Some Aspects of the Stackelberg Leader/Follower Model

2018 ◽  
pp. 171-181
Author(s):  
L. Mallozzi ◽  
R. Messalli ◽  
S. Patrì ◽  
A. Sacco
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Leader

scholarly journals Overconfidence and Timing of Entry

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 44
Author(s):  
Luis Santos-Pinto ◽  
Tiago Pires
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Welfare Effect ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Rational Player ◽  
Timing Of Entry ◽  
Game Players ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

We analyze the impact of overconfidence on the timing of entry in markets, profits, and welfare using an extension of the quantity commitment game. Players have private information about costs, one player is overconfident, and the other one rational. We find that for slight levels of overconfidence and intermediate cost asymmetries, there is a unique cost-dependent equilibrium where the overconfident player has a higher ex-ante probability of being the Stackelberg leader. Overconfidence lowers the profit of the rational player but can increase that of the overconfident player. Consumer rents increase with overconfidence while producer rents decrease which leads to an ambiguous welfare effect.

scholarly journals Vertical externalities with lump-sum taxes: how much difference does unemployment make?

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Diego Martinez-Lopez ◽  
Tomas Sjongren
Keyword(s):  
Federal Government ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Conventional Approach ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Lump Sum ◽  
Public Inputs ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

This paper analyses how the existence of unemployment affects the conventional approach to vertical externalities. We discuss the optimality rule for the provision of public inputs both in a unitary and in a federal state. Our findings indicate that decentralising spending responsability on public inputs in the presence of unemployment allows output to be closer to the first best level. Moreover, we describe the inability of the federal government, behaving as a Stackelberg leader, to replicate the unitary outcome, unless there are new policy instruments at government's disposal.

Research on Supply Chain Profit Coordination Mechanism Based on JIT Lot-Splitting

2013 ◽  
Vol 694-697 ◽  
pp. 3466-3471
Author(s):  
Qin Lv
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Saving ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Total Cost ◽  
Lot Splitting ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

A supply chain profit coordination mechanism based on JIT lot-splitting, which involves a two stage supply chain consisted of a supplier and a buyer, is discussed. Based on the bargaining power of supplier, the profit coordination with and without incentives are respectively explored. For the total cost minimizations of buyer and supplier separately, two stage stackelberg leader-follower game models, in which buyer is the leader and supplier is the follower, are established. Supplier applies JIT delivery to reduce buyer’s cost and the total cost of the supply chain via dividing buyer’s order per batch into some batches to deliver. Finally, a numerical example and a simulation analysis are given and the impact of the variation of relative parameters on the total cost saving of buyer, supplier and system is discussed. In addition, the efficiency of game decision on the basis of JIT lot-splitting is proved.

An N-person Stackelberg leader-leader model

1991 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferenc Szidarovszky ◽  
Sándor Molnár ◽  
Koji Okuguchi
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Leader

Improving Quality of Business in Next Generation Telecom Networks

2019 ◽  
pp. 1226-1236
Author(s):  
Vesna Radonjić Đogatović
Keyword(s):  
Service Provisioning ◽  
Next Generation ◽  
Technical Aspects ◽  
Telecommunication Services ◽  
Pricing Scheme ◽  
Generation Network ◽  
Responsive Pricing ◽  
Telecom Networks ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

Quality of business (QoBiz) is an important aspect of providing quality of telecommunication services that is being increasingly used in the pursuit of better business. It covers financial aspects of service provisioning, which is firmly related to service provider (SP) revenue and profit. In next generation network (NGN), relation between pure technical aspects (i.e., quality of service [QoS] and QoBiz) tend to be dynamic with pricing as an important tool for adjusting users' demand to network congestion, thus allowing a SP to maximize his revenue. This chapter aims to investigate and provide new possibilities for SPs to enhance their revenues using responsive pricing scheme for charging end users in NGN. Interaction of a SP and user is defined as a Stackelberg leader-follower game with provider acting as the leader and users acting as followers.

Improving Quality of Business in Next Generation Telecom Networks

2018 ◽  
pp. 6546-6555 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vesna Radonjić Đogatović
Keyword(s):  
Service Provisioning ◽  
Next Generation ◽  
Technical Aspects ◽  
Telecommunication Services ◽  
Pricing Scheme ◽  
Generation Network ◽  
Responsive Pricing ◽  
Telecom Networks ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

Quality of business (QoBiz) is an important aspect of providing quality of telecommunication services that is being increasingly used in the pursuit of better business. It covers financial aspects of service provisioning, which is firmly related to service provider (SP) revenue and profit. In next generation network (NGN) relation between pure technical aspects, i.e. quality of service (QoS) and QoBiz tend to be dynamic with pricing as an important tool for adjusting users' demand to network congestion, thus allowing a SP to maximize his revenue. This chapter aims to investigate and provide new possibilities for SPs to enhance their revenues using responsive pricing scheme for charging end users in NGN. Interaction of a SP and user is defined as a Stackelberg leader-follower game with provider acting as the leader and users acting as followers.

Probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg leader and follower

1983 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Alkan ◽  
T. Brown ◽  
M. R. Sertel
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Leader

scholarly journals A Closed-Loop Supply Chain Problem with Retailing and Recycling Competition

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chuanchao Xu ◽  
Bo Li ◽  
Yanfei Lan ◽  
Yi Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Forward Channel ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Retail Products ◽  
Chain Problem ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

We investigate a durable product retailing and recycling problem in a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and two competitive retailers, in which the manufacturer collects used products via retailers from the consumers and has sufficient channel power over the retailers to act as a Stackelberg leader; the retailers compete in retail products and recycling used products. In order to analyze the impact of retailing and recycling competitions on the profits of the manufacturer and the competitive retailers, two collection models (coordinated collection (ModelC) and decentralized collection (ModelD)) are established, respectively. Then, based on game theory, we derive the optimal retail price, the optimal repurchase price, and the optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailers. The managerial insights demonstrate that more intense retailing competition induces the increase of the manufacturer's profits in both forward and reverse channels and retailers' profits in the forward channel and the decrease of retailers' profits in the reverse channel, while more intense recycling competition induces the decrease of the profits of the manufacturer and retailers in both forward and reverse channels. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed models.

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