scholarly journals Causal Semantics for the Algebra of Connectors

Author(s):  
Simon Bliudze ◽  
Joseph Sifakis
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Sergei Viktorovich Serebrennikov

This article explores causal relations complicated by modus saturation. As examples, the author selected the modus of necessity with modal predicate must, and modus of assumption with modal work perhaps. The goal of this work consists in examination of causal semantics in modus formations of various type and mark out a demarcation that is important in analyzing causal semantics and logics of similar relations in a sentence and text. The following methods are applies in the course of this research component analysis, propositional analysis, and contextual analysis. The work is conducted within the framework of semantic syntax and logics of language. The main conclusion consists in determination of the primary role of the modus of necessity in the texts with causal semantics, as well as potential of a modus to form the semantics of cause and effect in the texts. The relevance of this article us substantiated by reference to such modern linguistic directions as the logics of language, semantic syntax, and syntax of text.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert van Rooij ◽  
Katrin Schulz

Abstract The felicity, or acceptability, of IS generics, i.e. generic sentences with indefinite singulars, is considerably more restricted compared to BP generics, generics with bare plurals. The goal of this paper is to account for the limited felicity of IS generics compared to BP generics, on the one hand, while preserving the close similarity between the two types of generics, on the other. We do so by proposing a causal analysis of IS generics, and show that this corresponds closely with a probabilistic analysis of BP generics.


2000 ◽  
Vol 243 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 409-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tuomas Aura ◽  
Johan Lilius

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Flanagan

A provision’s legal meaning is thought by many to be a function of its literal meaning. To explain the appearance that lawyers are arguing over a provision’s legal meaning and not just over which outcome would be more prudent or morally preferable, some legal literalists claim that a provision’s literal meaning may be causally, rather than conventionally, determined. I argue, first, that the proposed explanation is inconsistent with common intuitions about legal meaning; second, that explaining legal disagreement as a function of the causally determined meanings of moral terms requires, but lacks, a causal semantics which is clearly consistent with the scope of moral disagreement. Finally, I suggest that an element of the theory of language invoked by ‘causal’ legal literalists might be better deployed as part of an intentionalist account of legal practice.


Author(s):  
Rob J. van Glabbeek ◽  
Ursula Goltz ◽  
Jens-Wolfhard Schicke
Keyword(s):  

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