How Attentional Cognitive Penetration Works

Author(s):  
Francesco Marchi
Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri

The recognition that attention performs two roles enables one to argue that the epistemology of attention is such that attention provides an immediate improvement to justification, as long as there are no defeaters, and also that suitably expert attention is sufficient for knowledge. Attentional justification is an underived epistemic principle, related to a view known as ‘Dogmatism’ in the epistemology of perception. There is cognitive penetration of attention by beliefs and interests, as well as by past actions, but it is restricted in scope. So attention improves justification, and sometimes, when attention is trained or cultivated, the improvement is such as to deliver knowledge.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Shevlin ◽  
Phoebe Friesen

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 390-391
Author(s):  
Gillian Rhodes ◽  
Michael L. Kalish

How can the impenetrability hypothesis be empirically tested? We comment on the role of signal detection measures, suggesting that context effects on discriminations for which post-perceptual cues are irrelevant, or on neural activity associated with early vision, would challenge impenetrability. We also note the great computational power of the proposed pre-perceptual attention processes and consider the implications for testability of the theory.


2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
Vladimir Konecni

Several very recent examples are critically discussed of philosophical aestheticians using psychological data allegedly showing the cognitive penetration of visual perception in order to build arguments on major issues in aesthetics: How art expertise functions (Stokes, 2014); the (in)validity of an important aspect of Arthur Danto?s theory that is based on his ?gallery of indiscernibles? (Nanay, 2015); and the claim of ?automatic? emotional impact of paintings (Bullot & Reber, 2013). The present critique of these aestheticians? theoretical endeavors is based largely on the recent analysis by Firestone and Scholl (2016) - sweeping, but most likely justified - to the effect that visual perception is encapsulated and that cognition does not affect visual perception. Additional theoretical and empirical support for the critique is derived from a nonemotivist theory of the effect of paintings (Konecni, 2015a).


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