Alternative Legacies of Authoritarianism: Pro-dictator Bias in Ideology

How does an authoritarian past shape voters’ left-right orientation? Recent studies investigate “anti-dictator bias” in political ideology, where citizens in a former right-wing (left-wing) dictatorship may display a leftist (rightist) bias in their ideological self-identification. In this paper, I provide evidence for a “pro-dictator bias” where citizens hold ideological positions corresponding to those of the dictator depending on their experiences during and after transition. In countries with negotiated transitions and stronger former ruling parties, these successors could continue mobilizing the popular base of the former dictatorship with inherited advantages from the past and by invoking nostalgia through consistent reference to previous authoritarian achievements. I test this hypothesis with variables measuring successor party strength and the type of regime transition by combining individual-level survey data and country-level data. The findings emphasize the role of post-transition features in shaping alternative legacies on voter attitudes in former authoritarian societies.

Party Strength of Regionalist Parties of United Kingdom: Conceptualisation and Measuring

The article conceptualizes the concept of party strength and the measurement of its two quantitative elements (electoral and institutional) by example of four United Kingdom regionalist parties: Scottish National Party, Democratic Unionist Party, Sinn Fein and Plaid Cymru. Based on the analysis of the main theoretical approaches to party strength, the article proposes a method for its measurement, which can be used to measure and evaluate regionalism through the strength of regionalist parties in different political and institutional contexts. Comparing the levels of electoral and institutional party strength allows to highlight several tendencies: growth in electoral strength of UK regionalist parties during 2010s is noted, with stabilization of the institutional party strength; and the gap in the levels of institutional strength of the regionalist parties does not reflect the difference in the level of electoral strength. At the same time, the article mentions the challenges to assessing the strength of regionalist parties, namely, the need for detailed conceptualization of the qualitative characteristics of the party strength and the lack of analysis of the communicative and organizational elements of party strength.

Autocratic ruling parties during regime transitions: Investigating the democratizing effect of strong ruling parties

This study examines the role of autocratic ruling party strength in democratic transitions. While the impact of ruling party strength on regime stability is extensively studied, we know much less about how ruling party strength influences prospects for democratization during regime transitions. Proceeding from recent studies that suggest autocratic incumbents often choose to democratize from a position of strength rather than weakness, I discuss how specific attributes strong ruling party organizations wield can provide autocratic incumbents with incentives and capabilities to lead democratization in the context of regime change. Using original data on organizational characteristics of 161 autocratic ruling parties between 1970 and 2015, I provide the first set of systematic empirical evidence supporting the argument that ruling party organizational features that promote regime durability can simultaneously facilitate the implementation of substantial democratizing reforms by regime elites in a top-down fashion to preempt political opposition.

All Power to the Party! The Sources of Ruling Party Strength in Authoritarian Regimes

The role of political parties in facilitating authoritarian rule has been the subject of extensive research, but parties vary widely in their institutional strength to perform regime-bolstering functions. This article synthesizes existing literature to develop a general theory that explains the sources of ruling party strength in autocracies. We argue that party strength stems from a strategic calculation by political actors who weigh the benefits of building a strong party against its costs. The relative benefits of strong parties depend on the stage of the authoritarian life cycle and factors specific to the strategic environment. The observable implications of the theory are tested using a dataset that includes all autocratic ruling parties that were in power between 1940 and 2015. Consistent with our argument, parties that originated from revolutions tend to be the strongest, whereas those created to support an incumbent dictator tend to be the weakest. A country's resource endowments and external environment also shape the dynamics for party building.

The state of labor in the democratic party coalition

Since the New Deal, labor has been a key member of the Democratic coalition. As unions decline, their centrality to the Democratic Party has also diminished. At the same time, state variation in party preferences, party strength, and the types of unions that remain has led some unions to become involved in Republican politics. In this manuscript we investigate how central unions are in party networks using state legislative donation data from 2000–2016. We find that union contributions are associated with increasing centrality to the Democratic Party, while business interest contributions are associated with unions being less central. Only union membership rates are related to labor’s position in the Republican network. This work has implications for how we consider which groups are associated under a party’s umbrella. While labor may spend more money, it cannot keep pace with business groups in the party coalition.

Political parties and citizens’ well-being among non-democratic developing countries

This article explains variations in citizens’ well-being among non-democratic developing countries by disaggregating non-democracies and focusing on the role of party strength. The effect of party strength is analyzed through the prisms of information and capacity. I argue that stronger parties facilitate a two-way flow of information between citizens and political leaders about societal needs. Additionally, stronger parties have the capacity to aggregate information and formulate policies that meet the needs of the citizenry. The theory is tested through a time-series-cross-sectional analysis of developing non-democracies and is supplemented with a case narrative on Rwanda. The findings demonstrate the significance of disaggregating non-democratic regimes to better understand the political dynamics of citizens’ well-being.

Does Changing Electoral Systems Affect (Corrupt) Particularistic Exchanges? Evidence from the Italian Case

The literature on forms of particularism explores the impact of institutional variables on what is denoted, alternatively, as constituency service, pork-barrel politics, or corruption. Attention has mostly been given to electoral systems, but other institutional provisions and political factors, such as party strength, are also relevant. The present contribution investigates the likely effects of electoral reforms on corruption control and seeks confirmation of the hypothesis that single member plurality (even within mixed member) systems are conducive to a type of particularism that might help fight corruption, taking Italy as a case. We test the impact of two electoral reforms and three electoral systems enacted in Italy between 1996 and 2016, whose primary aim was bolstering enfeebled party leaderships and facilitating the formation of durable governments, and we compare the effort at corruption control of the Italian governments born under these different electoral systems with those of other European democracies.

Authoritarian-Led Democratization

Authoritarian regimes become more likely to democratize when they face little choice or little risk. In some cases, the risk of democratization to authoritarian incumbents is so low that ending authoritarianism might not mean exiting power at all. This article develops a unified theory of authoritarian-led democratization under conditions of relatively low incumbent risk. We argue that the party strength of the authoritarian incumbent is the most pivotal factor in authoritarian-led democratization. When incumbent party strength has been substantial enough to give incumbent authoritarian politicians significant electoral victory confidence, nondemocratic regimes have pursued reversible democratic experiments that eventually culminated in stable, thriving democracies. Evidence from Europe's first wave of democratization and more recent democratic transitions in Taiwan and Ghana illustrate how party strength has underpinned authoritarian-led democratization across the world and across modern history.

Political Parties and Public Participation in Constitution Making: Legitimation, Distraction, or Real Influence?

Over the past three decades, participatory methods of constitution making have gained increasing acceptance and are now an indispensable part of any constitution-making process. Despite this, we know little about how much public participation actually affects the constitution. This article investigates the impact of participation in two groundbreaking cases: Brazil (1988) and South Africa (1996). This analysis demonstrates that public participation has relatively small effects on the text, but that it varies in systematic ways. The theory advanced here posits that party strength (especially in terms of discipline and programmatic commitments) is the key determinant of the effectiveness of public participation. Strong parties may be more effective in many ways, but they are less likely to act on input from the public in constitution-making processes.