Understanding Strategic Interaction

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

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Reformulating Jan Tinbergen’s normative vision on welfare and security

Journal of Peace Research ◽

10.1177/0022343320969771 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 002234332096977

Author(s):

S Mansoob Murshed

Keyword(s):

Moral Hazard ◽

Strategic Interaction ◽

Free Riding ◽

Payoff Function ◽

Cooperative Behaviour ◽

Individual Behaviour ◽

World Government ◽

Identity Based ◽

Intellectual Legacy

This article builds on the intellectual legacy of Jan Tinbergen by extending his analysis on welfare and security into a framework involving strategic interaction. I first incorporate welfare and security in terms of interstate tensions into a single utility or payoff function. An uncertain world is characterized by states that are more peaceful, and others where nations are more hostile to each other. Both conflictual and peaceful outcomes lie along a spectrum of hostility short of war. The strategies adopted by the two countries, which promote peace, can be complements or substitutes. This means that they can go up or down in response to increases in the strategies of its rival. I demonstrate that non-cooperative behaviour between nations is Pareto inferior to cooperative behaviour, because the latter is associated with more actions and efforts to promote peace. Cooperative behaviour is akin to Tinbergen’s notion of world government. Non-cooperative behaviour by states also leads to moral hazard, and there can be free-riding in joint peaceful behaviour by some nations, particularly when the strategies of the countries are substitutes. The model is extended to aggressive international behaviour, including that mandated by populist plebiscites or election victories, as well as an outline of individual behaviour driven by identity-based politics.

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Spatiotemporal context and firm performance: The mediating effect of strategic interaction

Growth and Change ◽

10.1111/grow.12460 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Jiafeng Gu

Keyword(s):

Firm Performance ◽

Strategic Interaction ◽

Mediating Effect

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The anti-mercenary norm and the market for combat force

International Journal Canada s Journal of Global Policy Analysis ◽

10.1177/0020702021994519 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 002070202199451

Author(s):

Ulrich Petersohn

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Strategic Interaction ◽

Strategic Interactions ◽

Norm Violation ◽

Reputational Costs

Since 2013, combat services have been increasingly exchanged on the market. This development is puzzling since the practice emerged despite an anti-mercenary norm banning such services, and without any revision of the norm. The article argues that the combat market is not a deliberate design, but the result of strategic interaction. For some, compliance with the anti-mercenary norm is the best strategy, while for others, violating the norm is best. However, once the norm violation occurs, it is in the interest of all actors to maintain a façade of compliance. Non-compliant actors benefit from the combat services, and compliant actors do not have to engage in costly sanctioning of the norm violation, and avoid the reputational costs associated with non-enforcement. The article employs game theory to investigate the strategic interactions of actors across 11 combat contracts from 2013 to 2019.

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