Can the EU Merger Control Regime Regulate Too Big to Fail Banks? Some Problems and a Proposal

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Giannino
Keyword(s):  
Merger Control ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
The Eu

Die materielle Fusionskontrolle in der VR China und in der Europäischen Union

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Ma
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Socialist Country ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
National Economic ◽  
Vr China ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
The Eu

This paper examines the similarities and differences between the European and Chinese merger control systems, thereby considering the decision-making practice of the responsible competition authorities in China and the EU. Merger control is an important economic policy instrument both in China and in the EU. Traditionally, merger control essentially serves the purpose of preventing unwanted monopolies and other structural impairments of competition. In the EU, merger control is an important instrument of strengthening competition and the market economy in the inner-European market. Given that China considers itself to be a socialist country, the fact that China also has introduced a merger control system that largely meets international standards is remarkable. In a socialist country, the economic system is usually a planned economy instead of a market economy. Competition does not play a comparable role. Nevertheless, China created a merger control regime which was strongly influenced by European merger control in 2008. In many instances, even the same terminology was incorporated into the provisions. European merger control thus served as a model for the creation of Chinese merger control. Despite these similarities, there are also significant differences between European and Chinese merger control. These special features lie, in particular, in the consideration and weighting of non-competitive factors, such as public interest or national economic development. The deviations are due to the functions and objectives of the Chinese merger control regime.

9 Merger Control

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Control Regulation ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
The Eu

This concluding chapter discusses the EU merger control regime. Merger-specific law is relatively new to the EU body of law. It was not until 1974 that specific merger regulation was even proposed, and not until over a decade after that that any merger regulation was actually adopted. Regulation 4064/89 (the ‘European Merger Control Regulation’ or ‘EMCR’) sets out an ex ante notification procedure for concentration with an EU dimension. Two reasons seem to have driven the adoption of a merger control regime by the EU. The first is economic. The second reason is of a legal nature. Between 1989 and 2010, more than 4,500 operations were notified to the Commission. This number does not comprise the very many mergers notified to the national competition authorities (NCAs).

scholarly journals Into the Grey Zone. What Do We (Don’t) Know About Types of Concentrations Between Undertakings Under EU law After Austria Asphalt?

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 219-236
Author(s):  
Adrian Bielecki ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Joint Venture ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Grey Zone ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Economic Entity ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Economic Foundations ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
The Eu

In Austria Asphalt, the Court of Justice issued the first preliminary ruling related to the EU merger control regime. In Advocate General Kokott’s words, the Austrian Supreme Court asked the Court of Justice to answer the fundamental question of what constitutes a concentration between undertakings within Article 3 of the EUMR. The Court of Justice held that Article 3 of the EUMR must be interpreted as meaning that a concentration is deemed to arise upon a change in the form of control of an existing undertaking which, previously exclusive, becomes joint only if the joint venture created by such a transaction performs on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. Although the ruling was rendered in the context of a specific transaction scenario, the underlying reasoning could shed new light on how to assess transactions that fall between acquisition of control and creation of a joint venture. However, this reasoning is incompliant with the purposes and economic foundations of the EU merger control regime. This can be proven both in relation to the transaction scenario directly covered by the question for a preliminary ruling and, if extrapolated, in relation to other transaction scenarios.

EU merger review of the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings: where to now?

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-92
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Mary Wilks
Keyword(s):  
White Paper ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
One Year ◽  
Minority Shareholdings ◽  
Minority Interests ◽  
Policy Proposals ◽  
Benefits And Costs ◽  
The Eu

AbstractOn 9 July 2014, the European Commission (the Commission) published its White Paper “Towards more effective EU merger control”, which reviewed the operation of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) ten years after the introduction of the substantive test of “significant impediment to substantial competition” (SIEC) and proposed certain specific improvements, including the review of non-controlling minority interests under the EUMR. The 2014 White Paper followed approximately one year of consultation with Member States and interested parties, and was accompanied by a Staff Working Document, which analyses in more detail the considerations underlying the policy proposals in the 2014 White Paper, and an Impact Assessment, which analyses the potential benefits and costs of the various policy options considered.Less than six months after the consultation on the 2014 White Paper closed, Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager indicated that the Commission is reconsidering its proposals to allow it to review the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings under the EUMR. This decision has been welcomed by many in the business and legal community as the “targeted transparency system” proposed by the Commission had raised a number of concerns regarding proportionality, legal certainty, cost and administrative burden.Whilst we await the Commission’s next move, this article considers whether non-controlling minority shareholdings should be subject to EU merger control and the extent to which the Commission’s originally envisaged system adequately dealt with the issues it sought to address. This article also proposes a number of principles that the authors suggest should be taken into account when designing a balanced system of merger review for acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings in which the burden of the additional review is proportionate to the goals pursued.

21. Mergers (2): EU law

2021 ◽  
pp. 871-958
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Control Section ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines EU merger control. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of EU merger control. Section 3 discusses the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission in Brussels or by the national competition authorities (‘the NCAs’) of the Member States. Section 4 deals with the procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. Section 5 discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), and section 6 explains the procedure whereby the Commission may authorise a merger on the basis of commitments, often referred to as remedies, offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. The subsequent sections describe the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

19. The EU merger control regime and the treatment of joint ventures

2019 ◽  
pp. 427-467
Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino
Keyword(s):  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Time Limits ◽  
Stage Process ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
The Eu

This chapter discusses the application of competition law to mergers, focusing on the EU and the EUMR. In the EU, where a merger (‘concentration’) meets the relevant thresholds, it falls within the exclusive competence of the European Commission to examine the merger. Undertakings contemplating such a merger are required compulsorily to notify the Commission. The test of a merger’s acceptance is that of whether it substantially impedes effective competition in the internal market, in particular, but not exclusively, by creating or strengthening a dominant position. Using the powers set out in the Merger Regulation the Commission may authorize, or block, the merger over a two-stage process. Tight time limits apply. Appeals against Commission decisions are to the General Court.

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