Trade, Sensitivity and Feedbacks: Interregional Impacts of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement

Author(s):  
Ricardo Gazel ◽  
Geoffrey J. D. Hewings ◽  
Michael Sonis
2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEAN F. CROMBOIS

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
KERRY CHASE

The GATT treaty's loophole for free trade areas in Article XXIV has puzzled and deceived prominent scholars, who trace its postwar origins to US aspirations to promote European integration and efforts to persuade developing countries to endorse the Havana Charter. Drawing from archival records, this article shows that in fact US policymakers crafted the controversial provisions of Article XXIV to accommodate a trade treaty they had secretly reached with Canada. As a result, the free trade area exemption was embedded in the GATT–WTO regime, even though neither the Havana Charter nor the US–Canada free trade agreement was ever ratified. Theoretically, the case is an important example of how Cold War exigencies altered the policy ideas of US officials.


2008 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
JESSICA LEIGHT

AbstractThe 2003 US-Chile free trade agreement, regarded by many as consistent with Chile's long-held trade liberalisation strategy, nonetheless engendered a surprisingly vigorous debate focused on the proposed elimination of the bandas de precio protecting traditional agricultural crops. Opposition to the agreement, mounted by the conservative Alianza por Chile, offers an intriguing political case study that suggests that populist posturing surrounding free trade agreements may persist long after a trade liberalisation strategy has become well-established. This article argues that agricultural liberalisation will be a significant challenge for Chile's governing coalition if it wishes to pursue trade negotiations while seeking to avoid costly political battles at home over the economic costs of abandoning price supports and the challenges of ‘reconverting’ to an export-oriented sector. Even given the strong elite consensus around trade liberalisation in Chile, the interconnections between sectoral interest groups, domestic politics and trade negotiations remain relevant, and deserving of analytical attention.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-455
Author(s):  
Yan Wang

AbstractThis article illustrates the power of discourse in free trade agreement (FTA) negotiation, elucidating the concept from the perspective of a country’s abilities of rule control, rule assimilation and rule contestation. To enhance rule control, the G2 (the US and EU) have chosen their FTA partners, designed the FTA rules, and offered offensive-defensive exchange strategically. They have approached weak or trade-dependent parties first in FTA negotiation, innovated new rules to accelerate FTA negotiation, skillfully constructed intentional ambiguity and exemptions to remove rule discrepancies and made offensive-defensive exchange with their negotiating parties. Some of these strategies have been copied by China although in a different way. Further, a template approach for negotiating an FTA and exporting domestic laws and normative values to others contributes to the G2’s rule assimilation. A de facto FTA template has also been established by China recently, but its legal culture and political stance have led it to sign incomplete contracts and tolerate rule differences with its negotiating parties instead of transposition of domestic law. In facing the rival rules adopted by their competitors, the G2 have incorporated counteractive rules in their FTAs with their competitors’ close trading nations. China has also contested rules treating China as a non-market economy in its FTAs, but its stance toward state-owned enterprises (SOE) disciplines and rules forbidding forced technology transfer is milder due to its lack of experience in dealing with unfavourable rules.


2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 597-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory W. White

In June 2004, the United States signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Morocco. FTAs are typically thought of as economic agreements, but the agreement with Morocco has an explicit security component. Indeed, US officials have cast the agreement as an opportunity to support a close ally in the region, and its signing coincides with Morocco's denomination as a non-NATO ally of the US. Yet even if the FTA achieves its stated economic goals — a very tall and ambitious order — it remains to be seen whether or not the benefits will extend to a society divided by enormous social cleavages. As a result, the US-Moroccan FTA and Morocco's new found stature in US security policy paradoxically run the risk of deepening societal resentment within Morocco toward the government and, by extension, the US.


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