What Is Individualism in Social Ontology? Ontological Individualism vs. Anchor Individualism

The neo-Marxist literature on uneven and combined development has made significant progress towards a comprehensive theory of the international. Its point of departure is societal multiplicity as a fundamental condition of the international. This article identifies an important lacuna in the ontology of multiplicity: there is no discussion of what constitutes a ‘society’, or the basic entity capable of entering a relationship with other entities. Existing solutions, including those relying on relational sociology, gravitate towards ontological individualism. Building on poststructuralist neo-Gramscian theories, I propose to ground the conceptualisation of ‘society’ in the notion of hegemony. This implies a discursive ontology, which attributes the inside/outside dynamic to hegemonic formations rather than states or societies. Coupled with the understanding of hegemony as a scalar phenomenon, this ontology can account for the primacy of the state in modern times, while also enabling a research focus on other types of collectivities.

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Sartres Lösung zur Antinomie der sozialen Realität in der Kritik der dialektischen Vernunft

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie ◽

10.1515/dzph-2020-0057 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 68 (6) ◽

pp. 817-847

Author(s):

Sebastian Gardner

Keyword(s):

Ethical Theory ◽

A Priori ◽

Social Ontology ◽

Human Freedom ◽

Philosophical Foundation ◽

A Posteriori ◽

Political Reality ◽

Dialectical Reason ◽

The Individual

AbstractCritics have standardly regarded Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason as an abortive attempt to overcome the subjectivist individualism of his early philosophy, motivated by a recognition that Being and Nothingness lacks ethical and political significance, but derailed by Sartre’s Marxism. In this paper I offer an interpretation of the Critique which, if correct, shows it to offer a coherent and highly original account of social and political reality, which merits attention both in its own right and as a reconstruction of the philosophical foundation of Marxism. The key to Sartre’s theory of collective and historical existence in the Critique is a thesis carried over from Being and Nothingness: intersubjectivity on Sartre’s account is inherently aporetic, and social ontology reproduces in magnified form its limited intelligibility, lack of transparency, and necessary frustration of the demands of freedom. Sartre’s further conjecture – which can be formulated a priori but requires a posteriori verification – is that man’s collective historical existence may be understood as the means by which the antinomy within human freedom, insoluble at the level of the individual, is finally overcome. The Critique provides therefore the ethical theory promised in Being and Nothingness.

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Social Ontology and Model-Building: A Response to Epstein

Philosophy of the Social Sciences ◽

10.1177/0048393121991728 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 51 (2) ◽

pp. 176-192

Author(s):

Nadia Ruiz

Keyword(s):

Social Sciences ◽

Social Science ◽

Model Building ◽

Social Ontology ◽

Model Construction ◽

Ontological Commitments ◽

Starting Point ◽

The Social

Brian Epstein has recently argued that a thoroughly microfoundationalist approach towards economics is unconvincing for metaphysical reasons. Generally, Epstein argues that for an improvement in the methodology of social science we must adopt social ontology as the foundation of social sciences; that is, the standing microfoundationalist debate could be solved by fixing economics’ ontology. However, as I show in this paper, fixing the social ontology prior to the process of model construction is optional instead of necessary and that metaphysical-ontological commitments are often the outcome of model construction, not its starting point. By focusing on the practice of modeling in economics the paper provides a useful inroad into the debate about the role of metaphysics in the natural and social sciences more generally.

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Constructivist Moral Realism

The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy ◽

10.5840/wcp20-paideia199842788 ◽

1998 ◽

pp. 147-153

Author(s):

J. K. Swindler

Keyword(s):

Social Relations ◽

Moral Realism ◽

Social Ontology ◽

Social Reality ◽

Well Being ◽

Social World ◽

Moral Law ◽

Social Morality ◽

The Social ◽

Social Realm

We are social animals in the sense that we spontaneously invent and continuously re-invent the social realm. But, not unlike other artifacts, once real, social relations, practices, institutions, etc., obey prior laws, some of which are moral laws. Hence, with regard to social reality, we ought to be ontological constructivists and moral realists. This is the view sketched here, taking as points of departure Searle's recent work on social ontology and May's on group morality. Moral and social selves are distinguished to acknowledge that social reality is constructed but social morality is not. It is shown how and why moral law requiring respect for the dignity and well being of agents governs a social world comprising roles that are real only because of their occupants' social intentions.

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