scholarly journals Correlation Between Human Aesthetic Judgement and Spatial Complexity Measure

Author(s):  
Mohammad Ali Javaheri Javid ◽  
Tim Blackwell ◽  
Robert Zimmer ◽  
Mohammad Majid al-Rifaie
Author(s):  
Mohammad Ali Javaheri Javid ◽  
Tim Blackwell ◽  
Robert Zimmer ◽  
Mohammad Majid Al-Rifaie

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Stoel-Gammon
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Brigitte Hilmer

Kunst kann dann als reflexiv interpretiert werden, wenn Reflexivität nicht auf propositionalen Gehalt oder sogar sprachliche Artikulation angewiesen ist. Reflexion tritt auf in den Modi der Selbstbeziehung des Lebendigen, des Überlegens und der Selbstreferenz im Symbolischen. Kunst ist ein Reflexionsmedium, das diese Modi beansprucht und miteinander verflicht. Eine spezifisch ästhetische Reflexivität ist von und nach Kant nach dem Vorbild der transzendentalen Reflexion und in Konkurrenz zu ihr etabliert worden. Sie läßt sich als Reflexivität des ästhetischen Urteils, als emphatisches Gemachtsein, als Rückwendung auf Wahrnehmungsvollzüge oder als Begriffsreflexion verstehen. Dabei wird die Unterscheidung von Anschauung und Verstand in deren Zusammenspiel oder Abspaltung vorausgesetzt. Von der Analogie zur transzendentalen Reflexion löst sich aber erst ein Verständnis von ästhetischer Reflexivität, das von den drei Modi und ihrer Verflechtung ausgeht.<br><br>Reflexivity does not presuppose linguistic articulation or even propositional content. If it did, art could not be called reflexive. Reflexivity can be found in the self-contact of the living, in mental reflection or in symbolic self-reference. Art is a medium which claims these different modes of reflexivity and intertwines them. Aesthetic reflexivity as such has been established by Kant and his epigones, following the model of transcendetal reflection. Thus it could be specified as the reflexive structure of aesthetic judgement, or as an emphasis on a work’s being created, or as a reference to perception itself in the process of perceiving, or as a way of reflecting concepts. Aesthetic reflexivity can only be detached from the model of transcendental reflection, if it is seen as oriented towards the interaction among the three modes of reflection mentioned above, leaving aside the difference, interplay or competition between perception and conceptual capacities.


Evaluation is ubiquitous. Indeed, it isn't an exaggeration to say that we assess actions, character, events, and objects as good, cruel, beautiful, etc., almost every day of our lives. Although evaluative judgement—for instance, judging that an institution is unjust—is usually regarded as the paradigm of evaluation, it has been thought by some philosophers that a distinctive and significant kind of evaluation is perceptual. For example, in aesthetics, some have claimed that adequate aesthetic judgement must be grounded in the appreciator's first-hand perceptual experience of the item judged. In ethics, reference to the existence and importance of something like ethical perception is found in a number of traditions, for example, in Virtue Ethics and Sentimentalism. This volume brings together philosophers in aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and value theory, to contribute in novel ways to debates about what we call Evaluative Perception. Specifically, they engage with (1) Questions regarding the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are perceptual experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of perceptual experience? (2) Questions about Epistemology: Can evaluative perceptual experiences ever justify evaluative judgements? Are perceptual experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgements? (3) Questions about Value Theory: Is the existence of evaluative perceptual experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of evaluative perceptual experience?


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (11) ◽  
pp. 847-850 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix S. L. Ng

Author(s):  
Qingsong Zhao ◽  
Weitao Hu ◽  
Boyuan Xia ◽  
Junyi Ding ◽  
Mengjun Li

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Suryajith Chillara

In this article, we are interested in understanding the complexity of computing multilinear polynomials using depth four circuits in which the polynomial computed at every node has a bound on the individual degree of r ≥ 1 with respect to all its variables (referred to as multi- r -ic circuits). The goal of this study is to make progress towards proving superpolynomial lower bounds for general depth four circuits computing multilinear polynomials, by proving better bounds as the value of r increases. Recently, Kayal, Saha and Tavenas (Theory of Computing, 2018) showed that any depth four arithmetic circuit of bounded individual degree r computing an explicit multilinear polynomial on n O (1) variables and degree d must have size at least ( n / r 1.1 ) Ω(√ d / r ) . This bound, however, deteriorates as the value of r increases. It is a natural question to ask if we can prove a bound that does not deteriorate as the value of r increases, or a bound that holds for a larger regime of r . In this article, we prove a lower bound that does not deteriorate with increasing values of r , albeit for a specific instance of d = d ( n ) but for a wider range of r . Formally, for all large enough integers n and a small constant η, we show that there exists an explicit polynomial on n O (1) variables and degree Θ (log 2 n ) such that any depth four circuit of bounded individual degree r ≤ n η must have size at least exp(Ω(log 2 n )). This improvement is obtained by suitably adapting the complexity measure of Kayal et al. (Theory of Computing, 2018). This adaptation of the measure is inspired by the complexity measure used by Kayal et al. (SIAM J. Computing, 2017).


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