scholarly journals Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryosuke Sakai ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Arbitrary Number ◽  
Econ Theory ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Object Allocation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Equal Treatment Of Equals ◽  
Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.

scholarly journals Multi-Type Resource Allocation with Partial Preferences

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 2260-2267
Author(s):  
Haibin Wang ◽  
Sujoy Sikdar ◽  
Xiaoxi Guo ◽  
Lirong Xia ◽  
Yongzhi Cao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Partial Order ◽  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Hybrid Mechanism ◽  
Random Priority ◽  
Unrestricted Domain ◽  
Main Message ◽  
Equal Treatment Of Equals

We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well-known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problems (MTRAs) with partial preferences. In our setting, there are multiple types of divisible items, and a group of agents who have partial order preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each type. We show that for the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences, no mechanism satisfies both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. Notwithstanding this impossibility result, our main message is positive: When agents' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-nets, MPS satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, ordinal fairness, and upper invariance, while MRP satisfies ex-post-efficiency, sd-strategyproofness, and upper invariance, recovering the properties of PS and RP. Besides, we propose a hybrid mechanism, multi-type general dictatorship (MGD), combining the ideas of MPS and MRP, which satisfies sd-efficiency, equal treatment of equals and decomposability under the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences.

scholarly journals Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

2020 ◽  
Vol 188 ◽  
pp. 105036 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomoya Kazumura ◽  
Debasis Mishra ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Strategy Proof

scholarly journals Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Constantinos Daskalakis ◽  
Nikhil R. Devanur ◽  
S. Matthew Weinberg
Keyword(s):  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Budget Constraints ◽  
Ex Post

scholarly journals Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (4) ◽  
pp. 1486-1529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabrielle Fack ◽  
Julien Grenet ◽  
Yinghua He
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Test Scores ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Student Preferences ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Novel Approaches

We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings. (JEL D11, D12, D82, I23)

scholarly journals Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moritz Drexl ◽  
Andreas Kleiner
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rule ◽  
Welfare Analysis ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
The Status ◽  
Common Objection ◽  
The Common ◽  
Strategy Proof

A committee decides collectively whether to accept a given proposal or to maintain the status quo. Committee members are privately informed about their valuations and monetary transfers are possible. According to which rule should the committee make its decision? We consider strategy-proof and anonymous mechanisms and solve for the decision rule that maximizes utilitarian welfare, which takes monetary transfers to an external agency explicitly into account. For regular distributions of preferences, we find that it is optimal to exclude monetary transfers and to decide by qualified majority voting. This sheds new light on the common objection that criticizes voting for its inefficiency. (JEL D71, D72, D82)

scholarly journals STRATEGY-PROOF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION

2007 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANZ DIETRICH ◽  
CHRISTIAN LIST
Keyword(s):  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Judgment Aggregation ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Theoretic Concept ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.

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