UN Peacekeepers, the Military and Sexual Exploitation

UN Peacekeeping in Africa: A Critical Examination and Recommendations for Improvement by Kwame Akonor

NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability ◽

10.37540/njips.v4i2.107 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 119-120

Author(s):

Gul e Hina

Keyword(s):

Fundamental Problem ◽

Sexual Exploitation ◽

Dark Side ◽

Critical Examination ◽

Criminal Prosecution ◽

Peace Operations ◽

African Region ◽

Un Peacekeeping ◽

Two Factors ◽

The Military

The book titled ‘UN Peacekeeping in Africa: A Critical Examination and Recommendations for Improvement’, authored by Kwame Akonor,2 lays out a significant overview of the UN peace operations in the African region. The argument of this book revolves around those circumstances where the peacekeepers themselves become the perpetrators of crime; thereby, this book represents the ‘dark side’ of the U.N. peacekeeping, which remains a fundamental problem in jeopardizing the future of peacekeeping. By reviewing the reports and publications on UN Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA),3 Akonor discusses four factors regarding why abuses occur and why the abusers barely face criminal prosecution. The paramount factor in the book is the prevailing hyper-masculinity in the military culture and the tendency to protect each other against civilian complaints. The other two factors include the economic deprivation and variation in the legal and cultural system among the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC). Finally, the physical and psychological repercussions of conflict on civilians expose them to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA).

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Democrazy—Dem Go Craze, O: Monitoring the 1999 Nigerian Elections

Issue A Journal of Opinion ◽

10.1017/s1548450500005862 ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 27 (1) ◽

pp. 29-33

Author(s):

Darren Kew

Keyword(s):

Transition Program ◽

The Political ◽

High Stakes ◽

Political Class ◽

Soccer Match ◽

The Public ◽

The Military

In many respects, the least important part of the 1999 elections were the elections themselves. From the beginning of General Abdusalam Abubakar’s transition program in mid-1998, most Nigerians who were not part of the wealthy “political class” of elites—which is to say, most Nigerians— adopted their usual politically savvy perspective of siddon look (sit and look). They waited with cautious optimism to see what sort of new arrangement the military would allow the civilian politicians to struggle over, and what in turn the civilians would offer the public. No one had any illusions that anything but high-stakes bargaining within the military and the political class would determine the structures of power in the civilian government. Elections would influence this process to the extent that the crowd influences a soccer match.

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