scholarly journals A Bayesian Framework for Nash Equilibrium Inference in Human-Robot Parallel Play

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shray Bansal ◽  
Jin Xu ◽  
Ayana Howard ◽  
Charles Isbell
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Bayesian Framework ◽  
Parallel Play

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Equilibrium Conditions ◽  
Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

Modeling Interstation Travel Speed of Hybrid Bus Rapid Transit within A Bayesian Framework

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ji-hua Hu ◽  
Jia-xian Liang
Keyword(s):  
Road Traffic ◽  
Travel Speed ◽  
Bayesian Framework ◽  
Bus Rapid Transit ◽  
Rapid Transit ◽  
Important Indicator ◽  
Main Road ◽  
Traffic Lights ◽  
Speed Distribution ◽  
Hybrid Bus

Interstation travel speed is an important indicator of the running state of hybrid Bus Rapid Transit and passenger experience. Due to the influence of road traffic, traffic lights and other factors, the interstation travel speeds are often some kind of multi-peak and it is difficult to use a single distribution to model them. In this paper, a Gaussian mixture model charactizing the interstation travel speed of hybrid BRT under a Bayesian framework is established. The parameters of the model are inferred using the Reversible-Jump Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach (RJMCMC), including the number of model components and the weight, mean and variance of each component. Then the model is applied to Guangzhou BRT, a kind of hybrid BRT. From the results, it can be observed that the model can very effectively describe the heterogeneous speed data among different inter-stations, and provide richer information usually not available from the traditional models, and the model also produces an excellent fit to each multimodal speed distribution curve of the inter-stations. The causes of different speed distribution can be identified through investigating the Internet map of GBRT, they are big road traffic and long traffic lights respectively, which always contribute to a main road crossing. So, the BRT lane should be elevated through the main road to decrease the complexity of the running state.

scholarly journals Expressiveness and Nash Equilibrium in Iterated Boolean Games

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Julian Gutierrez ◽  
Paul Harrenstein ◽  
Giuseppe Perelli ◽  
Michael Wooldridge
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Infinite Sequence ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Temporal Logics ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Temporal Properties ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Boolean Games

We define and investigate a novel notion of expressiveness for temporal logics that is based on game theoretic equilibria of multi-agent systems. We use iterated Boolean games as our abstract model of multi-agent systems [Gutierrez et al. 2013, 2015a]. In such a game, each agent  has a goal  , represented using (a fragment of) Linear Temporal Logic ( ) . The goal  captures agent  ’s preferences, in the sense that the models of  represent system behaviours that would satisfy  . Each player controls a subset of Boolean variables , and at each round in the game, player is at liberty to choose values for variables in any way that she sees fit. Play continues for an infinite sequence of rounds, and so as players act they collectively trace out a model for , which for every player will either satisfy or fail to satisfy their goal. Players are assumed to act strategically, taking into account the goals of other players, in an attempt to bring about computations satisfying their goal. In this setting, we apply the standard game-theoretic concept of (pure) Nash equilibria. The (possibly empty) set of Nash equilibria of an iterated Boolean game can be understood as inducing a set of computations, each computation representing one way the system could evolve if players chose strategies that together constitute a Nash equilibrium. Such a set of equilibrium computations expresses a temporal property—which may or may not be expressible within a particular fragment. The new notion of expressiveness that we formally define and investigate is then as follows: What temporal properties are characterised by the Nash equilibria of games in which agent goals are expressed in specific fragments of  ? We formally define and investigate this notion of expressiveness for a range of fragments. For example, a very natural question is the following: Suppose we have an iterated Boolean game in which every goal is represented using a particular fragment of : is it then always the case that the equilibria of the game can be characterised within ? We show that this is not true in general.

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