scholarly journals Is justice grounded? How expertise shapes conceptual representation of institutional concepts

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Villani ◽  
Stefania D’Ascenzo ◽  
Anna M. Borghi ◽  
Corrado Roversi ◽  
Mariagrazia Benassi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Institutions ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Conceptual Representation ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Inner Experiences ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Hand Involvement ◽  
Positive Valence ◽  
Concrete Concepts

AbstractUsing abstract concepts is a hallmark of human cognition. While multiple kinds of abstract concepts exist, they so far have been conceived as a unitary kind in opposition to concrete ones. Here, we focus on Institutional concepts, like justice or norm, investigating their fine-grained differences with respect to other kinds of abstract and concrete concepts, and exploring whether their representation varies according to individual proficiency. Specifically, we asked experts and non-experts in the legal field to evaluate four kinds of concepts (i.e., institutional, theoretical, food, artefact) on 16 dimensions: abstractness-concreteness; imageability; contextual availability; familiarity; age of acquisition; modality of acquisition; social valence; social metacognition; arousal; valence; interoception; metacognition; perceptual modality strength; body-object interaction; mouth and hand involvement. Results showed that Institutional concepts rely more than other categories on linguistic/social and inner experiences and are primarily characterized by positive valence. In addition, a more subtle characterization of the institutional domain emerged: Pure-institutional concepts (e.g., parliament) were perceived as more similar to technical tools, while Meta-institutional concepts (e.g., validity) were characterized mainly by abstract components. Importantly, for what concerns individual proficiency, we found that the level of expertise affects conceptual representation. Only law-experts associated Institutional concepts with exteroceptive and emotional experiences, showing also a more grounded and situated representation of the two types of institutional concepts. Overall, our finding highlights the richness and flexibility of abstract concepts and suggests that they differ in the degree of embodiment and grounding. Implications of the results for current theories of conceptual representation and social institutions are discussed.

EXPRESS: Articulatory suppression delays processing of abstract words: the role of inner speech

2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110536
Author(s):  
Chiara Fini ◽  
Gian Daniele Zannino ◽  
Matteo Orsoni ◽  
Giovanni Augusto Carlesimo ◽  
Mariagrazia Benassi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Articulatory Suppression ◽  
Judgment Task ◽  
Inner Speech ◽  
Dominant Hand ◽  
Conceptual Representation ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Single Object ◽  
Abstract Words ◽  
Concrete Concepts

Compared to concrete concepts, like “book”, abstract concepts expressed by words like “justice” are more detached from sensorial experiences, even though they are also grounded in sensorial modalities. Abstract concepts lack a single object as referent and are characterized by higher variability both within and across participants. According to the Word as Social Tool (WAT) proposal, owing to their complexity, abstract concepts need to be processed with the help of inner language. Inner language can namely help participants to re-explain to themselves the meaning of the word, to keep information active in working memory, and to prepare themselves to ask information from more competent people. While previous studies have demonstrated that the mouth is involved during abstract concepts’ processing, both the functional role and the mechanisms underlying this involvement still need to be clarified. We report an experiment in which participants were required to evaluate whether 78 words were abstract or concrete by pressing two different pedals. During the judgment task, they were submitted, in different blocks, to a baseline, an articulatory suppression, and a manipulation condition. In the last two conditions, they had to repeat a syllable continually and to manipulate a softball with their dominant hand. Results showed that articulatory suppression slowed down the processing of abstract more than that of concrete words. Overall results confirm the WAT proposal’s hypothesis that abstract concepts processing involves the mouth motor system and specifically inner speech. We discuss the implications for current theories of conceptual representation.

scholarly journals A Peircean account of concepts: grounding abstraction in phylogeny through a comparative neuroscientific perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Cuccio ◽  
Vittorio Gallese
Keyword(s):  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Embodied Simulation ◽  
Faculty Psychology ◽  
Link Type ◽  
The One ◽  
Concrete Concepts

The nature of concepts has always been a hotly debated topic in both philosophy and psychology and, more recently, also in cognitive neuroscience. Different accounts have been proposed of what concepts are. These accounts reflect deeply different conceptions of how the human mind works. In the last decades, two diametrically opposed theories of human cognition have been discussed and empirically investigated: the Computational Theory of Mind, on the one hand (Fodor 1983 The modularity of mind: an essay on faculty psychology ; Pylyshyn 1984 Computation and cognition: toward a foundation for cognitive science ), and Embodied Cognition (Barsalou 2008 Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59 , 617–645. ( doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639 ); Gallese & Lakoff 2005 Cogn. Neuropsychol. 22 , 455–479 ( doi:10.1080/02643290442000310 ); Shapiro 2011 Embodied cognition ), on the other hand. The former proposes that concepts are abstract and amodal symbols in the language of thought, while the latter argues for the embodied nature of concepts that are conceived of as grounded in actions and perception. The embodiment of both concrete and abstract concepts has been challenged by many (e.g. Mahon & Caramazza 2008 J. Physiol. 102 , 59–70. ( doi:10.1016/j.jphysparis.2008.03.004 ); Caramazza et al . 2014 Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 37 , 1–15. ( doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-071013-013950 )). These challenges will be here taken seriously and addressed from a comparative perspective. We will provide a phylogenetic and neurobiologically inspired account of the embodied nature of both abstract and concrete concepts. We will propose that, although differing in certain respect, they both might have a bodily foundation. Commonalities between abstract and concrete concepts will be explained by recurring to the Peircean notions of icon and abductive inference (CP 2.247). According to Peirce, icons are the kind of signs on which abductive inferences rest (Peirce CS 1931 in Collected papers of Charles S. Peirce, Hartshorne C, Weiss P, Burks AW. (eds), 40; Peirce CS 1997 In The 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism (ed. A. Turrisi)). It will be claimed that the mechanism of Embodied Simulation (Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011 Trends Cogn. Sci. 15 , 512–519. ( doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.09.003 )) can be described as an icon (Cuccio V & Caruana F. 2015 Il corpo come icona. Abduzione, strumenti ed Embodied Simulation. Versus, n. 119, 93–103), and it will then be suggested that on these, basic natural signs rest, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, the capacity to conceptualize. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.

Varieties of abstract concepts and their grounding in perception or action

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Kiefer ◽  
Marcel Harpaintner
Keyword(s):  
Grounded Cognition ◽  
Conceptual Representation ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Conceptual Category ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Linguistic Representations ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Conceptual Memory ◽  
Sensorimotor Information ◽  
Concrete Concepts

AbstractFor a very long time, theorizing in the cognitive sciences was dominated by the assumption that abstract concepts, which lack a perceivable referent, can only be handled by amodal or verbal linguistic representations. In the last years, however, refined grounded cognition theories emphasizing the importance of emotional and introspective information for abstract concepts, in addition to verbal associations and sensorimotor information, have received increasing support. Here, we review theoretical accounts of the structure and neural basis of conceptual memory and evaluate them in light of recent empirical evidence with regard to the processing of concrete and abstract concepts. Based on this literature review, we argue that abstract concepts should not be treated as a homogenous conceptual category, whose meaning is established by one single specific type of representation. Instead, depending on the feature composition, there are different subgroups of abstract concepts, including those with strong relations to vision or action, which are represented in the visual and motor brain systems similar to concrete concepts. The reviewed findings with regard to concrete and abstract concepts can be accommodated best by hybrid theories of conceptual representation assuming an interaction between modality-specific, multimodal and amodal hub areas.

scholarly journals Abstract and concrete concepts in conversation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Villani ◽  
Matteo Orsoni ◽  
Luisa Lugli ◽  
Mariagrazia Benassi ◽  
Anna M. Borghi
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Knowledge ◽  
Social Aspects ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Inner Experiences ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
The World ◽  
Spatio Temporal ◽  
Concrete Concepts ◽  
Visual Properties

Concepts allow us to make sense of the world. Most evidence on their acquisition and representation comes from studies of single decontextualized words and focuses on the opposition between concrete and abstract concepts (e.g. bottle vs. truth). Our study examines linguistic exchanges analyzing the differences between sub-kinds of concepts. Participants responded to sentences involving sub-kinds of concrete (tools, animals, food) and abstract concepts (PS, philosophical-spiritual; EMSS, emotional-social, PSTQ, physical-spatio-temporal-quantitative). We found differences in content: foods evoked interoception; tools and animals elicited materials, spatial, auditive features, confirming their sensorimotor grounding. PS and EMSS yield inner experiences (e.g., emotions, cognitive states, introspections) and oppose PSTQ, tied to visual properties and concrete agency. More crucially, the various concepts elicited different interactional dynamics: more abstract concepts generated higher uncertainty and more interactive exchanges than concrete ones. Investigating concepts in situated interactions opens new possibilities for studying conceptual knowledge and its pragmatic and social aspects.

scholarly journals Concepts for which we need others more: The case of abstract concepts

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna M. Borghi
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Word Meaning ◽  
Interactive Methods ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Core Component ◽  
Concrete Concepts ◽  
Sensorimotor Processes

The capability to form and use concepts is a core component of human cognition. While all concepts are grounded in sensorimotor processes, more abstract concepts (e.g. “phantasy”) collect more heterogeneous and perceptually dissimilar exemplars; thus, linguistic and social interaction are particularly crucial for their acquisition and use. Due to their indeterminacy, abstract concepts generate more uncertainty than more concrete concepts; hence they induce people to monitor their inner knowledge longer and then to revert to others to ask for information and negotiate the word meaning. We propose that abstract concepts are concepts for which we need others more – other people are essential to acquire, process, and use them. Conceiving them in these terms requires the employment of novel, interactive methods to investigate their representation in use.

Effects of Context on Processing Emotionally Neutral Abstract and Concrete Concepts

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (7) ◽  
pp. 1191-1200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liusheng Wang ◽  
Hongmei Qiu ◽  
Jianjun Yin
Keyword(s):  
College Students ◽  
Lexical Decision ◽  
Lexical Decision Task ◽  
Emotional Valence ◽  
Decision Task ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Context Condition ◽  
Word Context ◽  
Concrete Concepts ◽  
Concrete Words

The abstractness effect describes the phenomenon of individuals processing abstract concepts faster and more accurately than they process concrete concepts. In this study, we explored the effects of context on how 43 college students processed words, controlling for the emotional valence of the words. The participants performed a lexical decision task in which they were shown individual abstract and concrete words, or abstract and concrete words embedded in sentences. The results showed that in the word-context condition the participants' processing of concrete concepts improved, whereas in the sentence-context condition their processing of abstract concepts improved. These findings support the embodied cognition theory of concept processing.

Characterization of ultra-fine grained aluminum produced by accumulative back extrusion (ABE)

2012 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 14-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Alihosseini ◽  
G. Faraji ◽  
A.F. Dizaji ◽  
K. Dehghani
Keyword(s):  
Fine Grained

scholarly journals How well do similarity measures predict priming in abstract and concrete concepts?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Montefinese ◽  
Erin Michelle Buchanan ◽  
David Vinson
Keyword(s):  
Word Association ◽  
Semantic Representation ◽  
Similarity Measures ◽  
Semantic Features ◽  
Association Strength ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Strategic Processes ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Two Measures ◽  
Concrete Concepts

Models of semantic representation predict that automatic priming is determined by associative and co-occurrence relations (i.e., spreading activation accounts), or to similarity in words' semantic features (i.e., featural models). Although, these three factors are correlated in characterizing semantic representation, they seem to tap different aspects of meaning. We designed two lexical decision experiments to dissociate these three different types of meaning similarity. For unmasked primes, we observed priming only due to association strength and not the other two measures; and no evidence for differences in priming for concrete and abstract concepts. For masked primes there was no priming regardless of the semantic relation. These results challenge theoretical accounts of automatic priming. Rather, they are in line with the idea that priming may be due to participants’ controlled strategic processes. These results provide important insight about the nature of priming and how association strength, as determined from word-association norms, relates to the nature of semantic representation.

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