be less sensitive to starting point bias and yea-saying.Conclusions:Different elicitation format do give rise to different demand curves; however, this may be partially due to the fact that they do not measure the same outcome. For example, the dichotomous choice format produces a demand curve, while the payment card, open-ended and bidding game produce inverse demand curves. All formats are prone to multiple biases. When choosing an elicitation format, it is important to first consider the purpose and use of the data. Each elicitation method has strengths and weaknesses and can be used for different purposes in technology assessment.

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