Logic and the Automatic Acquisition of Scientific Knowledge: An Application to Functional Genomics

Author(s):  
Ross D. King ◽  
Andreas Karwath ◽  
Amanda Clare ◽  
Luc Dehaspe
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (63) ◽  
pp. 1440-1448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross D. King ◽  
Maria Liakata ◽  
Chuan Lu ◽  
Stephen G. Oliver ◽  
Larisa N. Soldatova

The reuse of scientific knowledge obtained from one investigation in another investigation is basic to the advance of science. Scientific investigations should therefore be recorded in ways that promote the reuse of the knowledge they generate. The use of logical formalisms to describe scientific knowledge has potential advantages in facilitating such reuse. Here, we propose a formal framework for using logical formalisms to promote reuse. We demonstrate the utility of this framework by using it in a worked example from biology: demonstrating cycles of investigation formalization [ F ] and reuse [ R ] to generate new knowledge. We first used logic to formally describe a Robot scientist investigation into yeast ( Saccharomyces cerevisiae ) functional genomics [ f 1 ]. With Robot scientists, unlike human scientists, the production of comprehensive metadata about their investigations is a natural by-product of the way they work. We then demonstrated how this formalism enabled the reuse of the research in investigating yeast phenotypes [ r 1 = R ( f 1 )]. This investigation found that the removal of non-essential enzymes generally resulted in enhanced growth. The phenotype investigation was then formally described using the same logical formalism as the functional genomics investigation [ f 2 = F ( r 1 )]. We then demonstrated how this formalism enabled the reuse of the phenotype investigation to investigate yeast systems-biology modelling [ r 2 = R ( f 2 )]. This investigation found that yeast flux-balance analysis models fail to predict the observed changes in growth. Finally, the systems biology investigation was formalized for reuse in future investigations [ f 3 = F ( r 2 )]. These cycles of reuse are a model for the general reuse of scientific knowledge.


1997 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 293-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ype H. Poortinga ◽  
Ingrid Lunt

In national codes of ethics the practice of psychology is presented as rooted in scientific knowledge, professional skills, and experience. However, it is not self-evident that the body of scientific knowledge in psychology provides an adequate basis for current professional practice. Professional training and experience are seen as necessary for the application of psychological knowledge, but they appear insufficient to defend the soundness of one's practices when challenged in judicial proceedings of a kind that may be faced by psychologists in the European Union in the not too distant future. In seeking to define the basis for the professional competence of psychologists, this article recommends taking a position of modesty concerning the scope and effectiveness of psychological interventions. In many circumstances, psychologists can only provide partial advice, narrowing down the range of possible courses of action more by eliminating unpromising ones than by pointing out the most correct or most favorable one. By emphasizing rigorous evaluation, the profession should gain in accountability and, in the long term, in respectability.


1989 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 467-469
Author(s):  
Clifford I. Notarius

Author(s):  
Kathy Hirsh-Pasek ◽  
Anita Kochanoff ◽  
Nora S Newcombe ◽  
Jill de Villiers

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 180-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah L. Desmarais ◽  
Joseph Simons-Rudolph ◽  
Christine Shahan Brugh ◽  
Eileen Schilling ◽  
Chad Hoggan

Author(s):  
Sook-Young Park ◽  
Myoung-Hwan Chi ◽  
Junhyun Jeon ◽  
Yong-Hwan Lee

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