On a Cournot Dynamic Game with Cost Uncertainty and Relative Profit Maximization

Author(s):  
Georges Sarafopoulos ◽  
Kosmas Papadopoulos
Author(s):  
Yuqi Dou ◽  
Xingyu Liu

In this paper, the complex dynamic behavior of a mixed duopoly game model is studied. Based on the principle of relative profit maximization and bounded rational expectation, the corresponding discrete dynamic systems are constructed in the case of nonlinear cost function. In theory, the conditions for the local stability of Nash equilibrium are given. In terms of numerical experiments, bifurcation diagrams are used to depict the effects of product differences, adjustment speed, and other parameters on the stability of Nash equilibrium.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yi-min Huang ◽  
Qiu-xiang Li ◽  
Yan-yan Guo ◽  
Yu-hao Zhang

This paper considers a Cournot–Bertrand game model based on the relative profit maximization with bounded rational players. The existence and stability of the Nash equilibrium of the dynamic model are investigated. The influence of product differentiation degree and the adjustment speed on the stability of the dynamic system is discussed. Furthermore, some complex properties and global stability of the dynamic system are explored. The results find that the higher degree of product differentiation enlarges the stable range of the dynamic system, while the higher unit product cost decreases the stable range of price adjustment and increases the one of output adjustment; period cycles and aperiodic oscillation (quasi-period and chaos) occur via period-doubling or Neimark–Sacker bifurcation, and the attraction domain shrinks with the increase of adjustment speed values. By selecting appropriate control parameters, the chaotic system can return to the stable state. The research of this paper is of great significance to the decision-makers’ price decision and quantity decision.


2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (02) ◽  
pp. 203-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
YUANZHU LU

This paper investigates whether the relative-profit-maximization objective of private firms affects endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly in the linear demand case. Assuming firms have constant marginal costs and symmetric private firms are more efficient than the public firm, it is found that such an objective does not affect endogenous timing compared with the absolute-profit-maximization case. When the equilibrium involves the public firm acting as a leader, social welfare increases compared with the level in the absolute-profit-maximization case. When the equilibrium involves the public firm acting as a follower, social welfare remains unchanged.


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