Roll Call Voting by Congress

Author(s):  
James B. Kau ◽  
Paul H. Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Justin Buchler

Spatial theory is divided between models of elections and models of roll call voting, neither of which alone can explain congressional polarization. This chapter discusses the history of spatial theory, why it is important to link the two strands of spatial models, and the value of reversing the order of conventional models. Conventional models place an election before policy decisions are made. This chapter proposes a unified spatial model of Congress in which the conventional order is reversed. First, there is a legislative session, then an election in which voters respond retrospectively, not to the locations candidates claim to hold, but to the bundles of roll call votes that incumbents cast to incrementally adopt their locations in the policy space. Such a model is best suited to explaining three puzzles: why do legislators adopt extreme positions, how do they win, and what role do parties play in the process?


1999 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle A. Barnello

2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 22-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jang Hyun Kim ◽  
George A. Barnett ◽  
K. Hazel Kwon

Along with individuals’ ideological factors, various network properties play a crucial role in the process of legislators’ political decision making. Social networks among legislators provide relational resources through which communication occurs, exerting social influence among the members in a network. This paper examines six social relationships among the members of the 109th United States Senate as predictors of senatorial voting (roll call votes), shared committees, co-sponsorships, party membership, PAC donation, geographical contiguity, and internet hyperlinks, which may be considered as direct or indirect representations of communication networks. The six networks are modeled using MRQAP, and results suggest that roll call voting was predicted by party membership, co-sponsorship, geographical proximity, and PAC donation networks, while shared committee membership did not contribute significantly. As for hyperlinks, results were mixed, showing a small variance of contribution in a simpler model but not significant with more complex models.


Author(s):  
Austin Bussing ◽  
Will Patton ◽  
Jason M. Roberts ◽  
Sarah A. Treul

2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Thames

Mixed-member electoral systems embrace two views of representation by electing some legislators in single-member district elections and others in a proportional representation election. This can potentially create a “mandate divide” in legislatures, because single-member district legislators have an incentive to embrace parochial issues and proportional representation legislators have an incentive to center on national issues. Previous studies of this question have only found limited evidence of its existence. The author argues that the level of party system institutionalization will fundamentally determine whether a mandate divide will exist in a mixed-member legislature. Using roll-call voting data from the Hungarian National Assembly, the Russian Duma, and the Ukrainian Rada, the author analyzes patterns of party discipline in each legislature. The empirical results show that a mandate divide only existed in the legislature with the most weakly institutionalized party system, the Russian Duma.


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