A Semantics for Hyperintensional Belief Revision Based on Information Bases

I propose a novel hyperintensional semantics for belief revision and a corresponding system of dynamic doxastic logic. The main goal of the framework is to reduce some of the idealisations that are common in the belief revision literature and in dynamic epistemic logic. The models of the new framework are primarily based on potentially incomplete or inconsistent collections of information, represented by situations in a situation space. I propose that by shifting the representational focus of doxastic models from belief sets to collections of information, and by defining changes of beliefs as artifacts of changes of information, we can achieve a more realistic account of belief representation and belief change. The proposed dynamic operation suggests a non-classical way of changing beliefs: belief revision occurs in non-explosive environments which allow for a non-monotonic and hyperintensional belief dynamics. A logic that is sound with respect to the semantics is also provided.

Integrating social and cognitive aspects of belief dynamics: towards a unifying framework

Belief change and spread have been studied in many disciplines—from psychology, sociology, economics and philosophy, to biology, computer science and statistical physics—but we still do not have a firm grasp on why some beliefs change more easily and spread faster than others. To fully capture the complex social-cognitive system that gives rise to belief dynamics, we first review insights about structural components and processes of belief dynamics studied within different disciplines. We then outline a unifying quantitative framework that enables theoretical and empirical comparisons of different belief dynamic models. This framework uses a statistical physics formalism, grounded in cognitive and social theory, as well as empirical observations. We show how this framework can be used to integrate extant knowledge and develop a more comprehensive understanding of belief dynamics.

Integrating social and cognitive aspects of belief dynamics: Towards a unifying framework

Belief change and spread have been studied in many disciplines-- from psychology, sociology, economics and philosophy, to computer science and statistical physics-- but we still do not have a firm grasp on why some beliefs change and spread easier than others. To fully capture the complex social-cognitive system that give rise to belief dynamics, we need to integrate the findings of these disciplines into a single framework. Communication between disciplines is limited, and there is a lack of theoretical comparisons and empirical tests of the many different models of belief dynamics. Here we first review insights about structural components and processes of belief dynamics studied in different disciplines, focusing particularly on previously neglected but important areas such as cognitive representations and strategies used to integrate information. We then outline a unifying framework that enables theoretical and empirical comparisons of different belief dynamic models. The framework is quantified using a statistical physics formalism, grounded in cognitive and social theory as well as empirical observations. We show how the framework can be used to integrate numerous previous models and develop a more comprehensive science of belief dynamics.

I Play, Therefore I Believe

Religious topics are increasingly common in video games, frequently addressing issues such as spirituality and transcendence. Yet this is only the surface of more complex phenomena, deeply tied to religious experience itself in interactive digital simulations. The aim of the chapter is to highlight the implications of the ties between religion and belief dynamics in video games. First, it focuses on different kinds of player–game belief relationships, which take the forms of agreements (symmetrical) and self-givings (asymmetrical). Then, it addresses the process of institution of belief: the necessity for players not only to pretend to believe in the digital world, but to experience the act of believing itself while playing. Lastly, it presents a series of case studies (Planescape Torment, Nier: Automata, The Talos Principle, and The Stanley Parable) to show different peculiar dynamics involved in the relationships between religio, belief, and the ludic experience.

Tracking the mind’s eye: Primate gaze behavior during virtual visuomotor navigation reflects belief dynamics

SUMMARYTo take the best actions, we often need to maintain and update beliefs about variables that cannot be directly observed. To understand the principles underlying such belief updates, we need tools to uncover subjects’ belief dynamics from natural behaviour. We tested whether eye movements could be used to infer subjects’ beliefs about latent variables using a naturalistic, visuomotor navigation task. We observed eye movements that appeared to continuously track the goal location even when no visible target was present there. Accurate goal-tracking was associated with improved task performance, and inhibiting eye movements in humans impaired navigation precision. By using passive stimulus playback and manipulating stimulus reliability, we show that subjects’ eye movements are likely voluntary, rather than reflexive. These results suggest that gaze dynamics play a key role in action-selection during challenging visuomotor behaviours, and may possibly serve as a window into the subject’s dynamically evolving internal beliefs.