Bargaining in a Two-Stage Supply Chain Through Revenue-Sharing Contract

2011 ◽  
pp. 347-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Hou ◽  
Amy Z. Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Research on two-stage supply chain revenue sharing contract with loss-aversion under disruption

ICSSSM12 ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guohong Shi ◽  
Yueqian Fan ◽  
Yuefeng Zeng ◽  
Jia Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

scholarly journals Contracting Fashion Products Supply Chains When Demand Is Dependent on Price and Sales Effort

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Wei ◽  
Liyang Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Fashion Products ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Investment Level

This paper investigates optimal decisions in a two-stage fashion product supply chain under two specified contracts: revenue-sharing contract and wholesale price contract, where demand is dependent on retailing price and sales effort level. Optimal decisions and related profits are analyzed and further compared among the cases where the effort investment fee is determined and undertaken either by the retailer or the manufacturer. Results reveal that if the retailer determines the effort investment level, she would be better off under the wholesale price contract and would invest more effort. However, if the manufacturer determines the effort level, he prefers to the revenue-sharing contract most likely if both parties agree on consignment.

A Coordinated Revenue-Sharing Contract for a Two-Stage Supply Chain with Linear Stepwise Inventory Holding Costs

2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Hou ◽  
Amy Z. Zeng ◽  
Lindu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Sequential Optimization ◽  
Inventory Level ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Holding Costs ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Holding Cost ◽  
Inventory Holding ◽  
Optimization Mechanism

In this paper, the authors focus on examining the coordination mechanisms for a two-stage supply chain comprising one supplier and one retailer. The authors consider such a channel relationship that the transaction quantity between the two members is sensitive to the supplier’s inventory level and that the supplier’s unit inventory holding cost has a linear stepwise structure. They devise a coordinated revenue-sharing contract with bargaining so that each party’s respective profit is better than that resulted from the simple sequential optimization mechanism. The key contract parameters, namely the supplier’s inventory level and the retailer’s revenue-sharing fraction, are obtained and analyzed. Numerical illustrations of the contracts are given and shed lights on how the supply chain should coordinate in order to gain better performance.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Sambhu Das ◽  
Manjusri Basu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Time Price

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-price-sensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

Revenue Sharing in a Two-Stage Supply Chain with Linear Stepwise Unit Inventory Holding Cost

2011 ◽  
pp. 254-274
Author(s):  
Jing Hou ◽  
Amy Z. Zeng ◽  
Lindu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Sequential Optimization ◽  
Inventory Level ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Channel Relationship ◽  
Holding Cost ◽  
Inventory Holding Cost ◽  
Inventory Holding ◽  
Optimization Mechanism

In this chapter we focus on examining the coordination mechanisms for a two-stage supply chain comprising one supplier and one retailer. We consider such a channel relationship that the transaction quantity between the two members is sensitive to the supplier’s inventory level and that the supplier’s unit inventory holding cost has a linear stepwise structure. We devise a coordinated revenue-sharing contract with bargaining so that each party’s respective profit is better than that resulted from the simple sequential optimization mechanism. The key contract parameters, namely the supplier’s inventory level and the retailer’s revenue-sharing fraction, are obtained and analyzed. Numerical illustrations of the contracts are given and shed lights on how the supply chain should coordinate in order to gain better performance.

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