scholarly journals Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization

2002 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Keiding ◽  
Bezalel Peleg
Author(s):  
Chenghong Luo ◽  
Ana Mauleon ◽  
Vincent Vannetelbosch

AbstractWe propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed. A network is coalition-proof stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible group deviation. A coalition is said to have a credible group deviation if there is a profitable group deviation to some network and there is no subcoalition of the deviating players which has a subsequent credible group deviation. Coalition-proof stability is a coarsening of strong stability. We emphasize the importance of coalition-proof stability by considering four models where a strongly stable network fails to exist while a coalition-proof stable network does exist. We provide an easy to verify condition for the existence of a coalition-proof stable network while a strongly stable network may not exist. There is no relationship between the set of coalition-proof stable networks and the set of networks induced by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Myerson’s linking game.


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 476-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. König ◽  
Xiaodong Liu ◽  
Yves Zenou

We analyze a model of R&D alliance networks where firms are engaged in R&D collaborations that lower their production costs while competing on the product market. We provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium and determine the optimal R&D subsidy program that maximizes total welfare. We then structurally estimate this model using a unique panel of R&D collaborations and annual company reports. We use our estimates to study the impact of targeted versus nondiscriminatory R&D subsidy policies and empirically rank firms according to the welfare-maximizing subsidies they should receive.


2002 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 255-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. A. PETROSJAN ◽  
L. V. GRAUER

Infinite multistage games G with games Γ(·) played on each stage are considered. The definition of path and trajectory in graph tree are introduced. For infinite multistage games G a regularization procedure is introduced and in the regularizied game a strong Nash Equilibrium (coalition proof) is constructed. The approach considered in this paper is similar to one used in the proof of Folk theorems for infinitely repeated games. The repeated n-person "Prisoner's Dilemma" game is considered, as a special case. For this game a strong Nash Equilibrium is found.


Author(s):  
K. Urban ◽  
Z. Zhang ◽  
M. Wollgarten ◽  
D. Gratias

Recently dislocations have been observed by electron microscopy in the icosahedral quasicrystalline (IQ) phase of Al65Cu20Fe15. These dislocations exhibit diffraction contrast similar to that known for dislocations in conventional crystals. The contrast becomes extinct for certain diffraction vectors g. In the following the basis of electron diffraction contrast of dislocations in the IQ phase is described. Taking account of the six-dimensional nature of the Burgers vector a “strong” and a “weak” extinction condition are found.Dislocations in quasicrystals canot be described on the basis of simple shear or insertion of a lattice plane only. In order to achieve a complete characterization of these dislocations it is advantageous to make use of the one to one correspondence of the lattice geometry in our three-dimensional space (R3) and that in the six-dimensional reference space (R6) where full periodicity is recovered . Therefore the contrast extinction condition has to be written as gpbp + gobo = 0 (1). The diffraction vector g and the Burgers vector b decompose into two vectors gp, bp and go, bo in, respectively, the physical and the orthogonal three-dimensional sub-spaces of R6.


2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


1982 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Kumar ◽  
C. W. Bert

Abstract Unidirectional cord-rubber specimens in the form of tensile coupons and sandwich beams were used. Using specimens with the cords oriented at 0°, 45°, and 90° to the loading direction and appropriate data reduction, we were able to obtain complete characterization for the in-plane stress-strain response of single-ply, unidirectional cord-rubber composites. All strains were measured by means of liquid mercury strain gages, for which the nonlinear strain response characteristic was obtained by calibration. Stress-strain data were obtained for the cases of both cord tension and cord compression. Materials investigated were aramid-rubber, polyester-rubber, and steel-rubber.


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