Benefits of horizontal cooperation in supply chains

4OR ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hacardiaux
Author(s):  
Wenfang Shang ◽  
Liangliang Teng ◽  
Jian-bo Yang

AbstractWith the wider recognition of the concept of environmental protection and sustainable development, more and more manufacturers have begun to implement green manufacturing strategies. However, green development is a gradual process, and the coexistence of ordinary and green products is common. This paper examines the competition between ordinary products and green ones based on supply chains, and discusses the impact of retailers’ horizontal cooperation on pricing, greenness, market demand, profit, and other related decisions and results. Model solutions and numerical experiments have shown that consumers’ green preference (CGP) has a positive impact on the results of green products and negative effects on those of ordinary ones; however, the impact of competition intensity (CI) is more complex, and the trend tends to change if it exceeds a certain critical value. In general, cooperation encourages retailers to raise prices and make manufacturers lower wholesale prices, but the retail and wholesale prices of green products are always higher than the corresponding prices of ordinary ones. Market demand can be reduced due to cooperation, but it is conducive to strengthening green products’ greenness. However, if CI exceeds a certain threshold, the greenness will be weakened by cooperation. Both retailers can benefit from cooperation easily and they always reach a win-win situation, but manufacturers suffer badly as a result. Nevertheless, when CI is weak, cooperation will bring a greater profit improvement to the whole chain of ordinary products; in this case, if a retailer is willing to compensate for a manufacturer’s profit loss and help it benefit from cooperation, the manufacturer will encourage the retailer to cooperate horizontally with the green retailer, but the green chain will be seriously damaged. When CI is strong, the greenness of green products is not obvious enough, and cooperation can bring some chances to achieve a win-win situation for two chains; if the green retailer can obtain a larger share from cooperation under this scenario, it can also enable its manufacturer to obtain compensation and change the profit increment from negative to positive. From an overall perspective, when CI is very weak or very strong, horizontal cooperation is conducive to improving the profit of the entire supply chain competition system, but when CI is relatively flat, independent operation for each chain is more advantageous; if the competition status is stable and unchanged, independent competition will be superior to horizontal cooperation.


Author(s):  
Hui Li ◽  
Meng Shang ◽  
Xiaohui Qin ◽  
Rou Li ◽  
Yong Tan

The main body of competition has changed from the competition between enterprises to the competition between supply chains. The cooperation of the chain-to-chain attracts large attention from entrepreneurs and scholars in an increasingly competitive environment. Thus, this paper studies a chain-to-chain system with price competition consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer in each supply chain under carbon cap-and-trade regulation. Considering vertical-horizontal cooperation, the six different models are established by introducing the structural cooperation and the contractual cooperation (adopting the wholesale price contract) of supply chains. Based on the Stackelbeg game and Nash game, the optimal solutions of six models are obtained. The results show that the decisions, profits, and social welfare of the supply chains are affected by the structural cooperation than the contractual cooperation. The asymmetric competition structure changes the bargaining power of the supply chains. The relationship of supply chains' pricing only is affected by the cooperation structures. The relationship of  the cap setting, profits, and social welfare are affected by the cooperation structures and the main decision parameters.


2021 ◽  
Vol 122 ◽  
pp. 102888
Author(s):  
Han Zou ◽  
Maged M. Dessouky ◽  
Shichun Hu

2020 ◽  
Vol 02 (03/04) ◽  
pp. 60-61
Author(s):  
Jörg Schlüchtermann ◽  
Johannes Heller

Insbesondere in komplexen Supply Chains ist es heute üblich, dass Kunden ihre Lieferanten über Selbstverpflichtungserklärungen (Codes of Conduct) steuern. Forschungen aus anderen Industrien zeigen die Möglichkeiten, aber auch Grenzen der Arbeit mit diesem Instrument des Lieferantenmanagements. Davon können auch Krankenhauseinkäufer profitieren.


2003 ◽  
Vol 32 (11) ◽  
pp. 634-641
Author(s):  
Hans Corsten ◽  
Ralf Gössinger
Keyword(s):  

2000 ◽  
Vol 29 (9) ◽  
pp. 535-539
Author(s):  
Rolf Krüger ◽  
Marion Steven
Keyword(s):  

Controlling ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 177-184
Author(s):  
Michael Eßig
Keyword(s):  

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