Impact of Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance on Capital Structure of Nepalese Listed Companies

2018 ◽  
pp. 399-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raj Kumar Bajagai ◽  
Ravi Kumar Keshari ◽  
Pratikshya Bhetwal ◽  
Radhe Shyam Sah ◽  
Rajnish Nath Jha
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 508-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Merendino ◽  
Rob Melville

PurposeThis study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.Design/methodology/approachThis research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership.FindingsWhile directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.Practical implicationsThis paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.Originality/valueThe results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 1063-1081 ◽  
Author(s):  
Navitha Singh Sewpersadh

PurposeA vital resource for attracting investments and boosting economic growth is compliance with corporate-governance practices. To achieve firm growth, businesses often rely on leverage as a source of finance, which has tax-saving benefits but could attract financial distress costs. In this context, this study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and the use of debt financing in Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)-listed companies.Design/methodology/approachThis study used a six-year period to examine 713 annual reports in an unbalanced panel of 130 JSE-listed companies from 2011 to 2016. The empirical econometric methodology used was the two-step difference generalised method of moments estimation model, which is robust in controlling endogeneity and potential bi-directional causality between leverage and corporate governance.FindingsThis study illustrated that corporate governance practices and firm-specific variables such as profitability, firm size and firm age have a significant influence on the capital structure decisions of JSE-listed firms. This study found support for four out of the six hypotheses. CEO duality and director ownership are positively correlated with leverage, whereas audit committee independence and board size are negatively correlated with leverage. This study also found contraventions of board independence, audit committee independence and CEO duality. The technology sector was the least compliant, with only 40 per cent of their boards being independent. The consumer-services sector had the maximum presence of CEO duality (7 per cent). The industrial sector had the highest average director ownership (18 per cent). The heath-care sector had 28 per cent of their audit committees in contravention of the independence rule.Practical implicationsA useful analysis of the theoretical frameworks used by academic writers are provided. This study revealed the governance practices contravened by the relevant sectors, as well as the associations between corporate governance and leverage.Originality/valueThe study contributes to the literature on capital structure and corporate governance by an emerging economy such as South Africa (SA) which has not been explored. This study’s results have key implications for policy-makers, practitioners, investors and regulatory authorities. This study informs these constituencies about a set of governance attributes that are catalysts and/or inhibitors of leverage.


2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 246-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Godfred A. Bokpin ◽  
Anastacia C. Arko

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-46
Author(s):  
Hassan Ahmad ◽  
Nasreen Akhter ◽  
Tariq Siddiq ◽  
Zahid Iqbal

This study is undertaken with the purpose of investigating the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance on the capital structure of Pakistani listed firms from 2011-2014, feasible general least square is used to investigate the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance on capital structure of KSE 100 index firms. Explanatory variables include ownership concentration, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, institutional ownership, board size, board independence and CEO duality along with the three control variables namely firm size, firm profitability and liquidity. There is insignificant positive relationship between ownership concentration and capital structure, managerial ownership has a significant negative impact on debt ratio. Foreign ownership has also a significant negative impact on firm capital structure and institutional ownership has significant positive impact on capital structure. Board size is positively related to capital structure, board independence also positively related to firm’s debt ratio but CEO duality negatively related to the dependent variable, all these variables have significant impact on capital structure of Pakistani firms. 


Author(s):  
Ibrahim Anyass Ahmed

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between three variables; capital structure, ownership structure and corporate governance. Although these issues have been largely researched, less attention has been focused on small and medium enterprises (SMEs). At the time of this study, evidence was not found for a study analyzing all three variables in relation to SMEs, within the context of a developing country. This current study examines the link between capital structure, ownership structure, and corporate governance. Using an appropriate regression model, the study assesses how governance mechanisms and ownership decisions affect the choice of financing SMEs. The results show a positive relationship for all corporate governance variables except for board size. Ownership structure is found to be positive and significantly related to capital structure. The signs indicated by control variables are those which are in consonance with conventional capital structure literature. Generally, ownership and corporate governance are found to affect the financing mix of SMEs in Ghana.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. e0249963
Author(s):  
Xiaoping Huo ◽  
Hongying Lin ◽  
Yanan Meng ◽  
Peter Woods

Guiding institutional investors to actively participate in corporate governance is a hot issue to improve the internal governance of China’s listed companies. This study seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the mechanism that underlies the governance effects of the heterogeneity of institutional investors on the cost of capital, and the influence of ownership structure on the relationship between them. Using an unbalanced panel data on A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen in China’s capital market during the 2014–2019 period, this study reveals how institutional investors with longer holding period and higher shareholding ratio are negatively associated with the cost of capital in China’s capital market. Furthermore, this study successfully confirms the moderating effect of ownership structure in the relationship between institutional investors and the cost of capital. China’s state-owned enterprises are more likely to introduce improvements at the corporate governance level, and ownership concentration weakens the negative influence of institutional investors on the cost of capital. The research contributes to a deeper understanding of the impacts of institutional investor’s heterogeneity and ownership structure on the cost of capital in China. In the process, the study yields useful implications for the theory and practice of corporate governance.


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