The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems

2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 333-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Péter Biró ◽  
Katarína Cechlárová ◽  
Tamás Fleiner
2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 1830-1837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Bredereck ◽  
Jiehua Chen ◽  
Dušan Knop ◽  
Junjie Luo ◽  
Rolf Niedermeier

Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing “incrementalized versions” of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for both problems, what is the computational cost of adapting an existing stable matching after some of the preferences of the agents have changed. While doing so, we also model the constraint that the new stable matching shall be not too different from the old one. After formalizing these incremental versions, we provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the computational complexity landscape of Incremental Stable Marriage and Incremental Stable Roommates. To this end, we exploit the parameters “degree of change” both in the input (difference between old and new preference profile) and in the output (difference between old and new stable matching). We obtain both hardness and tractability results, in particular showing a fixed-parameter tractability result with respect to the parameter “distance between old and new stable matching”.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-268
Author(s):  
SOFIE DE CLERCQ ◽  
STEVEN SCHOCKAERT ◽  
MARTINE DE COCK ◽  
ANN NOWE

AbstractSince the introduction of the stable marriage problem (SMP) by Gale and Shapley (1962), several variants and extensions have been investigated. While this variety is useful to widen the application potential, each variant requires a new algorithm for finding the stable matchings. To address this issue, we propose an encoding of the SMP using answer set programming (ASP), which can straightforwardly be adapted and extended to suit the needs of specific applications. The use of ASP also means that we can take advantage of highly efficient off-the-shelf solvers. To illustrate the flexibility of our approach, we show how our ASP encoding naturally allows us to select optimal stable matchings, i.e. matchings that are optimal according to some user-specified criterion. To the best of our knowledge, our encoding offers the first exact implementation to find sex-equal, minimum regret, egalitarian or maximum cardinality stable matchings for SMP instances in which individuals may designate unacceptable partners and ties between preferences are allowed.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (02) ◽  
pp. 181-198
Author(s):  
BETTINA KLAUS ◽  
FLIP KLIJN

We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a procedurally fair matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.'s (1999) analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto in terms of a probabilistic serial dictatorship on the set of stable matchings. Second, we show that Aldershof et al.'s (1999) conjectures are correct for small matching markets but not necessarily correct for large matching markets.


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