The impact of data on EU merger control

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-161
Author(s):  
Stephen Whitfield ◽  
Richard J. Brown ◽  
Ingrid Rogers
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Global Competition ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Legal Frameworks ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Concentration Levels

There has been an increased focus of the European Commission and numerous national competition authorities on data-related mergers, which also fits more generally in the context of a broader global competition law focus on the ‘FAANGs’ (i.e., Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google) and the wider tech sector. This article considers the impact of data on EU merger control and explores the theories of harm and legal frameworks which have been applied and developed in considering data-related competition concerns, in particular the notable developments in the Commission's recent consideration of Apple's acquisition of Shazam. The article considers that the impact of these developments is that data-related mergers should no longer be assessed by reference to traditional economic indicators such as market shares and concentration levels only, but rather also in the context of the broader global competition law focus on big tech.

scholarly journals Local nexus in merger control regimes

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-160
Author(s):  
Daniela Lukáčová
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Potential Effect ◽  
The State ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
National Legislation ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Economic Size ◽  
The Eu

Merger control is one of the competition law tools. While competition authorities in EU act primarily on the basis of national legislation, European Commission controls mergers with EU dimension. The jurisdictional tests relate only to the economic size of the parties and do not depend on the market shares of the parties or substantive impact of the transaction, or on whether the concentration will have any effects within the state. Globalization increases the number of multijurisdictional mergers that are subject to control of several competition authorities within or outside the EU. Differences in merger control proceedings in such cases with regard to the timeframe, or the result of the proceeding, could have a negative impact on the economy in another country. Parties to the concentration could decide to neglect the merger notification due to the timeframe, or complications connected with approving of multijurisdictional merger in other countries with jurisdiction. Therefore, the national authorities’ effort to set in their legislation turnover criteria with local nexus could help to control concentrations with potential effect on competition in their country.

21. Mergers (2): EU law

2021 ◽  
pp. 871-958
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Control Section ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines EU merger control. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of EU merger control. Section 3 discusses the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission in Brussels or by the national competition authorities (‘the NCAs’) of the Member States. Section 4 deals with the procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. Section 5 discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), and section 6 explains the procedure whereby the Commission may authorise a merger on the basis of commitments, often referred to as remedies, offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. The subsequent sections describe the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

21. Mergers (2): EU law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
National Competition ◽  
The Eu

This chapter provides an overview of EU merger control and the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission or by the national competition authorities. It deals with procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. It discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (‘the EUMR’) and explains the procedure for the Commission to authorise a merger on the basis of commitments offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. Finally, it describes the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

10. An Introduction to EU Competition Policy and Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Arts 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law, state aid; and EU merger control.

scholarly journals EU Merger Control and Harm to Innovation—A Long Walk to Freedom (from the Chains of Causation)

2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-30
Author(s):  
Mario Todino ◽  
Geoffroy van de Walle ◽  
Lucia Stoican
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
Control Analysis ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Specific Product ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Novel Theory

In a string of recent merger decisions, culminating in the Dow/DuPont case, the European Commission has profoundly revisited its traditional analysis of innovation and, ultimately, introduced what some authors have labeled “a novel theory of harm in EU merger policy.” According to this theory, the Commission does not look at harm to innovation on a specific product market in which parties are developing similar pipeline products, but adopts a general assessment of harm to innovation, unrelated to a specific product market and without considering potential anticompetitive effects on this basis. The purpose of this article is to show that over the last few years, the European Commission has been progressively departing from a “traditional” theory of harm in its assessment of mergers affecting innovation. In particular, we argue that the novel theory of harm developed in Dow/DuPont, based on a generic prejudice to innovation, is the landing place of a long journey through which the Commission has progressively altered the analytical framework applicable to traditional cases affecting pipeline products/potential competitors. And while this stance may be inspired by a legitimate policy goal, it brings the Commission on a collision route with the principles of causation and symmetry governing European Union merger control analysis.

Reforming EU merger control to capture ‘killer acquisitions’ – the case for caution

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-67
Author(s):  
Nicholas Levy ◽  
Henry Mostyn ◽  
Bianca Buzatu
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Review Process ◽  
Digital Age ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Control Rules ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Start Ups

This article examines whether EU merger control rules should be recalibrated to address concerns said to arise from acquisitions of innovative start-ups by established digital platforms – commonly referred to as ‘killer’ or ‘nascent’ acquisitions. It assesses various proposals designed to remedy two failings: a perceived failure to review anti-competitive transactions due to inadequate jurisdictional thresholds and a perceived failure to detect competition problems during the merger review process. It argues that, given the large number of transactions already subject to merger control, any expansion of existing rules should occur only where there is clear evidence of a significant enforcement gap. In the view of the authors, there is no persuasive evidence that a material number of anti-competitive digital acquisitions are escaping antitrust scrutiny, that the analytical framework applied by the European Commission should be significantly changed, or that the methodological tools employed to review concentrations are unfit for purpose. The authors therefore disfavour wide-ranging changes to the EU's rules and instead propose a series of incremental improvements to ensure that EU merger enforcement is tailored to the digital age.

9 Merger Control

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Control Regulation ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
The Eu

This concluding chapter discusses the EU merger control regime. Merger-specific law is relatively new to the EU body of law. It was not until 1974 that specific merger regulation was even proposed, and not until over a decade after that that any merger regulation was actually adopted. Regulation 4064/89 (the ‘European Merger Control Regulation’ or ‘EMCR’) sets out an ex ante notification procedure for concentration with an EU dimension. Two reasons seem to have driven the adoption of a merger control regime by the EU. The first is economic. The second reason is of a legal nature. Between 1989 and 2010, more than 4,500 operations were notified to the Commission. This number does not comprise the very many mergers notified to the national competition authorities (NCAs).

The impact of mergers on innovation in EU merger control

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-101
Author(s):  
Pascale Déchamps ◽  
Ilaria Fanton
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
Traditional Markets ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Impact

Are mergers good for innovation or do they hinder it? Finding a balance between protecting competition in innovation and allowing consolidation in markets where efficiencies might be generated has proven one of the biggest challenges of merger control in recent years. Although economic literature provides helpful pointers in striking that balance, it does not provide a general unambiguous framework. Competition authorities consider both aspects and may seem to have adopted different approaches to this issue in traditional markets (e.g. pharmaceuticals and pesticides) compared to digital markets. While the debate is still ongoing, this article summarizes the theoretical framework from the economic literature and how it has been applied in real recent cases by competition authorities.

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