Three Dimensional Evolution of Governance Structure in Chinese Family Business

Author(s):  
Wang Lan ◽  
Wang Zhangliu
2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Chen ◽  
Jakob Arnoldi ◽  
Chaohong Na

ABSTRACTLoan guarantees to related parties by affiliated subsidiaries within family controlled pyramids form a means by which the controlling family expropriates value from minority shareholders. The controlling family, however, will attempt to escape blame for the behavior. Using a sample of 1785 listed Chinese firms affiliated with family-controlled business groups, we explore how family governance structure affects the use of related party loan guarantees. As hypothesized, we find that affiliates with non-family chairmen, but with family directors or senior executives, issue larger volumes of loan guarantees to related parties, whereas affiliates with family chairmen and those with non-family interlocking chairmen do not. The behavior is moderated by regional institutional development.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann Sophie K. Löhde ◽  
Giovanna Campopiano ◽  
Andrea Calabrò

PurposeChallenging the static view of family business governance, we propose a model of owner–manager relationships derived from the configurational analysis of managerial behavior and change in governance structure.Design/methodology/approachStemming from social exchange theory and building on the 4C model proposed by Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005), we consider the evolving owner–manager relationship in four main configurations. On the one hand, we account for family businesses shifting from a generalized to a restricted exchange system, and vice versa, according to whether a family manager misbehaves in a stewardship-oriented governance structure or a nonfamily manager succeeds in building a trusting relationship in an agency-oriented governance structure. On the other hand, we consider that family firms will strengthen a generalized exchange system, rather than a restricted one, according to whether a family manager contributes to the stewardship-oriented culture in the business or a nonfamily manager proves to be driven by extrinsic rewards. Four scenarios are analyzed in terms of the managerial behavior and governance structure that characterize the phases of the relationship between owners and managers.FindingsVarious factors trigger managerial behavior, making the firm deviate from or further build on what is assumed by stewardship and agency theories (i.e. proorganizational versus opportunistic behavior, respectively), which determine the governance structure over time. Workplace deviance, asymmetric altruism and patriarchy on the one hand, and proorganizational behavior, relationship building and long-term commitment on the other, are found to determine how the manager behaves and thus characterize the owner's reactions in terms of governance mechanisms. This enables us to present a dynamic view of governance structures, which adapt to the actual attitudes and behaviors of employed managers.Research limitations/implicationsAs time is a relevant dimension affecting individual behavior and triggering change in an organization, one must consider family business governance as being dynamic in nature. Moreover, it is not family membership that determines the most appropriate governance structure but the owner–manager relationship that evolves over time, thus contributing to the 4C model.Originality/valueThe proposed model integrates social exchange theory and the 4C model to predict changes in governance structure, as summarized in the final framework we propose.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Wang ◽  
Qiang Liang ◽  
Lihong Song ◽  
Erming Xu

Purpose With features of both “family” and “business,” family businesses must seek a balance between the emotional aspect of “family” and the economic aspect of “business” in its organizational and decision-making processes to ensure the sustainability of the family’s entrepreneurship. This study aims to focus on how internal institutional complexity combined evolves alongside the growth of the family business. Design/methodology/approach The research looks, from the perspective of institutional logic, into the Charoen Pokphand Group, which is an epitome of overseas Chinese family businesses and proceeds to build a model of family business growth in the context of institutional complexity. Findings The research finds that as a family business grows, institutional complexity inside the organization would change from aligned period to sustaining period and then to dominant period. Then further elucidates the process of proactive response in different stages of the development of a family business. Attaching equal importance to the cultivation of entrepreneurship and to the continuation of family values and culture is the crucial mechanism by which Chinese family businesses seek a balance between family logic and business logic. Originality/value This paper unveils the change of institutional complexity in the evolution of family businesses and the process of action of its agency as an organization, and simultaneously partly reveals the features of entrepreneurship that overseas Chinese family businesses have as they grew, which is of positive significance for exploring and building a path of growth unique to Chinese family businesses.


2011 ◽  
Vol 403-408 ◽  
pp. 313-317
Author(s):  
Li Zhang

In China, the family business usually implement paternalistic management model at the startup. When the enterprise scale enlarged, along with the change of the outside environment, the risk and uncertainty of the enterprise management will be increased and the distortions of family management model will become increasingly clear. Therefore, it is an irresistible trend to carry out reforms on the family business governance model. This paper analyzed the current status of Chinese family management model, pointed out the opportunity under the market economy for family business accelerating its development, and summarized the four models of Chinese family business governance. Currently, under the market economy, the biggest problem faced by Chinese family business is not how to transform into modern enterprise, but how to realize their sustainable development. To build a modern enterprise system is just an important destination for family business development, but can’t be the only choose at the present stage. A precisely suitable enterprise system is established according to the time, place, different industry, scale, development stage and background, while there is no standard model of universal application.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Iskandar Hasan Tan Abdullah ◽  
Muhammad Syahmizan Azmi ◽  
Sakinah Mat Zin ◽  
Lim Soo Chee ◽  
Nur Azuki Yusoff

2005 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Po-yin Chung

1996 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 141-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murray Weidenbaum

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