Consequence Relations with Real Truth Values

Author(s):  
Daniele Mundici
2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serge P Odintsov ◽  
Heinrich Wansing
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri ◽  
John Hawthorne

In Chapter 2 we argue that internalists are committed to a kind of relativism, and that theirs is a particularly radical form of relativism. Thought experiments involving certain symmetries across space and/or time play a starring role. If the kinds of symmetries featured in them are possible, we argue, the truth values of narrow content must be relative to some very unusual parameters.


Author(s):  
Agustín Rayo

This article is divided into four sections. The first two identify different logicist theses, and show that their truth-values can be established given minimal assumptions. The third section sets forth a notion of “content-recarving” as a possible constraint on logicist theses. The fourth section—which is largely independent from the rest of the article—is a discussion of “neologicism.”


2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722110241
Author(s):  
Tal Moran ◽  
Jamie Cummins ◽  
Jan De Houwer

Research on automatic stereotyping is dominated by the idea that automatic stereotyping reflects the activation of (group–trait) associations. In two preregistered experiments (total N = 391), we tested predictions derived from an alternative perspective that suggests that automatic stereotyping is the result of the activation of propositional representations that, unlike associations, can encode relational information and have truth values. Experiment 1 found that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the validity of information about pairs of traits and groups. Experiment 2 showed that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the specific relations (e.g., whether a particular group is more or less friendly than a reference person) between pairs of traits and groups. Interestingly, both experiments found a weaker influence of validity/relational information on automatic stereotyping than on non-automatic stereotyping. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on automatic stereotyping.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Poppy Mankowitz

AbstractSome in the recent literature have claimed that a connection exists between the Liar paradox and semantic relativism: the view that the truth values of certain occurrences of sentences depend on the contexts at which they are assessed. Sagi (Erkenntnis 82(4):913–928, 2017) argues that contextualist accounts of the Liar paradox are committed to relativism, and Rudnicki and Łukowski (Synthese 1–20, 2019) propose a new account that they classify as relativist. I argue that a full understanding of how relativism is conceived within theories of natural language shows that neither of the purported connections can be maintained. There is no reason why a solution to the Liar paradox needs to accept relativism.


Studia Logica ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 107 (4) ◽  
pp. 613-637
Author(s):  
Minghui Ma ◽  
Jinsheng Chen

2002 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 207-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest Adams
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 780-810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaos Galatos ◽  
Constantine Tsinakis

AbstractEquivalences and translations between consequence relations abound in logic. The notion of equivalence can be denned syntactically, in terms of translations of formulas, and order-theoretically, in terms of the associated lattices of theories. W. Blok and D. Pigozzi proved in [4] that the two definitions coincide in the case of an algebraizable sentential deductive system. A refined treatment of this equivalence was provided by W. Blok and B. Jónsson in [3]. Other authors have extended this result to the cases of κ-deductive systems and of consequence relations on associative, commutative, multiple conclusion sequents. Our main result subsumes all existing results in the literature and reveals their common character. The proofs are of order-theoretic and categorical nature.


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