scholarly journals Coalition-proof stable networks

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chenghong Luo ◽  
Ana Mauleon ◽  
Vincent Vannetelbosch
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Strong Stability ◽  
Coalition Proof ◽  
Stable Network

AbstractWe propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed. A network is coalition-proof stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible group deviation. A coalition is said to have a credible group deviation if there is a profitable group deviation to some network and there is no subcoalition of the deviating players which has a subsequent credible group deviation. Coalition-proof stability is a coarsening of strong stability. We emphasize the importance of coalition-proof stability by considering four models where a strongly stable network fails to exist while a coalition-proof stable network does exist. We provide an easy to verify condition for the existence of a coalition-proof stable network while a strongly stable network may not exist. There is no relationship between the set of coalition-proof stable networks and the set of networks induced by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Myerson’s linking game.

STRONG NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MULTISTAGE GAMES

2002 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 255-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. A. PETROSJAN ◽  
L. V. GRAUER
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Regularization Procedure ◽  
Multistage Games ◽  
Strong Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Graph Tree ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Infinitely Repeated Games ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Coalition Proof

Infinite multistage games G with games Γ(·) played on each stage are considered. The definition of path and trajectory in graph tree are introduced. For infinite multistage games G a regularization procedure is introduced and in the regularizied game a strong Nash Equilibrium (coalition proof) is constructed. The approach considered in this paper is similar to one used in the proof of Folk theorems for infinitely repeated games. The repeated n-person "Prisoner's Dilemma" game is considered, as a special case. For this game a strong Nash Equilibrium is found.

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Equilibrium Conditions ◽  
Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document