Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design

2019 ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Executive Veto

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 531-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel L. Negretto
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Significant Variation ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
Ability To Act ◽  
Policy Making Process

What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances executives’ ability to act as agenda setters. This capacity, however, is not uniform across all cases. Developing a simple spatial model of decree games, the author argues that the bargaining power of an executive to promote legal changes through decrees varies according to three interrelated factors: decree approval rules, the extent of the executive’s partisan support in the legislature, and the strength of the presidential veto. These propositions are supported by a comparative analysis of the process of constitutional design and the implementation of decrees in Brazil and Argentina, two cases presenting significant variation in each of the independent variables.

Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nolan M. McCarty
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Executive Veto

It is often argued that executive powers such as the veto serve to reduce particularistic spending by the legislature. I argue that the effect of the executive veto depends strongly on assumptions about both the nature of executive preferences and the institutional structure of executive-legislative bargaining. To support these claims, I develop a model of distributive policymaking subject to an executive veto. This framework incorporates variation in presidential objectives and formal powers into a dynamic bargaining model. In equilibrium, stronger veto power leads to a lower level of distributive spending, but the effects are mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others. The model also generates new insights and predictions about fiscal policy under the separation of powers, including the effects of divided government, electoral rules, and term limitations for the executive.

Appointee vacancies in US executive branch agencies

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
William G. Resh ◽  
Gary E. Hollibaugh ◽  
Patrick S. Roberts ◽  
Matthew M. Dull
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Empirical Model ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
High Status ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Committee Chair ◽  
Institutional Politics

Abstract We analyse United States presidential appointee positions subject to Senate confirmation without a confirmed appointee in office. These “vacant” positions are byproducts of American constitutional design, shaped by the interplay of institutional politics. Using a novel dataset, we analyse appointee vacancies across executive branch departments and single-headed agencies from 1989 to 2013. We develop a theoretical model that uncovers the dynamics of vacancy onset and length. We then specify an empirical model and report results highlighting both position and principal–agent relations as critical to the politics of appointee vacancies. Conditional on high status positions reducing the frequency and duration of vacancies, we find important principal–agent considerations from a separation of powers perspective. Appointee positions in agencies ideologically divergent from the relevant Senate committee chair are vacant for less time than in ideologically proximal agencies. Importantly, this relationship strengthens as agency ideology diverges away from the chair and towards the chair’s party extreme.

Emergencies, Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy

2012 ◽  
Vol 37 (03) ◽  
pp. 743-767
Author(s):  
William E. Scheuerman
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Institutional Reform ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
The Us ◽  
Executive Discretion ◽  
Uncertain Future ◽  
The Many ◽  
Do So

This article reexamines the question of how best to restrain executive power in a political and social context that seems to favor its dramatic expansion. Modern interventionist government amidst a dynamic social environment, where the executive faces a seemingly endless series of “crises” or “emergencies,” provides a heightened scope for executive discretion. At the same time, the US-style separation of powers, in which an independent president faces a potentially obstinate Congress, offers executives many incentives to exploit crises, real or otherwise. The works examined in this article confront, with varying degrees of success, the seemingly inexorable expansion of executive power within the US version of liberal democracy. We can only hope to deal with the many intellectual and political tasks posed by the symbiotic nexus between executive-centered and crisis-oriented government by confronting some tough questions about US constitutional design and the possibility of radical institutional reform. Unfortunately, even those scholars who provide plausible accounts of the US system's fragilities seem hesitant to do so.

scholarly journals Executive veto power and credit claiming

Public Choice ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 146 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 375-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indridi H. Indridason
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power ◽  
Credit Claiming ◽  
Executive Veto

Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes

2007 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
TIMOTHY HELLWIG ◽  
DAVID SAMUELS
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Regime Type ◽  
Relative Impact ◽  
Attribution Of Responsibility ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Democratic Performance ◽  
Presidential Systems

Do voters reward or punish incumbents for retrospective performance similarly in different democratic regimes? Despite debates on the merits of different regimes, little research has investigated the implications of constitutional design on voters' ability to hold politicians to account. This article shows that regime type determines the way and extent to which elections enable voters to reward or sanction incumbents. These regime effects are separate from and conceptually prior to factors previously identified in the literature on comparative economic voting. Analysis of elections from seventy-five countries reveals that, all else equal, voters have greater potential to hold incumbents to accounts under the separation of powers than under parliamentarism. Moreover, variables particular to separation of powers systems – the electoral cycle in pure presidential systems and instances of cohabitation in semi-presidential systems – affect the relative impact of the attribution of responsibility. The results contribute to ongoing debates about the relative advantages of different constitutional formats for democratic performance.

The Executive Veto in Illinois

1939 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 1049-1057
Author(s):  
Glenn R. Negley
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Constitutional Convention ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Effective Operation ◽  
Executive Veto

The original veto power in Illinois was vested in a council of revision, consisting of the governor and the justices of the supreme court, whose function was limited to a preview of legislative acts for the purpose of making recommendations in regard to their constitutionality. Practical difficulties hampered the effective operation of this council, especially the inability of justices to perform adequately their two sets of diverse duties. The constitutional convention of 1848 found it expedient, therefore, to reform the constitutional mandate of veto by concentrating the function in the governor.

Separation of Powers in African Constitutionalism

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Design And Implementation ◽  
Constant Friction ◽  
Common Problems ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This book examines one of the critical measures introduced by African constitutional designers in their attempts to entrench an ethos of constitutionalism on the continent. Taking a critical look at the different ways in which attempts have been made to separate the different branches of government, the book examines the impact this is having on transparent and accountable governance. Beginning with an overview of constitutionalism in Africa and the different influences on modern African constitutional developments, it looks at the relationship between the legislature and the executive as well as the relationship between the judiciary and the political branches. Despite differences in approaches between the various constitutional cultures that have influenced developments in Africa, there remain common problems. One of these problems is the constant friction in the relationship between the three branches and the resurgent threats of authoritarianism which clearly suggest that there remain serious problems in both constitutional design and implementation. The book also studies the increasing role being played by independent constitutional institutions and how they complement the checks and balances associated with the traditional three branches of government.

scholarly journals Constitutional design and destiny of the states: The Weimar Constitution and the St Vitus Day Constitution in comparative perspective

Pravni zapisi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 396-417
Author(s):  
Dragoljub Popović
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Parliamentary Government ◽  
Territorial Organization ◽  
Vertical Division ◽  
Made In

The Weimar Constitution of 1919 and the St Vitus Day Constitution of 1921 were quite different in many aspects. Their comparison is nevertheless of interest not only because it shows some influences of the older one to the younger, but also for the fact that it displays the line of developments of the two countries - Germany and Yugoslavia. If considered from the standpoint of parliamentary government, territorial organization of the two states and some other features the analysis of the respective constitutional developments leads to several conclusions. The two constitutions had their initial shortcomings, but those did not belong to the same area of constitutional law. In Germany they concerned the horizontal separation of powers, whereas in Yugoslavia they belonged to the vertical division of power. Both constitutions under survey ended up in dictatorships. In both countries, attempts were made in the course of history to remedy the initial shortcomings or constructive errors of the two constitutions. In Germany such attempts were successful, which on the contrary was not the case in Yugoslavia. Germany therefore became a well-functioning liberal democracy, while Yugoslavia failed and disappeared.

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