Can Fifty-One Laboratories Cure What Ails the Individual Health Insurance Markets?

Author(s):  
Rosemarie Day ◽  
Niko Lehman-White
2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan C. Monheit ◽  
Joel C. Cantor ◽  
Margaret Koller ◽  
Kimberley S. Fox

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 219-236
Author(s):  
Anna D. Sinaiko ◽  
Timothy J. Layton ◽  
Sherri Rose ◽  
Thomas G. McGuire

Author(s):  
Peter Zweifel

The purpose of this article is to examine the working of voluntary private health insurance works. While empirical evidence on the functioning of voluntary private individual health insurance markets is lacking, there is a large and well-developed theoretical literature describing the functioning of private insurance markets in other sectors. This article begins by discussing this extensive literature and the working of such markets if they exist in the health sector. It considers the functioning of the three common forms of voluntary insurance, namely, individual health insurance markets, voluntary private coverage, and voluntary private health insurance that are auxiliary to public systems. Finally, the article proposes that a political economy based explanation for the existence of the theoretically optimal market does not exist and it concludes with areas for future research.


Author(s):  
Katherine Swartz

Simple income-based incentives to purchase health insurance (tax credits or deductions, or subsidies) are unlikely to succeed in significantly reducing the number of uninsured because income is not a good predictor of the extent to which individuals use medical service. Proposals to provide incentives to low-income people so they will purchase individual health insurance need to address the inherent tension between the interests of low-risk and high-risk people who rely on individual coverage. If carriers are forced to cover all applicants and to community rate premiums, low-risk people will drop coverage or not apply for it because premiums will exceed their expected need for insurance. Concern for people who currently have access to individual coverage calls for careful examination of options to permit incentive programs to succeed with the individual insurance markets. In particular, attention should focus on using alternatives to simple income-based subsidies to spread the burden of high-risk people's costs broadly, rather than impose the costs on low-risk people who purchase individual coverage. This paper describes three such alternatives. One uses risk adjustments and two rely on reinsurance so that carriers are compensated for the higher costs of covering high-risk people who use incentives to buy insurance. One alternative also permits risk selection by insurance carriers.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina Corlette Corlette ◽  
Kevin W. Lucia Lucia ◽  
Justin Giovannelli Giovannelli

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