A Silent Revolution. Property and Free Enterprise Before the Spanish Constitutional Court

2021 ◽  
pp. 289-298
Author(s):  
José María Rodríguez de Santiago ◽  
Luis Arroyo Jiménez
1990 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-128
Author(s):  
Joaquin Martin Canivell

Abstract The promulgation of the new Italian Law for the protection of competition and the market urges a comparison with the corresponding Spanish legislation, taking also account of its evolution.In 1963 a first competition law was introduced in Spain as a consequence of a request by the United States, whose intention was to increase its business activities in Spain. Another justification of the interest of Spain for introducing this law was the idea that it could be a step forward the European Common Market.This law was not very effective and, furthermore, its life has not been very easy, though it included the main legal definitions of the EEC Treaty, in particular provisions for cartels and for abuse of a dominant position. In addition, the Spanish law introduced a definition for «dominant position».In order to implement the law, two organisms have been created: the «Service for the Defence of Competition” and the Tribunal having the same name.Both the law and the administrative system organized on its basis became almost useless, because for the first two decades very few decisions had been taken and the only proposal by the Tribunal to the Government for inflicting a sanction was not approved. By consequence, the Tribunal made no other attempts to propose measures to the Government.The revival came after the introduction in Spain of the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1978 and which established, in art. 38, a free-enterprise system in the framework of a market economy to be protected by the public authorities.A judgement by July 1st, 1986, of the Constitutional Court, confirmed that competition is a component of the market economy which protects rather than restrict the freedom of enterprise.By the end of 1985 the Service for the Defence of Competition started a new life. The same happened with the activities of the Tribunal. The number of examinations increased and after 1988 the Tribunal tried again to inflict sanctions, and it was successful.A new law for the protection of the competition was approved by the Parliament on July 17th, 1989 and is in force in Spain since that time. It is founded on the EEC Treaty and it also benefits from the experience with the previous law.Cartels and abuse of dominant position are the main objects of the law which introduced, in addition, the case of «unfair competition».The Tribunal can injunct to the undertakings to suspend their action and to eliminate its consequences. Another innovation of the law was the attribution to the Tribunal of the power to inflict fees up to 150 million pesetas (about 1,7 billion Italian lire), to be increased until the 10 per cent of the turnover.As it was with the first law, two organs are committed to the safeguard of competition: the Service for the Defence of Competition and the Tribunal. The Service has the assignment to start preliminary investigations, to supervise the enforcement of the judgements of the Tribunal, to keep the register with the annotations of authorizations, prohibitions and concentrations and to make studies on the economic system.The Tribunal is an organ of the Ministry for Economy and Finances, but is functionally independent. Its eight members (economists and lawyers) and the president are appointed by the Government for six years and can be confirmed. The president is Secretary of State and the members have the rank of general directors. Decisions are taken by the Tribunal with a majority of six votes (including that of the president or of the vicepresident).Apart from its judiciary powers, the Tribunal can express opinions and give advices upon request by the Parliament, by the Government or by Ministers, as well as by local governments, by unions and by organizations of producers and consumers.The Tribunal has also the power to authorize agreements and other actions prohibited by the competition legislation, on the basis of these reasons: 1) productive improvements or better wholesalers’ organization, technical or technological progress; 2) partecipation by the consumers to the resulting benefits.No limitations to competition can be introduced in order to obtain such results. Competition cannot be eliminated from the market or from a relevant part of it.Such authorizations are not retroactive and can be renewed or revoked.On the subject of economic concentrations, the Tribunal can take action only on request by the Minister for Economy and Finances. The notification by undertakings is voluntary. The advice provided by the Tribunal to the Minister is not binding, since the power to decide on concentrations is entirely under the responsibility of the government.The rules of procedure adopted by the Tribunal and the Service are flexible and effective in order to guarantee the rights of the citizens. The judgements of the Tribunal can be taken to the Civil Courts. Also damage compensation is decided by the Civil Courts.At the moment, there are not yet cases on the basis of the new law and those pending follow the rules of the old law.Some authorizations, instead, have been decided already by the Tribunal whose advice has been requested twice on cases of concentration.New regulations for authorizations by category will be issued in the next future. Other rules for cases of individual authorization will also be provided.The number of cases submitted to the Tribunal increases and the number (as well as the amount) of fees goes up as the public opinion realizes how beneficial can be competition for the general welfare.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 197-221
Author(s):  
Luis Renato Vedovato

The present article, taking into account advances in international rights and the need for domestic implementation of Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) standards, has the objective of analyzing the competence to bring domestic and international regulations to fruition, with the purpose of creating coordinated public policies for tobacco control. So, it is possible to argue that the FCTC, by means of its guidelines, laid down at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and which are binding to all members states of the convention, paves the way for international regulation. Domestically, such regulation has to observe DOP guidelines, there being leeway for organizations like Brazil’s ANVISA to bring those guidelines into action, such as the one related to FTCT articles 9 and 10, which limit the use of flavour additives in tobacco products, as a way of implementing international standards within the country. There is also no conflict between free enterprise and tobacco control given that, as stated by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in a process involving the constitutionality of restrictions to tobacco advertising, this is a market that should not be stimulated, but rather merely tolerated. 


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 197-221
Author(s):  
Luis Renato Vedovato

The present article, taking into account advances in international rights and the need for domestic implementation of Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) standards, has the objective of analyzing the competence to bring domestic and international regulations to fruition, with the purpose of creating coordinated public policies for tobacco control. So, it is possible to argue that the FCTC, by means of its guidelines, laid down at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and which are binding to all members states of the convention, paves the way for international regulation. Domestically, such regulation has to observe DOP guidelines, there being leeway for organizations like Brazil’s ANVISA to bring those guidelines into action, such as the one related to FTCT articles 9 and 10, which limit the use of flavour additives in tobacco products, as a way of implementing international standards within the country. There is also no conflict between free enterprise and tobacco control given that, as stated by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in a process involving the constitutionality of restrictions to tobacco advertising, this is a market that should not be stimulated, but rather merely tolerated. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 197-221
Author(s):  
Luis Renato Vedovato

The present article, taking into account advances in international rights and the need for domestic implementation of Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) standards, has the objective of analyzing the competence to bring domestic and international regulations to fruition, with the purpose of creating coordinated public policies for tobacco control. So, it is possible to argue that the FCTC, by means of its guidelines, laid down at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and which are binding to all members states of the convention, paves the way for international regulation. Domestically, such regulation has to observe DOP guidelines, there being leeway for organizations like Brazil’s ANVISA to bring those guidelines into action, such as the one related to FTCT articles 9 and 10, which limit the use of flavour additives in tobacco products, as a way of implementing international standards within the country. There is also no conflict between free enterprise and tobacco control given that, as stated by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in a process involving the constitutionality of restrictions to tobacco advertising, this is a market that should not be stimulated, but rather merely tolerated. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 197-221
Author(s):  
Luis Renato Vedovato

The present article, taking into account advances in international rights and the need for domestic implementation of Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) standards, has the objective of analyzing the competence to bring domestic and international regulations to fruition, with the purpose of creating coordinated public policies for tobacco control. So, it is possible to argue that the FCTC, by means of its guidelines, laid down at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and which are binding to all members states of the convention, paves the way for international regulation. Domestically, such regulation has to observe DOP guidelines, there being leeway for organizations like Brazil’s ANVISA to bring those guidelines into action, such as the one related to FTCT articles 9 and 10, which limit the use of flavour additives in tobacco products, as a way of implementing international standards within the country. There is also no conflict between free enterprise and tobacco control given that, as stated by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in a process involving the constitutionality of restrictions to tobacco advertising, this is a market that should not be stimulated, but rather merely tolerated. 


Author(s):  
Oleksandr Byrkovych

Purpose. The purpose of the article is to identify the fundamental values of the Ukrainian people, on the basis of which not only his mentality, but also all national-state institutions, including institutions of justice and justice, as well as to identify trends of influence of these values on the further development of legal foundations of the judiciary and justice of Ukraine. Method. The methodological basis of the study was the combination of principles and methods of scientific knowledge. For the objectivity of the research, a set of general scientific, special-legal, special-historical and philosophical methods of scientific knowledge was used. Results. At the current stage of reforming the institutions of the judiciary and the judiciary, the notion of fair justice, which is formed on the basis of popular national culture, plays an important role. Given the functioning of the modern Constitutional Court of Ukraine, whose representatives are formed by delegation to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the judiciary, this institution needs radical reform as it has repeatedly made political rather than constitutional decisions. Scientific novelty. Based on the analysis of the national tradition of justice, it is established that the Constitutional Court should be formed by public organizations, which are formed by legal experts. There are several higher scientific institutions in Ukraine which have departments, constitutional law research institutes. Their representatives should delegate the best experts in the constitutional right to competitive selection to fill vacancies in the constitutional court. Practical importance. The results of the study can be used in further historical and legal studies, preparation of special courses.


1950 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 30-30
Author(s):  
Joseph W. Ballantine
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


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