Multi-Type Resource Allocation with Partial Preferences

We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well-known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problems (MTRAs) with partial preferences. In our setting, there are multiple types of divisible items, and a group of agents who have partial order preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each type. We show that for the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences, no mechanism satisfies both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. Notwithstanding this impossibility result, our main message is positive: When agents' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-nets, MPS satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, ordinal fairness, and upper invariance, while MRP satisfies ex-post-efficiency, sd-strategyproofness, and upper invariance, recovering the properties of PS and RP. Besides, we propose a hybrid mechanism, multi-type general dictatorship (MGD), combining the ideas of MPS and MRP, which satisfies sd-efficiency, equal treatment of equals and decomposability under the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences.

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Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

Social Choice and Welfare ◽

10.1007/s00355-021-01333-y ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Ryosuke Sakai ◽

Shigehiro Serizawa

Keyword(s):

Arbitrary Number ◽

Econ Theory ◽

Equal Treatment ◽

Revenue Maximization ◽

Object Allocation ◽

Ex Post ◽

Monetary Transfers ◽

Strategy Proof ◽

Equal Treatment Of Equals ◽

Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.

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An Optimal Water Resource Allocation Mechanism Based on Ex-Post Verification and Reward in Huangbai River

Water ◽

10.3390/w13111588 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (11) ◽

pp. 1588

Author(s):

Hui Zhang ◽

Jiaying Li

Keyword(s):

Resource Allocation ◽

Water Resources ◽

Water Resource ◽

Water Allocation ◽

Allocation Rule ◽

Allocation Efficiency ◽

Water Resource Allocation ◽

Water Users ◽

Ex Post ◽

Demand Information

Under the current administrative system (AS) in China, the water resources governor allocates limited water resources to several users to realize the utility of water resources, leading to a principal–agent problem. The governor (referred to as the principal and she) wishes to maximize water resource allocation efficiency, while each user (referred to as the agent and he) only wishes to maximize his own quota. In addition, the governor cannot know water demand information exactly since it is the water users’ private information. Hence, this paper builds an ex ante improved bankruptcy allocation rule and an ex post verification and reward mechanism to improve water allocation efficiency from the governor’s perspective. In this mechanism, the governor allocates water among users based on an improved bankruptcy rule before the water is used up, verifies users’ information by various approaches, and poses a negative reward to them if their information is found to be false after the water is used up. Then, this mechanism is applied to Huangbai River Basin. Research results show that the improved allocation rule could motivate users to report demand information more honestly, and ex post verification could motivate water users to further report their true information, which, as a result, could improve the water allocation efficiency. Furthermore, this mechanism could be applied to the allocation of other resources.

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Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.103.2.585 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 103 (2) ◽

pp. 585-623 ◽

Cited By ~ 119

Author(s):

Eric Budish ◽

Yeon-Koo Che ◽

Fuhito Kojima ◽

Paul Milgrom

Keyword(s):

Resource Allocation ◽

School Choice ◽

Real World ◽

Random Allocation ◽

Assignment Problems ◽

Matching Problems ◽

House Allocation ◽

Controlled Choice ◽

Ex Post ◽

Ex Ante

Randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation. We generalize the theory of randomized assignment to accommodate multi-unit allocations and various real-world constraints, such as group-specific quotas (“controlled choice”) in school choice and house allocation, and scheduling and curriculum constraints in course allocation. We develop new mechanisms that are ex ante efficient and fair in these environments, and that incorporate certain non-additive substitutable preferences. We also develop a “utility guarantee” technique that limits ex post unfairness in random allocations, supplementing the ex ante fairness promoted by randomization. This can be applied to multi-unit assignment problems and certain two-sided matching problems. (JEL C78, D82)

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Necessary players, Myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals

Annals of Operations Research ◽

10.1007/s10479-018-3055-0 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 280 (1-2) ◽

pp. 111-119 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Florian Navarro

Keyword(s):

Equal Treatment ◽

Equal Treatment Of Equals

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Sustainability principle for the ethics of healthcare resource allocation

Journal of Medical Ethics ◽

10.1136/medethics-2020-106644 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. medethics-2020-106644 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Christian Munthe ◽

Davide Fumagalli ◽

Erik Malmqvist

Keyword(s):

Resource Allocation ◽

Cost Effectiveness ◽

Healthcare Resource ◽

The Other ◽

Equal Treatment ◽

Ethical Principles ◽

Treatment Need ◽

Healthcare Resource Allocation

We propose a principle of sustainability to complement established principles used for justifying healthcare resource allocation. We argue that the application of established principles of equal treatment, need, prognosis and cost-effectiveness gives rise to what we call negative dynamics: a gradual depletion of the value possible to generate through healthcare. These principles should therefore be complemented by a sustainability principle, making the prospect of negative dynamics a further factor to consider, and possibly outweigh considerations highlighted by the other principles. We demonstrate how this principle may take different forms, and show that a commitment to sustainability is supported by considerations internal to the ethical principles already guiding healthcare resource allocation. We also consider two objections. The first of these, we argue, is either based on implausible assumptions or begs the question, whereas the second can be adequately accommodated by the principle we propose.

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Ex-Post Efficiency and Resource Allocation Under Uncertainty

The Review of Economic Studies ◽

10.2307/2297245 ◽

1978 ◽

Vol 45 (3) ◽

pp. 427-436 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

R. Harris

Keyword(s):

Resource Allocation ◽

Ex Post

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EFFECT OF MORAL CONDUCT ON TAX MANAGEMENT: COHERENT PERCEPTIVE

European Journal of Management and Marketing Studies ◽

10.46827/ejmms.v6i3.1086 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 6 (3) ◽

Author(s):

Inyang Ochi Inyang ◽

Rose Emmanuel Eyo ◽

John Oboh Ogenyi

Keyword(s):

Best Practice ◽

Equal Treatment ◽

Public Authorities ◽

Tax System ◽

Moral Conduct ◽

Ex Post ◽

Tax Management ◽

Ex Post Facto ◽

Tax Payers ◽

The Impact

The exploration was undertaken on the effect of moral conduct on tax management: Coherent perceptive. The objectives were to: determine the effect of tax equity on tax management in Nigeria; investigate how tax payers’ integrity influence tax management in Nigeria; ascertain the nexus of fairness and tax management in Nigeria; and examine the impact of honesty on tax management in Nigeria. The design adopted in this study was an ex post facto design. This is because the events had already taken place before the investigation is carried out. The ex-post facto design uses descriptive survey to scientifically collect data from a population and explores the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The data for the study were analyzed with multiple linear regression technique to determine the nexus between the moral conduct of tax payers and tax management. The result revealed that tax equity, taxpayers’ integrity, tax fairness and tax honesty affect tax management in Nigeria. Therefore, the study ended by making the following suggestions; that great care should be taken in developing a code of best practice for tax managers to ensure that all the moral factors are effectively addressed within this code for efficient and effective tax structure. The public authorities and tax managers should encourage taxpayers’ knowledge and integrity through the provision of quality infrastructural facilities and other incentives to enhance its revenue generation. The motivation of tax payers through the provision of public goods and services will help to encourage them to remit their tax liabilities and hence improve on their moral conducts for efficient tax management. Individual tax laws need to adhere to moral internal and external standards, such as equal treatment and principles imminent to a given tax, derived from its legal character. The moral quality or fairness of tax law is important because it determines the reach of the obligation of the constituents to pay taxes and the level of voluntary compliance. The tax system should be fair and objective. High level of literacy and managerial capability should be enhanced through adequate sensitization and awareness on the part of the taxpayers, while the managerial competence of the tax collectors should be appropriately enhanced towards the development of efficient tax system. JEL: L20; L23 Article visualizations:<img src="/-counters-/edu_01/0785/a.php" alt="Hit counter" />

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Mechanisms for Fair Allocation Problems: No-Punishment Payment Rules in Verifiable Settings

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research ◽

10.1613/jair.4224 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 49 ◽

pp. 403-449 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

G. Greco ◽

F. Scarcello

Keyword(s):

Computational Complexity ◽

High Probability ◽

Optimal Allocation ◽

Equal Treatment ◽

Fair Allocation ◽

Presumption Of Innocence ◽

Indivisible Goods ◽

Coalitional Games ◽

Monetary Compensation ◽

Equal Treatment Of Equals

Mechanism design is considered in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation, by focusing on problems where agents' declarations on allocated goods can be verified before payments are performed. A setting is considered where verification might be subject to errors, so that payments have to be awarded under the presumption of innocence, as incorrect declared values do not necessarily mean manipulation attempts by the agents. Within this setting, a mechanism is designed that is shown to be truthful, efficient, and budget-balanced. Moreover, agents' utilities are fairly determined by the Shapley value of suitable coalitional games, and enjoy highly desirable properties such as equal treatment of equals, envy-freeness, and a stronger one called individual-optimality. In particular, the latter property guarantees that, for every agent, her/his utility is the maximum possible one over any alternative optimal allocation. The computational complexity of the proposed mechanism is also studied. It turns out that it is #P-complete so that, to deal with applications with many agents involved, two polynomial-time randomized variants are also proposed: one that is still truthful and efficient, and which is approximately budget-balanced with high probability, and another one that is truthful in expectation, while still budget-balanced and efficient.

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