Linear Spaces, Boolean Algebras, and First Order Logic

Semantics ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 17-47
Author(s):  
András Kornai
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
Boolean Algebras ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Linear Spaces ◽  
First Order

On the elementary equivalence of automorphism groups of Boolean algebras; downward Skolem Löwenheim theorems and compactness of related quantifiers

1980 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matatyahu Rubin ◽  
Saharon Shelah
Keyword(s):  
Boolean Algebra ◽  
Automorphism Groups ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Boolean Algebras ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Elementary Equivalence ◽  
First Order ◽  
Finite Models ◽  
Countably Compact

AbstractTheorem 1. (◊ℵ1,) If B is an infinite Boolean algebra (BA), then there is B1, such that ∣ Aut (B1) ≤∣B1∣ = ℵ1 and 〈B1, Aut (B1)〉 ≡ 〈B, Aut(B)〉.Theorem 2. (◊ℵ1) There is a countably compact logic stronger than first-order logic even on finite models.This partially answers a question of H. Friedman. These theorems appear in §§1 and 2.Theorem 3. (a) (◊ℵ1) If B is an atomic ℵ-saturated infinite BA, Ψ Є Lω1ω and 〈B, Aut (B)〉 ⊨Ψ then there is B1, Such that ∣Aut(B1)∣ ≤ ∣B1∣ =ℵ1, and 〈B1, Aut(B1)〉⊨Ψ. In particular if B is 1-homogeneous so is B1. (b) (a) holds for B = P(ω) even if we assume only CH.

Generalisation of first-order logic to nonatomic domains

1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 815-838 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Roeper
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Boolean Algebras ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Quantification Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
General Kind ◽  
Existential Quantification

The quantifiers of standard predicate logic are interpreted as ranging over domains of individuals, and interpreted formulae beginning with a quantifier make claims to the effect that something is true of every individual, i.e. of the whole domain, or of some individuals, i.e. of part of the domain. To state that something is true of all or part of a totality seems to be the basic significance of universal and existential quantification, and this by itself does not involve a specification of the structure of the totality. This means that the notion of quantification by itself does not demand totalities of individuals, i.e. atomic totalities, as domains of quantification. Nonatomic domains, such as volumes of space, or surfaces, are equally in order. So one might say that a certain predicate applies “everywhere” or “somewhere” in such a domain. All that the concept of quantification requires is a totality which is structured in terms of a part-to-whole relation, and appropriate properties that apply to part or all of the totality. Quantification does not demand that the totality have smallest parts, or atoms. There is no conflict with the sense of universal or existential quantification if the domain is nonatomic, if every one of its parts has itself proper parts.The most general kind of quantification theory must then deal with totalities of any kind, atomic or not. The relationships among the parts of a domain are described by the theory of Boolean algebras, which we can regard as the most general characterisation of a totality, of a domain of quantification.In this paper I shall be concerned with this generalised theory of quantification, which encompasses nonatomic domains as well as atomic and mixed domains, i.e. totalities consisting entirely or partly of individuals.

scholarly journals Stone duality for first-order logic: a nominal approach to logic and topology

10.29007/tp3z ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murdoch J. Gabbay
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
Boolean Algebras ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Specific Class ◽  
Stone Duality ◽  
First Order ◽  
And Topology ◽  
Universal Quantification ◽  
Stone Spaces ◽  
Nominal Sets

What are variables, and what is universal quantification over a variable?Nominal sets are a notion of `sets with names', and using equational axioms in nominal algebra these names can be given substitution and quantification actions.So we can axiomatise first-order logic as a nominal logical theory.We can then seek a nominal sets representation theorem in which predicates are interpreted as sets; logical conjunction is interpreted as sets intersection; negation as complement.Now what about substitution; what is it for substitution to act on a predicate-interpreted-as-a-set, in which case universal quantification becomes an infinite sets intersection?Given answers to these questions, we can seek notions of topology.What is the general notion of topological space of which our sets representation of predicates makes predicates into `open sets'; and what specific class of topological spaces corresponds to the image of nominal algebras for first-order logic?The classic Stone duality answers these questions for Boolean algebras, representing them as Stone spaces.Nominal algebra lets us extend Boolean algebras to `FOL-algebras', and nominal sets let us correspondingly extend Stone spaces to `∀-Stone spaces'.These extensions reveal a wealth of structure, and we obtain an attractive and self-contained account of logic and topology in which variables directly populate the denotation, and open predicates are interpreted as sets rather than functions from valuations to sets.

First-Order Logic Reasoning Support for the Semantic Web

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 3091-3099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Hong XU ◽  
Jian ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Web ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Logic Reasoning

Boolean-valued structures

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Mathematical Concepts ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
First Order ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
Boolean Valued Model ◽  
Semantic Values

Chapters 6-12 are driven by questions about the ability to pin down mathematical entities and to articulate mathematical concepts. This chapter is driven by similar questions about the ability to pin down the semantic frameworks of language. It transpires that there are not just non-standard models, but non-standard ways of doing model theory itself. In more detail: whilst we normally outline a two-valued semantics which makes sentences True or False in a model, the inference rules for first-order logic are compatible with a four-valued semantics; or a semantics with countably many values; or what-have-you. The appropriate level of generality here is that of a Boolean-valued model, which we introduce. And the plurality of possible semantic values gives rise to perhaps the ‘deepest’ level of indeterminacy questions: How can humans pin down the semantic framework for their languages? We consider three different ways for inferentialists to respond to this question.

scholarly journals GAMES AND CARDINALITIES IN INQUISITIVE FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
IVANO CIARDELLI ◽  
GIANLUCA GRILLETTI
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order

scholarly journals Extensions in graph normal form

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Walicki
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Fixed Points ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Special Cases

Abstract Graph normal form, introduced earlier for propositional logic, is shown to be a normal form also for first-order logic. It allows to view syntax of theories as digraphs, while their semantics as kernels of these digraphs. Graphs are particularly well suited for studying circularity, and we provide some general means for verifying that circular or apparently circular extensions are conservative. Traditional syntactic means of ensuring conservativity, like definitional extensions or positive occurrences guaranteeing exsitence of fixed points, emerge as special cases.

Relational Chase Procedures Interpreted as Resolution with Paramodulation1

1991 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Joachim Biskup ◽  
Bernhard Convent
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Problem ◽  
First Order ◽  
Inference Problems ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theoretical Foundations ◽  
Insight Into

In this paper the relationship between dependency theory and first-order logic is explored in order to show how relational chase procedures (i.e., algorithms to decide inference problems for dependencies) can be interpreted as clever implementations of well known refutation procedures of first-order logic with resolution and paramodulation. On the one hand this alternative interpretation provides a deeper insight into the theoretical foundations of chase procedures, whereas on the other hand it makes available an already well established theory with a great amount of known results and techniques to be used for further investigations of the inference problem for dependencies. Our presentation is a detailed and careful elaboration of an idea formerly outlined by Grant and Jacobs which up to now seems to be disregarded by the database community although it definitely deserves more attention.

scholarly journals Formula size games for modal logic and μ-calculus

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1311-1344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauri T Hella ◽  
Miikka S Vilander
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
First Order ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Crucial Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Person Game

Abstract We propose a new version of formula size game for modal logic. The game characterizes the equivalence of pointed Kripke models up to formulas of given numbers of modal operators and binary connectives. Our game is similar to the well-known Adler–Immerman game. However, due to a crucial difference in the definition of positions of the game, its winning condition is simpler, and the second player does not have a trivial optimal strategy. Thus, unlike the Adler–Immerman game, our game is a genuine two-person game. We illustrate the use of the game by proving a non-elementary succinctness gap between bisimulation invariant first-order logic $\textrm{FO}$ and (basic) modal logic $\textrm{ML}$. We also present a version of the game for the modal $\mu $-calculus $\textrm{L}_\mu $ and show that $\textrm{FO}$ is also non-elementarily more succinct than $\textrm{L}_\mu $.

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