The Interactions of Competition Law and Investment Law: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and EU Merger Control Regime

Author(s):  
Alexandr Svetlicinii
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Arts 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law, state aid; and EU merger control.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Ma

This paper examines the similarities and differences between the European and Chinese merger control systems, thereby considering the decision-making practice of the responsible competition authorities in China and the EU. Merger control is an important economic policy instrument both in China and in the EU. Traditionally, merger control essentially serves the purpose of preventing unwanted monopolies and other structural impairments of competition. In the EU, merger control is an important instrument of strengthening competition and the market economy in the inner-European market. Given that China considers itself to be a socialist country, the fact that China also has introduced a merger control system that largely meets international standards is remarkable. In a socialist country, the economic system is usually a planned economy instead of a market economy. Competition does not play a comparable role. Nevertheless, China created a merger control regime which was strongly influenced by European merger control in 2008. In many instances, even the same terminology was incorporated into the provisions. European merger control thus served as a model for the creation of Chinese merger control. Despite these similarities, there are also significant differences between European and Chinese merger control. These special features lie, in particular, in the consideration and weighting of non-competitive factors, such as public interest or national economic development. The deviations are due to the functions and objectives of the Chinese merger control regime.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-161
Author(s):  
Stephen Whitfield ◽  
Richard J. Brown ◽  
Ingrid Rogers

There has been an increased focus of the European Commission and numerous national competition authorities on data-related mergers, which also fits more generally in the context of a broader global competition law focus on the ‘FAANGs’ (i.e., Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google) and the wider tech sector. This article considers the impact of data on EU merger control and explores the theories of harm and legal frameworks which have been applied and developed in considering data-related competition concerns, in particular the notable developments in the Commission's recent consideration of Apple's acquisition of Shazam. The article considers that the impact of these developments is that data-related mergers should no longer be assessed by reference to traditional economic indicators such as market shares and concentration levels only, but rather also in the context of the broader global competition law focus on big tech.


Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas

This concluding chapter discusses the EU merger control regime. Merger-specific law is relatively new to the EU body of law. It was not until 1974 that specific merger regulation was even proposed, and not until over a decade after that that any merger regulation was actually adopted. Regulation 4064/89 (the ‘European Merger Control Regulation’ or ‘EMCR’) sets out an ex ante notification procedure for concentration with an EU dimension. Two reasons seem to have driven the adoption of a merger control regime by the EU. The first is economic. The second reason is of a legal nature. Between 1989 and 2010, more than 4,500 operations were notified to the Commission. This number does not comprise the very many mergers notified to the national competition authorities (NCAs).


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 219-236
Author(s):  
Adrian Bielecki ◽  

In Austria Asphalt, the Court of Justice issued the first preliminary ruling related to the EU merger control regime. In Advocate General Kokott’s words, the Austrian Supreme Court asked the Court of Justice to answer the fundamental question of what constitutes a concentration between undertakings within Article 3 of the EUMR. The Court of Justice held that Article 3 of the EUMR must be interpreted as meaning that a concentration is deemed to arise upon a change in the form of control of an existing undertaking which, previously exclusive, becomes joint only if the joint venture created by such a transaction performs on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. Although the ruling was rendered in the context of a specific transaction scenario, the underlying reasoning could shed new light on how to assess transactions that fall between acquisition of control and creation of a joint venture. However, this reasoning is incompliant with the purposes and economic foundations of the EU merger control regime. This can be proven both in relation to the transaction scenario directly covered by the question for a preliminary ruling and, if extrapolated, in relation to other transaction scenarios.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document