Free Trade as a Strategic Instrument in the War on Terror?: The 2004 US-Moroccan Free Trade Agreement

2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 597-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory W. White

In June 2004, the United States signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Morocco. FTAs are typically thought of as economic agreements, but the agreement with Morocco has an explicit security component. Indeed, US officials have cast the agreement as an opportunity to support a close ally in the region, and its signing coincides with Morocco's denomination as a non-NATO ally of the US. Yet even if the FTA achieves its stated economic goals — a very tall and ambitious order — it remains to be seen whether or not the benefits will extend to a society divided by enormous social cleavages. As a result, the US-Moroccan FTA and Morocco's new found stature in US security policy paradoxically run the risk of deepening societal resentment within Morocco toward the government and, by extension, the US.

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-53
Author(s):  
Johni Robert Verianto Korwa

Australia is currently faced with a strategic and economic dilemma regarding its interactions with China and the United States (US). On the one hand, it should maintain and strengthen its strategic relations with the US as an ally in order to contain a rising China. On the other hand, Australia should ensure its economic growth by strengthening trade relations with China. This paper aims to examine the implications of the new China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) for the ANZUS strategic alliance. Through Qualitative Approach, this article analyzes the issues with the use of realist and liberal perspectives in international relations. By assessing two previous events involving the triangular Australia-US-China relationship (the case of the Taiwan conflict, and the US development of a National Missile Defense system), this paper concludes that ChAFTA may tend to undermine the ANZUS alliance. Three reasons for this conclusion are identified: a fundamental shift in the way Australia perceives China; ChAFTA offers more benefits to Australia than the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA); and finally Australia may consider ChAFTA as being more in its national interests in the international system than the ANZUS alliance.


1992 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sidney Weintraub

The Moment of Truth has come for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The US Congress will have to stop talking and vote to accept or reject the agreement negotiated among Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The disagreement on NAFTA in the United States is about free trade with Mexico, not with Canada. A US-Canada free trade agreement (FTA) already exists.This controversy over NAFTA has been fierce in the United States, much more so than in Mexico. This comparison speaks volumes about changing attitudes. It was almost unthinkable a decade ago that Mexico would so drastically alter its traditional position of maintaining economic and political distance from the United States. This change would not have been possible but for la decena trágica, the years of the 1980s. Beyond that, Mexico has more at stake in a free trade agreement. It has the smaller economy (about 1/27th that of the United States) so that changes, for better or worse, are magnified.


2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard J. Roth

The Government of Alberta has recently announced that it intends to increase oil sands royalty rates. This article reviews these proposed changes to determine if they comply with the investment protection obligations Canada assumed under c. 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In addition to ensuring non-discriminatory treatment of investors, c. 11 of the NAFTA prohibits expropriation of investments without compensation. What constitutes expropriation under the NAFTA may be broader than the expropriation protection under either American or Canadian domestic law. The result is that American investors in Canada may have greater protection against expropriation than Canadian investors in Alberta. Likewise, Canadian investors in the United States may also be in a preferred position relative to American investors in their own country. The article concludes that the Government of Alberta may have to compensate U.S. investors in Alberta’s oil sands if it carries through with the oil sands royalty changes it has announced.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. e57624
Author(s):  
Angelo Raphael Mattos

A partir das competências constitucionais do Congresso dos Estados Unidos em política externa, das plataformas dos partidos Democrata e Republicano de 1992, bem como dos argumentos a favor e contra a implementação do North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), o artigo objetiva compreender e discutir as razões da dificuldade enfrentada por Bill Clinton para aprovar o NAFTA no Congresso dos EUA em 1993. Os resultados das análises dos diferentes grupos domésticos, incluindo os atores Executivo e Legislativo, indicam que posições ideológicas, sobretudo presentes no Partido Democrata, como questões trabalhistas e ambientais, representaram o principal fator de resistência ao NAFTA no Capitólio.Palavras-chave: Congresso; Estados Unidos; NAFTA.ABSTRACTBased on the constitutional powers of the United States Congress in foreign policy, the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties of 1992, as well as the arguments for and against the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the article aimed to understand and discuss the reasons for Bill Clinton's difficulty in passing NAFTA to the US Congress in 1993. The results of the analyzes of different domestic groups, including the Executive and Legislative actors, indicate that ideological positions, especially present in the Democratic Party, as labor and environmental issues, represented the main factor of resistance to NAFTA in the Capitol. Keywords: Congress; United States; NAFTA. Recebido em: 08 fev. 2021 | Aceito em: 20 set. 2021.


1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 394-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Raby

This is a good deal, a good deal for Canada and a deal that is good for all Canadians. It is also a fair deal, which means that it brings benefits and progress to our partner, the United States of America. When both countries prosper, our democracies are strengthened and leadership has been provided to our trading partners around the world. I think this initiative represents enlightened leadership to the trading partners about what can be accomplished when we determine that we are going to strike down protectionism, move toward liberalized trade, and generate new prosperity for all our people.On January 2, 1988, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada signed the landmark comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries that already enjoyed the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. The FTA was subsequently ratified by the legislatures of both countries, if only after a bitterly fought election on the subject in Canada. On January 1, 1989, the FTA formally came into effect.


2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samira Salem

Has the time come for a free-trade agreement (FTA) between Egypt and the United States? According to the contributors to Building Bridges, an FTA is the logical next step in the Egypt–U.S. relationship. This policy-oriented volume explores the conditions under which the benefits of an FTA between the parties would be maximized. Although the contributors reach different conclusions regarding the optimal form of the Egypt–U.S. FTA, consensus is reached on one point: an FTA between Egypt and the United States will produce economic benefits for both nations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denielle M. Perry ◽  
Kate A. Berry

At the turn of the 21st century, protectionist policies in Latin America were largely abandoned for an agenda that promoted free trade and regional integration. Central America especially experienced an increase in international, interstate, and intraregional economic integration through trade liberalization. In 2004, such integration was on the agenda of every Central American administration, the U.S. Congress, and Mexico. The Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP) and the Central America Integrated Electricity System (SIEPAC), in particular, aimed to facilitate the success of free trade by increasing energy production and transmission on a unifi ed regional power grid (Mesoamerica, 2011). Meanwhile, for the United States, a free trade agreement (FTA) with Central America would bring it a step closer to realizing a hemispheric trade bloc while securing market access for its products. Isthmus states considered the potential for a Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States, their largest trading partner, as an opportunity to enter the global market on a united front. A decade and a half on, CAFTA, PPP, and SIEPAC are interwoven, complimentary initiatives that exemplify a shift towards increased free trade and development throughout the region. As such, to understand one, the other must be examined.


Author(s):  
Richard D. Mahoney

How did the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement come about? The officially named “U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement” was the stepchild of a rancorous hemispheric divorce between the United States and five Latin American governments over the proposal to extend the North American Free Trade Agreement...


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