The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource

Author(s):  
Molood Ale Ebrahim Dehkordi ◽  
Amineh Ghorbani ◽  
Paulien Herder ◽  
Mike Farjam ◽  
Anders Forsman ◽  
...  
Hydrology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51
Author(s):  
Francisco Muñoz-Arriola ◽  
Tarik Abdel-Monem ◽  
Alessandro Amaranto

Common pool resource (CPR) management has the potential to overcome the collective action dilemma, defined as the tendency for individual users to exploit natural resources and contribute to a tragedy of the commons. Design principles associated with effective CPR management help to ensure that arrangements work to the mutual benefit of water users. This study contributes to current research on CPR management by examining the process of implementing integrated management planning through the lens of CPR design principles. Integrated management plans facilitate the management of a complex common pool resource, ground and surface water resources having a hydrological connection. Water governance structures were evaluated through the use of participatory methods and observed records of interannual changes in rainfall, evapotranspiration, and ground water levels across the Northern High Plains. The findings, documented in statutes, field interviews and observed hydrologic variables, point to the potential for addressing large-scale collective action dilemmas, while building on the strengths of local control and participation. The feasibility of a “bottom up” system to foster groundwater resilience was evidenced by reductions in groundwater depths of 2 m in less than a decade.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (13) ◽  
pp. 912-920 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Revollo-Fernández ◽  
Alonso Aguilar-Ibarra ◽  
Fiorenza Micheli ◽  
Andrea Sáenz-Arroyo

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 319
Author(s):  
Ruben Weesie

Agro-pastoral dams (APDs) are an increasingly popular method of adaptation interventions improving communal water supply in rural West Africa. However, APDs are often constructed in areas where culturally heterogeneous pastoralists and farmers compete for similar land and water resources. Lifting open access water abundance is likely to change if not intensify ongoing tensions between farmers and settling Fulani herders. The extent of collective action and inclusivity of 6 APDs in Northern Ghana are analysed, combining theory from common-pool resource management and equity and justice in climate change adaptation into a proposed Inclusive Collective Action (ICA) model. Practically, the article demonstrates that neither fully excluding Fulani pastoralists nor making dams openly accessible results in inclusive APD usage and management where collective action is successful, and more dynamic forms of regional inclusion and exclusion are needed. Theoretically, the article identifies some of the limitations of applying the enabling conditions for collective action of common-pool resource theory as it tends to overlook negative aspects of excluding certain user groups in culturally heterogeneous contexts from managing and using a commons.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 512-531
Author(s):  
Leonardo Becchetti ◽  
Stefano Castriota ◽  
Pierluigi Conzo

AbstractIn low-income countries, grassroots collective action for the management of a common environmental resource is a well-known substitute for government provision of public goods. In our research we test experimentally what its effect is on social capital. To this purpose we structure a ‘sandwich’ experiment in which participants play a common pool resource game (CPRG) between two trust games in a Nairobi slum where social capital is scarce but informal rules regulating the commons are abundant. Our findings show that the change in trustworthiness between the two trust game rounds generated by the CPRG experience is crucially affected by the subjective satisfaction about the CPRG, rather than by standard objective measures related to CPRG players' behaviour. These results highlight that subjective satisfaction in a collective action has relevant predictive power on social capital creation, providing information which can be crucial to designing successful self-organized environmental resource regimes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (14) ◽  
pp. 7712-7718
Author(s):  
Jacob Freeman ◽  
Jacopo A. Baggio ◽  
Thomas R. Coyle

On a planet experiencing global environmental change, the governance of natural resources depends on sustained collective action by diverse populations. Engaging in such collective action can only build upon the foundation of human cognition in social–ecological settings. To help understand this foundation, we assess the effect of cognitive abilities on the management of a common pool resource. We present evidence that two functionally distinct cognitive abilities, general and social intelligence, improve the ability of groups to manage a common pool resource. Groups high in both forms of intelligence engage in more effective collective action that is also more consistent, despite social or ecological change. This result provides a foundation for integrating the effects of cognitive abilities with other dimensions of cognitive diversity to explain when groups will and will not sustainably govern natural resources.


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