The limits of the right of intervention in a case before the International Court of Justice

Author(s):  
Taslim O. Elias
1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 903-909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip C. Jessup

For the first time the International Court of Justice has squarely faced and ruled upon the right of a third state to intervene in a case to which two other states are parties. The litigation was the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application of Malta for Permission to Intervene, Judgment of April 14, 1981. The Court unanimously denied permission to intervene, but three judges appended separate opinions which contain matters of considerable interest.


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-330
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY GORDON

AbstractTraditional conceptions of the international community have come under stress in a time of expanding international public order. Various initiatives purport to observe a reconceived international community from a variety of perspectives: transnational, administrative, pluralist, constitutional, etc. The perspectives on this changing dynamic evidenced by the International Court of Justice, however, have been largely neglected. But as the principal judicial institution tasked with representing the diversity of legal perspectives in the world, the Court represents an important forum by which to understand the changing appreciation of international community. While decisions of the Court have been restrained, an active discourse has been carried forward among individual judges. I look at part of that discourse, organized around one perspective, which I refer to as innate cosmopolitanism, introduced to the forum of the ICJ by the opinions of Judge Álvarez. The innate cosmopolitan perspective reflects an idea of the international community as an autonomous collectivity, enjoying a will, interests, or ends of its own, independent of constituent states. The application of that perspective under international law is put most to test in matters of international security, in particular where the interest in a discrete, global public order runs up against the right to self-defence vested in states. The innate cosmopolitan perspective has not, in these cases, achieved a controlling position – but, over time, it has been part of a dialectical process showing a change in the appreciation of international community before the Court, and a changing perception from the bench of the role of the Court in that community.


1959 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nasim Hasan Shah

Do states possess the right to seize evidence located within the territory of another, by forcible measures if necessary, if the object of this action is to procure the best evidence and thereby facilitate the task of an international tribunal in the decision of a dispute brought before it? In other words do states have the right to obtain discovery of evidence by intervention? This was one of the questions which the International Court of Justice was called upon to decide in the Corfu Channel Case.


Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

Chapter 1 introduces the topic and explains the book’s context, purpose and importance. The chapter elaborates on how the International Court of Justice, scholars and states have approached necessity and proportionality and situates the book in relation to the current understanding of each requirement. The chapter proceeds to examine the provenance of necessity and proportionality (including consideration of the much-celebrated Caroline incident), as well as explaining the approach that this author takes to explore their contemporary meaning. Chapter 1 concludes by offering some initial observations on the nature and function of necessity and proportionality and the purposes of the right of self-defence that frame and underpin the subsequent analysis.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-180
Author(s):  
Timo Koivurova

AbstractThe article examines how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has dealt with the concept of peoples and peoples' rights in its jurisprudence. Most prominent has been the Court's role with respect to the right of self-determination and it is this issue that forms the core of the article. A second important question dealt with is the role of indigenous peoples in ICJ case practice, as the struggle by those peoples to gain collective rights is a recent development in international law. Drawing on this analysis, the discussion proceeds to consider the role that the ICJ has played in the development of the rights of peoples in general and what its future role might be in this sphere of international law. The article also examines the way in which the Court has allowed peoples to participate in its proceedings and whether and how its treatment of peoples' rights has strengthened the general foundations of international law.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 35-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Doswald-Beck

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice represents the first time that the Court's judges have been called upon to analyse in some detail rules of international humanitarian law. Other instances, for example, the Nicaragua case, involved nowhere near such an extensive analysis. The Advisory Opinion is therefore of particular interest in that it contains important findings on the customary nature of a number of humanitarian law rules and interesting pronouncements on the interpretation of these rules and their relationship with other rules. Most judges based their final decision on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons on teleological interpretations of the law, choosing either the right of self-defence as being the most fundamental value, or the survival of civilization and the planet as a whole as paramount. Unfortunately, space does not permit a comment on these highly important analyses of the underpinnings of humanitarian law and its purpose in the international order. Therefore, rather than focusing primarily on the Court's conclusion as to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, this short comment will concentrate on the various pronouncements made on humanitarian law rules. Reference to the Court's finding on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons will only be made from the point of view of how it has contributed to the interpretation of those rules. For this purpose, reference will be made not only to the Advisory Opinion as such (hereafter referred to as the “Opinion”), but also to the various Separate and Dissenting Opinions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-389
Author(s):  
Matthijs de Blois

The Mandate for Palestine has a unique character regarding both its beneficiaries, the Jewish people, wherever they live, and the obligations of the Mandatory power. At the same time it has been a burdensome stone right from the beginning. Representatives of Palestinian Arabs have rejected it as being incompatible with their right to self-determination. The policies of Great Britain, the Mandatory power, show a gradual departure from its obligations. The establishment of the Jewish national home became, instead of the primary obligation, just one of the duties of equal weight and content as others under the Mandate. Following the establishment of the State of Israel, the relevance of the mandatory system in the light of Article 80 of the UN Charter has been recognised, inter alia, by the International Court of Justice. The unique character of the Palestine Mandate, however, has been kept under wraps. Some academic writings and legal actions by the Palestinians now offer a radical revisionism, which uses the Mandate as the legal basis for a Palestinian state. This trend is not without consequences for the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and for the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.


2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Ker-Lindsay

For 60 years, the international community has limited the right of territories to gain independence without the permission of the “parent state.” Such limits were, however, challenged when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, in February 2008. As a result, Belgrade referred the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 22 July 2010, it came back with its long-awaited decision. Taking a narrow view of the question, the majority argued that, in general, declarations of independence, as mere statements, do not violate international law unless stated otherwise by the Security Council. Thus, Kosovo's declaration of independence cannot be considered as being wholly “unique” – as those states that supported its statehood have claimed. On the key questions of whether Kosovo's secession is legal, or if it is even a state, they chose to avoid controversy. On these points, the international community is no clearer now than it was before the case.


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