Low-carbon supply chain optimization considering warranty period and carbon emission reduction level under cap-and-trade regulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaojian Qu ◽  
Hui Yang ◽  
Ying Ji
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Supply Chain Optimization ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Trade Regulation ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Carbon Supply

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing, Ordering, and Coordination for Prefabricated Building Supply Chain with Power Structure and Flexible Cap-and-Trade

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (19) ◽  
pp. 2426
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Menglin Liu ◽  
Lu Gan ◽  
Chong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Prefabricated Building

Under the increasing pressure of global emission reduction, prefabricated buildings are becoming more and more popular. As prefabricated building manufacturers and assemblers are emerging in the market, how do they make decisions of pricing, ordering, and emission reduction? In this paper, game theory is used to make the decisions for the prefabricated building supply chain with flexible cap-and-trade and different power structures, i.e., using prefabricated building manufacturers as the leader, using the vertical Nash equilibrium, and using prefabricated building assemblers as the leader. The two-part tariff contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and to improve the supply chain performance. Moreover, we discuss the influence of different power structures and the two-part tariff contract on the optimal decisions and profits. Finally, numerical analysis is used to verify the conclusions. This indicates that the supply chain leaders will gain a higher profit and that the power structure has a significant influence on the two-part tariff contract, which will result in an unfair distribution of profit. High carbon trading prices benefit carbon emission reduction. Consumer low-carbon awareness has a positive effect on carbon emission reduction and supply chain performance.

scholarly journals Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Linming Qi ◽  
Lu Liu ◽  
Liwen Jiang ◽  
Zicheng Wang ◽  
Weiliang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Reduction Effort

Many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with capital constraints often have no access or find it costly to obtain a loan from a bank; the retailer tends to borrow money from other enterprises in the supply chain by trade credit financing. We consider an emission-dependent supply chain with one emission-dependent manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer in need of financing to explore the optimal operational and environmental strategies of a low-carbon supply chain under trade credit financing. We use a Stackelberg game model to depict the low-carbon supply chain. We analyse the optimal carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity in the equilibrium state. The impacts of key parameters, such as the retailer’s internal working capital, the manufacturer’s risk-aversion degree, and the carbon-trading price on the supply chain operation, are analysed. The results show that the retailer’s capital constraint causes the carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity to improve synchronously. The supply chain achieves a win-win outcome for both the manufacturer and the retailer when the capital-constrained retailer is funded via trade credit from the manufacturer. The in-depth development of financing is beneficial to the manufacturer but is a disadvantage for the retailer. When the initial carbon-emission quota is low, the manufacturer benefits from a relatively lower carbon-trading price. Otherwise, a higher carbon-trading price is better for the manufacturer. The “carbon-trading price trap” ensures that the retailer’s profit is minimal. We further investigate the scenario in which the manufacturer is risk averse and find that the retailer will purchase fewer products and that the manufacturer will gain less profit to decrease the carbon-emission reduction effort. The manufacturer’s risk aversion is unfavourable to both the economic and environmental outcomes of the whole supply chain. This research provides strategic support for a low-carbon supply chain to carry out operational decisions in the context of enterprise capital constraint. To examine the theoretical results, the data used in the existing literature are further used to simulate the corresponding conclusions. Our research enriches the existing supply chain finance literature and provides decision support for the supply chain core enterprise.

scholarly journals Comparison of Carbon Emission Reduction Modes: Impacts of Capital Constraint and Risk Aversion

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 1661 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weisheng Deng ◽  
Lu Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply

The need for low-carbon development has become a social consensus. Increasing numbers of enterprises implement carbon emission reduction by using carbon cap-and-trade mechanisms to cater to consumers and practice social responsibility. From the manufacturer’s perspective, they can implement carbon emission reduction investment by themselves or outsource it to the retailer or energy service company (referred as ESCO). To explore the best carbon emission reduction mode selection strategy, we built and compared three carbon emission reduction modes—manufacturer emission reduction, retailer emission reduction, and ESCO emission reduction—by using Stackelberg game models. The joint decisions of operation, finance, and environment were obtained by using the backward induction approach. The impacts of key parameters were analyzed, such as the retailer’s initial capital amount and the decision-makers’ risk aversion degree on the low carbon supply chain operation. Our results show that the optimal carbon emission reduction mode for the manufacturer is changed as the retailer’s initial capital amount changes. Carbon emission reduction by the ESCO (retailer) becomes the dominant strategy for both the economy and environment when the cost advantage (cash investment ratio) of the ESCO (retailer) carbon emission reduction mode is sufficiently high (low). Overall, decision-makers’ risk aversion is detrimental to both the economic and environmental developments of the supply chain. We also designed contracts to realize the coordination of risk-neutral, risk-averse, capital-adequate, and capital-constrained low-carbon supply chains. These results give guidance for decision-makers to better manage the low-carbon supply chain in the context of fully considering the influential factors of risk aversion and capital constraint.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing Decisions for a Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern under Carbon Quota Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 556
Author(s):  
Hao Zou ◽  
Jin Qin ◽  
Bo Dai
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
Fairness Concern

This research investigates the effect of fairness concerns on a sustainable low-carbon supply chain (LCSC) with a carbon quota policy, in which a manufacturer is in charge of manufacturing low-carbon products and sells them to a retailer. The demand is affected by price and the carbon emission reduction rate. The optimal decisions of pricing and carbon emission reduction rate are analyzed under four decision models: (i) centralized decision, (ii) decentralized decision without fairness concern, (iii) decentralized decision with manufacturer’s fairness concern, (iv) decentralized decision with retailer’s fairness concern. The results indicate that the profits in the centralized LCSC are higher than those in the decentralized LCSC with fairness concern. If a manufacturer pays close attention to fairness, the fairness concern coefficient will reduce the carbon emission reduction rate and the profit of the LCSC and increase the wholesale price and the retail price of the product. If a retailer pays close attention to fairness, and the preference of consumers for a low-carbon product is low, the fairness concern coefficient of the retailer increases the total profit of the LCSC and decreases the carbon emission reduction rate and retail price of the product. Otherwise, if the preference of consumers for a low-carbon product is great, the fairness concern coefficient of the retailer would lead to a lower retail price compared with the retail price in the centralized decision and decrease the total profit of the LCSC.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution Model for Construction Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Wenfei Lu ◽  
Qianwen Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
General Contractor ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Pure Competition

Cap-and-trade has become one of the most widely used carbon emission limitation methods in the world. Its constraints have a great impact on the carbon emission reduction decisions and production operations of supply chain enterprises, as well as profit distribution. In the construction supply chain, there are few studies on the profit distribution and emission reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade policy. This paper investigates the profit distribution model of a two-echelon construction supply chain consisting of a general contractor and a subcontractor with cap-and-trade policy. Using game theory and Shapley value method, the optimal emission reduction decisions and profit distribution under three cooperation modes of pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation are obtained, respectively. The research shows that the profits of the construction supply chain are increasing in pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation scenarios, and the emission reduction amount of the construction supply chain in the case of pure cooperation is greater than that of pure competition and co-opetition. The carbon emission reduction amount under the co-opetition scenario is not always greater than that under the pure competition scenario, which depends on the emission reduction cost coefficient relationship of general contractor and subcontractor. When the cost coefficient of emission reduction of the general contractor is less than that of the subcontractor, the emission reduction amount under pure competition is larger than that under co-opetition. A numerical study is carried out to verify the conclusions and illustrated the profits of the supply chain decreased with the increase of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, and had nothing to do with the emission reduction efficiency of enterprises.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document