Bayes–Nash: Bayesian inference for Nash equilibrium selection in human-robot parallel play

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shray Bansal ◽  
Jin Xu ◽  
Ayanna Howard ◽  
Charles Isbell
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Bayesian Inference ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Parallel Play

scholarly journals Valuable Cheap Talk and Equilibrium Selection

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Jamison
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Fictitious Play ◽  
Meaningful Communication

Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient outcome amongst the set of equilibria. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a rationale for expecting Nash equilibria in general. This paper presents a plausible formal model of cheap talk that distinguishes and resolves these possibilities. Players are assumed to have an unlimited opportunity to send messages before playing an arbitrary game. Using an extension of fictitious play beliefs, minimal assumptions are made concerning which messages about future actions are credible and hence contribute to final beliefs. In this environment, it is shown that meaningful communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to be a consequence of imposing optimality on the cheap talk portion of the extended game. This finding contrasts with previous “babbling” results.

scholarly journals A Bayesian Framework for Nash Equilibrium Inference in Human-Robot Parallel Play

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shray Bansal ◽  
Jin Xu ◽  
Ayana Howard ◽  
Charles Isbell
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Bayesian Framework ◽  
Parallel Play

scholarly journals On the Solutions of Games in Normal Forms: Particular Models based on Nash Equilibrium Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Gabriel Turbay ◽  
Giovanni E. Reyes
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Normal Forms ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Equilibrium Theory ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
John Von Neumann ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
The Third

Abstract The main objective of this paper is to present in a deductive way, solutions for general games played under normal conditions following competitive paths, applying core principles of Nash equilibrium. Here the normal approach implies strategic choices available for each player, formulated and implemented without any information concerning specific choices to be made by others players. It is convenient to keep in mind that John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern outlined a set of conditions for Nash equilibrium for a game in normal form, proposed as the basic framework to analyze the conditions and requirements for a particular Nash equilibrium to be the solution of the game. Theorems that exhibit imbedding relations among the Nash equilibriums of the game are given to examine the role of pre-play communication and the imbedding order in equilibrium selection. A core argument to claim here is that a generic case of Nash equilibriums that are strategically unstable relative to maxi-min strategies is given to emphasize the role of moves of the third kind and pre-play communication in correlated and coordinated solutions and the need to account for cases where Nash equilibriums are not plausible or even desirable as solutions for a game in normal form.

Fundamentals of Nonparametric Bayesian Inference

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subhashis Ghosal ◽  
Aad van der Vaart
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Inference ◽  
Nonparametric Bayesian

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Equilibrium Conditions ◽  
Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

Unifying Bayesian Inference and Vector Space Models for Improved Decipherment

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qing Dou ◽  
Ashish Vaswani ◽  
Kevin Knight ◽  
Chris Dyer
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Inference ◽  
Vector Space ◽  
Vector Space Models
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