Public Debt, Lobbying and Endogenous Redistribution in an Overlapping-Generations Model

Author(s):  
Tsuyoshi Shinozaki ◽  
Isidoro Mazza ◽  
Minoru Kunizaki
2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1640-1651 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikola Bokan ◽  
Andrew Hughes Hallett ◽  
Svend E. Hougaard Jensen

This paper develops an overlapping-generations model to study the growth-maximizing level of public debt under conditions of demograhic change. It is shown that the optimal debt level depends on a positive marginal productivity of public capital. In general, it also depends on the demographic parameters, but not if the government is not allowed to borrow to cover revenue shortfalls for current age-related spending. In that context, balanced budget rules are not an approriate form of fiscal rule. The implication is that a government facing demograhic change or demands for more welfare spending will have to adjust its fiscal plans to accommodate those changes, most likely downward, if growth is to be preserved. An advantage of this model is that it allows us to determine in advance the way in which fiscal policies need to adjust as demographic parameters change.


2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1198-1226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bossi ◽  
Gulcin Gumus

In this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping-generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of government revenues among transfer payments and old-age pensions. We show that the coalitions formed, the resulting political equilibria, and the demand for redistribution crucially depend on the level of income inequality and mobility.


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