Novel Didactic Proof Assistant for First-Order Logic Natural Deduction

2014 ◽  
pp. 441-451
Author(s):  
Jorge Pais ◽  
Álvaro Tasistro
Keyword(s):  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Proof Assistant ◽  
First Order

scholarly journals Reduction in first-order logic compared with reduction in implicational logic

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tigran M. Galoyan
Keyword(s):  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Strong Normalization ◽  
First Order ◽  
Reduction Sequence

In this paper we discuss strong normalization for natural deduction in the →∀-fragment of first-order logic. The method of collapsing types is used to transfer the result (concerning strong normalization) from implicational logic to first-order logic. The result is improved by a complement, which states that the length of any reduction sequence of derivation term r in first-order logic is equal to the length of the corresponding reduction sequence of its collapse term rc in implicational logic.

scholarly journals SUBFORMULA AND SEPARATION PROPERTIES IN NATURAL DEDUCTION VIA SMALL KRIPKE MODELS

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER MILNE
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
Careful Attention ◽  
Classical Propositional Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Invalid Inference ◽  
Subformula Property

Various natural deduction formulations of classical, minimal, intuitionist, and intermediate propositional and first-order logics are presented and investigated with respect to satisfaction of the separation and subformula properties. The technique employed is, for the most part, semantic, based on general versions of the Lindenbaum and Lindenbaum–Henkin constructions. Careful attention is paid (i) to which properties of theories result in the presence of which rules of inference, and (ii) to restrictions on the sets of formulas to which the rules may be employed, restrictions determined by the formulas occurring as premises and conclusion of the invalid inference for which a counterexample is to be constructed. We obtain an elegant formulation of classical propositional logic with the subformula property and a singularly inelegant formulation of classical first-order logic with the subformula property, the latter, unfortunately, not a product of the strategy otherwise used throughout the article. Along the way, we arrive at an optimal strengthening of the subformula results for classical first-order logic obtained as consequences of normalization theorems by Dag Prawitz and Gunnar Stålmarck.

Equivalences between logics and their representing type theories

1995 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippa Gardner
Keyword(s):  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Logical Framework ◽  
Simple Formulation ◽  
First Order ◽  
Relevant Logics ◽  
First Time ◽  
New Framework

We propose a new framework for representing logics, called LF+, which is based on the Edinburgh Logical Framework. The new framework allows us to give, apparently for the first time, general definitions that capture how well a logic has been represented. These definitions are possible because we are able to distinguish in a generic way that part of the LF+ entailment corresponding to the underlying logic. This distinction does not seem to be possible with other frameworks. Using our definitions, we show that, for example, natural deduction first-order logic can be well-represented in LF+, whereas linear and relevant logics cannot. We also show that our syntactic definitions of representation have a simple formulation as indexed isomorphisms, which both confirms that our approach is a natural one and provides a link between type-theoretic and categorical approaches to frameworks.

THE SUBFORMULA PROPERTY IN CLASSICAL NATURAL DEDUCTION ESTABLISHED CONSTRUCTIVELY

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 710-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
TOR SANDQVIST
Keyword(s):  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Constructive Proof ◽  
First Order ◽  
Subformula Property

AbstractA constructive proof is provided for the claim that classical first-order logic admits of a natural deduction formulation featuring the subformula property.

Natural deduction based set theories: a new resolution of the old paradoxes

1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 393-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Gilmore
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
First Order ◽  
Axiom Scheme ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
Comprehension Axiom

AbstractThe comprehension principle of set theory asserts that a set can be formed from the objects satisfying any given property. The principle leads to immediate contradictions if it is formalized as an axiom scheme within classical first order logic. A resolution of the set paradoxes results if the principle is formalized instead as two rules of deduction in a natural deduction presentation of logic. This presentation of the comprehension principle for sets as semantic rules, instead of as a comprehension axiom scheme, can be viewed as an extension of classical logic, in contrast to the assertion of extra-logical axioms expressing truths about a pre-existing or constructed universe of sets. The paradoxes are disarmed in the extended classical semantics because truth values are only assigned to those sentences that can be grounded in atomic sentences.

Establishing Connections between Aristotle's Natural Deduction and First-Order Logic

2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 309-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edgar José Andrade ◽  
Edward Samuel Becerra
Keyword(s):  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order

First-Order Logic Reasoning Support for the Semantic Web

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 3091-3099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Hong XU ◽  
Jian ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Web ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Logic Reasoning

Boolean-valued structures

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Mathematical Concepts ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
First Order ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
Boolean Valued Model ◽  
Semantic Values

Chapters 6-12 are driven by questions about the ability to pin down mathematical entities and to articulate mathematical concepts. This chapter is driven by similar questions about the ability to pin down the semantic frameworks of language. It transpires that there are not just non-standard models, but non-standard ways of doing model theory itself. In more detail: whilst we normally outline a two-valued semantics which makes sentences True or False in a model, the inference rules for first-order logic are compatible with a four-valued semantics; or a semantics with countably many values; or what-have-you. The appropriate level of generality here is that of a Boolean-valued model, which we introduce. And the plurality of possible semantic values gives rise to perhaps the ‘deepest’ level of indeterminacy questions: How can humans pin down the semantic framework for their languages? We consider three different ways for inferentialists to respond to this question.

scholarly journals GAMES AND CARDINALITIES IN INQUISITIVE FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
IVANO CIARDELLI ◽  
GIANLUCA GRILLETTI
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order
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