State Collusion or Erosion During a Sovereign Debt Crisis: Market Dynamics Spawn Informal Practices in Lebanon

2022 ◽  
pp. 277-300
Author(s):  
Joseph P. Helou
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Market Dynamics ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Informal Practices

European Economies Stability Faced With Potential Outburst of Sovereign Debt Crisis. An Empirical Study Using Neural Network

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 3255-3260
Author(s):  
Stelian Stancu ◽  
Alexandra Maria Constantin
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
European Level ◽  
Continuous Growth ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
European Economies ◽  
The Impact

Instilment, on a European level, of a state incompatible with the state of stability on a macroeconomic level and in the financial-banking system lead to continuous growth of vulnerability of European economies, situated at the verge of an outburst of sovereign debt crises. In this context, the current papers main objective is to produce a study regarding the vulnerability of European economies faced with potential outburst of sovereign debt crisis, which implies quantitative analysis of the impact of sovereign debt on the sensitivity of the European Unions economies. The paper also entails the following specific objectives: completing an introduction in the current European economic context, conceptualization of the notion of “sovereign debt crisis, presenting the methodology and obtained empirical results, as well as exposition of the conclusions.

European Versus Anglo-Saxon Credit View: Evidence from the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Altddrfer ◽  
Carlos A. De las Salas ◽  
Andre Guettler ◽  
Gunter LLffler
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Credit View

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nauro F. Campos ◽  
Paul De Grauwe ◽  
Yuemei Ji
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Business Cycle ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Structural Reform ◽  
Structural Reforms ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
The Business Cycle ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

Structural reform policies move like the business cycle. There are moments when these are implemented with great fervour and others when they are put on the back burner or even dismantled. After the global financial crisis, and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, many countries were forced by creditor countries or were self-imposed to apply deep reforms to their product markets and especially to their labour markets. Now that Europe is recovering, the pressure to implement structural reforms has abated....

scholarly journals The Impact of the Introduction of Uniform European Collective Action Clauses on European Government Bonds as a Regulatory Result of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nicoletta Layher ◽  
Eyden Samunderu
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Bond Yields ◽  
Member States ◽  
Sovereign Bond ◽  
European Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Collective Action Clauses

This paper conducts an empirical study on the inclusion of uniform European Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts issued from member states of the European Union, introduced as a regulatory result of the European sovereign debt crisis. The study focuses on the reaction of sovereign bond yields from European Union member states with the inclusion of the new regulation in the European Union. A two-stage least squares regression analysis is adopted in order to determine the extent of impact effects of CACs on member states sovereign bond yields. Evidence is found that CACs in the European Union are priced on financial markets and that sovereign bond yields do respond to the inclusion of uniform CACs in the European Union.

Eurobonds: Three Lessons from China’s “Debt Centralization/Decentralization” Experience

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyong An
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Institutional Mechanism ◽  
Previous Series

Abstract Eurobonds, dubbed as Coronabonds in the context of the current coronavirus crisis, are being hotly debated among the euro area member states amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The debate is in many ways a retread of the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012. As China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience is comparable with the introduction of Eurobonds in the European Union (EU) in terms of institutional mechanism design, we review our previous series of studies of China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience to shed some light on the Eurobonds debate. We obtain three key lessons. First, the introduction of Eurobonds in EU is likely to soften the budget constraint of the governments of the euro area member states. Second, it is also likely to strengthen the moral hazard incentives of the governments of the euro area member states to intentionally overstate their budget problems. Finally, the magnitudes of the moral hazard effects generated by the introduction of Eurobonds in EU are likely larger than their respective counterparts in China.

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