scholarly journals Supplier’s cooperation strategy with two competing manufacturers under wholesale price discount contract considering technology investment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shanxue Yang ◽  
Hongwei Liu ◽  
Guoli Wang ◽  
Yifei Hao
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shanxue Yang ◽  
Hongwei Liu ◽  
Guoli Wang ◽  
Yifei Hao

Abstract Cooperation between upstream suppliers and downstream manufacturers in technology investment is a popular way to improve production technology for reducing suppliers' production costs of key components. Technology investments undertaken by manufacturers and wholesale price discount contract provided by suppliers have an important impact on their cooperation. This paper explores whether a supplier should cooperate with two downstream competing manufacturers to accept their technology investments to reduce the supplier's production cost of a key component. Specifically, we consider the following three cooperation strategies: the supplier does not accept manufacturers' technology investments, only accepts one manufacturer's technology investment and accepts both manufacturers' technology investments. Our results demonstrate that the wholesale price discount contract and the technology investment can enhance the profits of the supplier and two manufacturers when the discount degree is low. Further, we conclude that when the discount degree is relatively low or when the discount degree and the technology investment efficiency are relatively high, the supplier's optimal cooperation strategy with two manufacturers is to accept both manufacturers' technology investments for reducing the supplier's production cost of the key component and both manufacturers are also willing to invest simultaneously. At last, we extend the model to the asymmetric potential market size and show that our theoretical results are robust.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.


2013 ◽  
Vol 143 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruo Du ◽  
Avijit Banerjee ◽  
Seung-Lae Kim

2009 ◽  
Vol 194 (2) ◽  
pp. 538-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Bykadorov ◽  
Andrea Ellero ◽  
Elena Moretti ◽  
Silvia Vianello

Nature ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Nordling

MIS Quarterly ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 453-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajiv Sabherwal ◽  
◽  
Sanjiv Sabherwal ◽  
Taha Havaknor ◽  
Zach Steelman ◽  
...  

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