scholarly journals Iterated Belief Revision in the Face of Uncertain Communication

Author(s):  
Yoshitaka Suzuki ◽  
Satoshi Tojo ◽  
Stijn De Saeger
1997 ◽  
Vol 89 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adnan Darwiche ◽  
Judea Pearl

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 598-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thanuka L. Wickramarathne ◽  
Kamal Premaratne ◽  
Manohar N. Murthi ◽  
Nitesh V. Chawla

2006 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 127-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Booth ◽  
T. Meyer

As partial justification of their framework for iterated belief revision Darwiche and Pearl convincingly argued against Boutilier's natural revision and provided a prototypical revision operator that fits into their scheme. We show that the Darwiche-Pearl arguments lead naturally to the acceptance of a smaller class of operators which we refer to as admissible. Admissible revision ensures that the penultimate input is not ignored completely, thereby eliminating natural revision, but includes the Darwiche-Pearl operator, Nayak's lexicographic revision operator, and a newly introduced operator called restrained revision. We demonstrate that restrained revision is the most conservative of admissible revision operators, effecting as few changes as possible, while lexicographic revision is the least conservative, and point out that restrained revision can also be viewed as a composite operator, consisting of natural revision preceded by an application of a "backwards revision" operator previously studied by Papini. Finally, we propose the establishment of a principled approach for choosing an appropriate revision operator in different contexts and discuss future work.


1997 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 1352-1370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Martin ◽  
Daniel Osherson

AbstractScientific inquiry is represented as a process of rational hypothesis revision in the face of data. For the concept of rationality, we rely on the theory of belief dynamics as developed in [5, 9]. Among other things, it is shown that if belief states are left unclosed under deductive logic then scientific theories can be expanded in a uniform, consistent fashion that allows inquiry to proceed by any method of hypothesis revision based on “kernel” contraction. In contrast, if belief states are closed under logic, then no such expansion is possible.


2007 ◽  
Vol 171 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Jin ◽  
Michael Thielscher

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joe Roussos

The problem of awareness growth, also known as the problem of new hypotheses, is a persistent challenge to Bayesian theories of rational belief and decision making. Cases of awareness growth include coming to consider a completely new possibility (called expansion), or coming to consider finer distinctions through the introduction of a new partition (called refinement). Recent work has centred on Reverse Bayesianism, a proposal for rational awareness growth due to Karni and Vierø. This essay develops a "Reserve Bayesian" position and defends it against two challenges. The first, due to Anna Mahtani, says that Reverse Bayesian approaches yield the wrong result in cases where the growth of awareness constitutes an expansion relative to one partition, but a refinement relative to a different partition. The second, due to Steele and Stefánsson, says that Reverse Bayesian approaches cannot deal with new propositions that are evidentially relevant to old propositions. I argue that these challenges confuse questions of belief revision with questions of awareness change. Mahtani’s cases reveal that the change of awareness itself requires a model which specifies how propositions in the agent’s old algebra are identified with propositions in the new algebra. I introduce a lattice-theoretic model for this purpose, which resolves Mahtani’s problem cases and some of Steele and Stefánsson’s cases. Applying my model of awareness change, then Reverse Bayesianism, and then a generalised belief revision procedure, resolves Steele and Stefánsson’s remaining cases. In demonstrating this, I introduce a simple and general model of belief revision in the face of new information about previously unknown propositions.


Author(s):  
Theofanis Aravanis ◽  
Pavlos Peppas ◽  
Mary-Anne Williams

Notwithstanding the extensive work on iterated belief revision, there is, still, no fully satisfactory solution within the classical AGM paradigm. The seminal work of Darwiche and Pearl (DP approach, for short) remains the most dominant, despite its well-documented shortcomings. In this article, we make further observations on the DP approach. Firstly, we prove that the DP postulates are, in a strong sense, inconsistent with Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom (P), extending previous initial conflicts. Immediate consequences of this result are that an entire class of intuitive revision operators, which includes Dalal's operator, violates the DP postulates, as well as that the Independence postulate and Spohn's conditionalization are inconsistent with (P). Lastly, we show that the DP postulates allow for more revision polices than the ones that can be captured by identifying belief states with total preorders over possible worlds, a fact implying that a preference ordering (over possible worlds) is an insufficient representation for a belief state.


Author(s):  
Jake Chandler ◽  
Richard Booth

The belief revision literature has largely focussed on the issue of how to revise one’s beliefs in the light of information regarding matters of fact. Here we turn to an important but comparatively neglected issue: How to model agents capable of acquiring information regarding which rules of inference (‘Ramsey Test conditionals’) they ought to use in reasoning about these facts. Our approach to this second question of so-called ‘conditional revision’ is distinctive insofar as it abstracts from the controversial details of how the address the first. We introduce a ‘plug and play’ method for uniquely extending any iterated belief revision operator to the conditional case. The flexibility of our approach is achieved by having the result of a conditional revision by a Ramsey Test conditional (‘arrow’) determined by that of a plain revision by its corresponding material conditional (‘hook’). It is shown to satisfy a number of new constraints that are of independent interest.


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