Belief revision, epistemic conditionals and the Ramsey test

Synthese ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sten Lindstr�m ◽  
Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Ramsey Test

scholarly journals Revision and Conditional Inference for Abstract Dialectical Frameworks

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse Heyninck ◽  
Gabriele Kern-Isberner ◽  
Tjitze Rienstra ◽  
Kenneth Skiba ◽  
Matthias Thimm
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Research Topic ◽  
Conditional Inference ◽  
Ramsey Test ◽  
The One ◽  
Exact Relationship ◽  
Nonmonotonic Inference ◽  
Total Preorder

For propositional beliefs, there are well-established connections between belief revision, defeasible conditionals and nonmonotonic inference. In argumentative contexts, such connections have not yet been investigated. On the one hand, the exact relationship between formal argumentation and nonmonotonic inference relations is a research topic that keeps on eluding researchers despite recently intensified efforts, whereas argumentative revision has been studied in numerous works during recent years. In this paper, we show that similar relationships between belief revision, defeasible conditionals and nonmonotonic inference hold in argumentative contexts as well. We first define revision operators for abstract dialectical frameworks, and use such revision operators to define dynamic conditionals by means of the Ramsey test. We show that such conditionals can be equivalently defined using a total preorder over three-valued interpretations, and study the inferential behaviour of the resulting conditional inference relations.

DIFFERENCE-MAKING CONDITIONALS AND THE RELEVANT RAMSEY TEST

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
HANS ROTT
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Classical Theory ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Conditional Logic ◽  
Counterfactual Analysis ◽  
Ramsey Test ◽  
Difference Making ◽  
Alternative Version ◽  
Almost All

Abstract This article explores conditionals expressing that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. A ‘relevantised’ version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed in the context of the classical theory of belief revision. The idea of this test is that the antecedent is relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is accepted just in case (i) the consequent is accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent and (ii) the consequent fails to be accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent’s negation. The connective thus defined violates almost all of the traditional principles of conditional logic, but it obeys an interesting logic of its own. The article also gives the logic of an alternative version, the ‘Dependent Ramsey Test,’ according to which a conditional is accepted just in case (i) the consequent is accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent and (ii) the consequent is rejected (e.g., its negation is accepted) if the belief state is revised by the antecedent’s negation. This conditional is closely related to David Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation.

scholarly journals Revision by Conditionals: From Hook to Arrow

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jake Chandler ◽  
Richard Booth
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Independent Interest ◽  
Plug And Play ◽  
Ramsey Test ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision

The belief revision literature has largely focussed on the issue of how to revise one’s beliefs in the light of information regarding matters of fact. Here we turn to an important but comparatively neglected issue: How to model agents capable of acquiring information regarding which rules of inference (‘Ramsey Test conditionals’) they ought to use in reasoning about these facts. Our approach to this second question of so-called ‘conditional revision’ is distinctive insofar as it abstracts from the controversial details of how the address the first. We introduce a ‘plug and play’ method for uniquely extending any iterated belief revision operator to the conditional case. The flexibility of our approach is achieved by having the result of a conditional revision by a Ramsey Test conditional (‘arrow’) determined by that of a plain revision by its corresponding material conditional (‘hook’). It is shown to satisfy a number of new constraints that are of independent interest.

BELIEF-REVISION, THE RAMSEY TEST, MONOTONICITY, AND THE SO-CALLED IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS

2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 402-423
Author(s):  
NEIL TENNANT
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Methodological Error ◽  
Ramsey Test ◽  
Impossibility Results ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
New Diagnosis ◽  
Made In ◽  
Monotonicity Principle

Peter Gärdenfors proved a theorem purporting to show that it is impossible to adjoin to the AGM-postulates for belief-revision a principle of monotonicity for revisions. The principle of monotonicity in question is implied by the Ramsey test for conditionals. So Gärdenfors’ result has been interpreted as demonstrating that it is impossible to combine the Ramsey test for conditionals with the basic postulates for rational belief-revision. It is shown here that this interpretation of Gärdenfors’ result is unwarranted. A new diagnosis is offered of a methodological error made in the statement of the key principle of monotonicity. Crucial applications of this principle in Gärdenfors’ proof require one to regard as revisions what are really expansions. If monotonicity is stated only for genuine revisions, then Gärdenfors’ proof does not go through. Nor can it; for, when the monotonicity principle for revisions is correctly formulated, one can actually establish a contrary consistency result. This requires only a slight adjustment to the postulates of AGM-theory, in order to ensure that the three operations of expansion, contraction, and revision trichotomize the domain of theory-changes. It is further shown that being careful in this way about the proper domains of definition of the three operations of expansion, contraction, and revision also disposes of another, more direct, impossibility result, due to Arló-Costa, that targets the Ramsey test.

scholarly journals Ranking kinematics for revising by contextual information

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meliha Sezgin ◽  
Gabriele Kern-Isberner ◽  
Christoph Beierle
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Contextual Information ◽  
Proof Of Concept ◽  
Ranking Functions ◽  
Ramsey Test ◽  
Local Contexts ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision ◽  
Probability Kinematics ◽  
Set Up

AbstractProbability kinematics is a leading paradigm in probabilistic belief change. It is based on the idea that conditional beliefs should be independent from changes of their antecedents’ probabilities. In this paper, we propose a re-interpretation of this paradigm for Spohn’s ranking functions which we call Generalized Ranking Kinematics as a new principle for iterated belief revision of ranking functions by sets of conditional beliefs with respect to their specific subcontext. By taking into account semantical independencies, we can reduce the complexity of the revision task to local contexts. We show that global belief revision can be set up from revisions on the local contexts via a merging operator. Furthermore, we formalize a variant of the Ramsey-Test based on the idea of local contexts which connects conditional and propositional revision in a straightforward way. We extend the belief change methodology of c-revisions to strategic c-revisions which will serve as a proof of concept.

Children change their answers in response to neutral follow-up questions by a knowledgeable asker

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Bonawitz ◽  
Patrick Shafto ◽  
Yue Yu ◽  
Sophie Elizabeth Colby Bridgers ◽  
Aaron Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Correct Answer ◽  
New Information ◽  
Common Practices ◽  
Parent Child

Burgeoning evidence suggests that when children observe data, they use knowledge of the demonstrator’s intent to augment learning. We propose that the effects of social learning may go beyond cases where children observe data, to cases where they receive no new information at all. We present a model of how simply asking a question a second time may lead to belief revision, when the questioner is expected to know the correct answer. We provide an analysis of the CHILDES corpus to show that these neutral follow-up questions are used in parent-child conversations. We then present three experiments investigating 4- and 5-year-old children’s reactions to neutral follow-up questions posed by ignorant or knowledgeable questioners. Children were more likely to change their answers in response to a neutral follow-up question from a knowledgeable questioner than an ignorant one. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of common practices in legal, educational, and experimental psychological settings.

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