Asymmetric Information Game Analysis of the Energy-Saving Building Market and the Policy

Author(s):  
Qian Li ◽  
Miaomiao Liu ◽  
Hongliang Ma
2019 ◽  
Vol 136 ◽  
pp. 01019
Author(s):  
Gangqiang Luo ◽  
Qin Wang

The paper constructs the oligopoly models of assembled building developers based on Cournot model and Stackelberg model of development scale competition. Based on the comparison of the profit of the regional assembled building market, which is obvious in product homogeneity and multi oligopoly, a game analysis is carried out for the development pattern of assembled building developers. On the basis of the above models, we get the equilibrium solution of developers' Cournot competition and the sub game refining Nash equilibrium solution of the developers' Stackelberg competition respectively. Based on the different N values, we compare the development scale, the development income and the market price of the two competitive modes. Combining with the above game equilibrium, this paper makes a concrete analysis of the actual situation of the competition of assembled building developers in China.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (9) ◽  
pp. 6312-6324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Li ◽  
Weihao Du ◽  
Fengmei Yang ◽  
Guowei Hua

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 5895-5904
Author(s):  
Siying Li

The construction of the evaluation index system of employee satisfaction level is the basis for an enterprise to measure the level of employee satisfaction. In this paper, the author analyzes the employee incentive in supply chain network based on asymmetric information game analysis and fuzzy model. Through the correction of network weight and threshold value, the error function decreases along the gradient direction. The construction and training of the network can be realized by MATLAB. The newff function in the software is used to construct the network, and the train function is used to train. This evaluation index system is a multi-level target evaluation system based on asymmetric information game, and its basic principle is to simplify complex problems. Long term effort is bigger when the salesperson’s risk averse parameter is more than a certain value or risk averse parameter is less but discount factor is more than a threshold; short term effort is bigger when risk averse parameter and discount factor is both less. For both information scenarios, the compensation contracts are designed and comparison analyses are conducted.


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