Although Nixon and Kissinger superimposed a Cold War distortion on a regional situation, tried to spin stories in the media, and allowed personal biases to flavor their responses, they responded logically and perhaps justifiably when seen in the broader context of U.S.-Soviet relations. The Nixon administration steadily escalated diplomatic signals, and the top policymakers sincerely believed that India had launched external aggression—not Pakistan—with its support for Mukthi Bahini (liberation force) raids into what was then East Pakistan.
Several additional themes run through Nixon and Kissinger’s response to the Indo-Pakistani War, many of which were also reflected in U.S.-Soviet back-channel communications and in the taped conversations. Not surprisingly, Nixon’s and Kissinger’s policy perceptions were clearly colored by their personal experiences with Indira Gandhi and Yahya Khan. The White House was unwilling to dismiss Yahya’s role as an honest broker in Sino-American rapprochement and likewise saw duplicity on the part of Indira Gandhi after she visited Washington, D.C., in early November 1971 and claimed that India had no desire for war with Pakistan. In addition, the surreptitiously recorded conversations between the president and his advisors are rife with gendered speech and appeals to masculine “toughness” that colored Nixon’s actions. Significantly, the frequent contact with the Soviets during the war mitigates some of the criticism of recklessness.
Exploring the re-emergence of industrial policy: Perceptions regarding low-carbon energy transitions in Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark
