scholarly journals A Closed-Loop Supply Chain Problem with Retailing and Recycling Competition

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chuanchao Xu ◽  
Bo Li ◽  
Yanfei Lan ◽  
Yi Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Forward Channel ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Retail Products ◽  
Chain Problem ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

We investigate a durable product retailing and recycling problem in a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and two competitive retailers, in which the manufacturer collects used products via retailers from the consumers and has sufficient channel power over the retailers to act as a Stackelberg leader; the retailers compete in retail products and recycling used products. In order to analyze the impact of retailing and recycling competitions on the profits of the manufacturer and the competitive retailers, two collection models (coordinated collection (ModelC) and decentralized collection (ModelD)) are established, respectively. Then, based on game theory, we derive the optimal retail price, the optimal repurchase price, and the optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailers. The managerial insights demonstrate that more intense retailing competition induces the increase of the manufacturer's profits in both forward and reverse channels and retailers' profits in the forward channel and the decrease of retailers' profits in the reverse channel, while more intense recycling competition induces the decrease of the profits of the manufacturer and retailers in both forward and reverse channels. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed models.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competing Retailers under Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism and Asymmetric Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao-qing Zhang ◽  
Xi-gang Yuan ◽  
Da-lin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Recovery Rate ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Weee Recycling ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Decentralized Model

In manufacturer-led closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with two competing retailers, the retailer-1 recycles WEEE whose fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information. Using dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three dynamic game models are built including (1) benchmark model without reward-penalty mechanism (RPM); (2) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM; (3) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM and recovery rate RPM. This paper discusses the influence of RPM and retailers competition on the CLSC and members benefits. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases retail price, but decreases the WEEE recycling motivation usually. On the contrary, the recovery rate RPM guides WEEE recycling and lowers the retail price effectively. (2) In any case, the retailer-1’s profit is higher than that of the retailer-2; apparently it suggests that the retailer recycling WEEE gains competitive advantages. Furthermore, both the recovery rate RPM and retailers competition are beneficial to improve the competitive advantage. The relationship between two retailers’ retail price is affected by many complicated factors. (3) The WEEE buyback price and WEEE recovery rate with high fixed recycling cost (H-type) are always higher than that of low fixed recycling cost (L-type), respectively, which means that the H-type fixed recycling cost has scale advantages; the greater the reward-penalty intensity and the fiercer the competition, the more obvious the scale advantages under certain condition. (4) The retailers’ competition can not only guide WEEE recycling but also improve retailers’ profits. Meanwhile, the impact of competition on the manufacturer is related to RPM, but the fierce competition decreases the manufacturer’s profit.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Analysis of the Value of Information and Coordination in a Dyadic Closed Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8398
Author(s):  
Juan Pedro Sepúlveda-Rojas ◽  
Rodrigo Ternero
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Local Optimization ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Optimization Approach ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Impact

Purpose: This article analyzes the value of information and coordination in a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) and discusses the benefits of a global or local optimization approach and the impact of uncertainty. Methodology: A theoretical dyadic closed loop supply chain is analyzed where the manufacturer re-manufactures products returned by customers, producing “as good as new products” for the retailer. Twelve coordination scenarios were analyzed. For the definition of these scenarios, a framework based on two criteria was proposed: value of information and perimeter of decision making. Findings: Information on returns leads to lower costs than information on demand. In the presence of complete or partial coordination between the actors in the supply chain, it is preferable to have low product return rates. However, if we are in the complete absence of coordination, high rates of return are more convenient as they function as a buffer against uncertainties. The perimeter of decision making (global or local optimization) does not significantly improve the supply chain performance in relation to its costs. Only the exchange of information improves its performance. Therefore, companies should make efforts to exchange information, first, on their lot sizes, then on their returns and finally, on the customer demand. Originality: The novelty of our work relies on an analysis of the closed loop supply chain performance with the simultaneous presence of information, coordination, and uncertainty.

scholarly journals A Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Trade-In Strategy under Retail Competition

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanting Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Retail Competition ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Intense Competition ◽  
Direct Benefits ◽  
Strategy Model ◽  
Product Sales ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and two competing retailers who collect used products through trade-in strategy. Three remanufacturing models with trade-in strategy have been developed: (1) the manufacturer implements trade-in strategy (Model M), (2) single retailer collects used products through trade-in strategy (Model SR), and (3) two retailers undertake trade-in activities (Model TR). We analyze the impact of trade-in strategy on equilibrium decisions and chain members’ profits when retailing is competitive. We show that, as for the manufacturer, he prefers the case where trade-in is implemented by himself due to the direct benefits from remanufacturing, and the case of single retailer implementing trade-in strategy is the most unfavorable for the environment. We also show that, if the net value of a used product is sufficiently large, the retailer only selling products benefits from the case of the manufacturer implementing trade-in strategy because the manufacturer can coordinate both the forward and reverse flows, and Model M dominates Model TR for the retailer who undertakes both product sales and trade-in strategy. Moreover, a larger trade-in rebate can be achieved when two retailers simultaneously conduct trade-in strategy due to the intense competition between two retailers.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

scholarly journals A multi-objective optimization of closed-loop supply chain problem with vehicle routing

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-130
Author(s):  
Shahul Hamid Khan ◽  
Vivek Kumar Chouhan ◽  
Santhosh Srinivasan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Consumer Products ◽  
Product Recovery ◽  
Business Strategies ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Programming Approach ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Competitive Edge ◽  
Chain Problem

Product recovery has become significant business strategies to increase a competitive edge in business and also in the society. Parts from discarded products due to rapid advancement and post-consumer products before & after end-of-life (EOL) are recovered to reduce landfill waste and to have become a part of circular economy. Product recovery is made possible with the help of Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). This paper concentrates on multi-period, multi-product, and multi-echelon Closed Loop Green Supply Chain (CLGSC) network. A bi-objective (cost and emission) Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model has been formulated for the network and has been optimized using Goal Programming approach and Genetic Algorithm. Results are discussed for providing some managerial insights of the model.

scholarly journals Closed-loop Supply Chain with Advertising Investment and Reward-Penalty Mechanism Based on Different CSR Sharing Models

2021 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 02086
Author(s):  
Yi Liu ◽  
Yanting Huang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
Investment Level ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Impact

This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer based on different corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviors. In addition, the advertising investment and government’s reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) are also taken in account. To explore the impact of CSR behaviors on supply chain, we developed three models: (1) Only the manufacturer undertakes CSR (model M); (2) only the retailer undertakes CSR (model R); (3) the manufacturer and the retailer share CSR (model MR). By analyzing the results, we found that: (1) The advertising investment level and waste products return rate both increase with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR when there is only retailer undertakes CSR and when the manufacturer and retailer share CSR, and remain unchanged when there is only the manufacturer undertakes CSR; (2) the overall social welfare increases with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR no matter which member undertakes CSR, and reaches the highest when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR; (3) it is the most conductive for the performance of the closedloop supply chain when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR.

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