Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain

The purpose of this paper is to investigate environmental performance of a supply chain which consists of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm. A mathematical model considering both downstream firm’s monitoring and governmental intervention is developed. Afterwards, a numerical example is presented to show the equilibriums of these models and the optimal choices of firms and government. The results show that when customers’ environmental awareness increases, both total environmental impact and social welfare decrease. The downstream firm’s monitoring will certainly reduce the total environmental impact. In most cases, it does not matter whether the downstream firm chooses to monitor the supplier or not, the total environmental impact and social welfare would not be affected when the government chooses subsidy. If a subsidy is present, firms and environment will be better than those without subsidy. Hence, the government is more likely to choose to provide subsidy and the downstream firm will not monitor the supplier’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction effort. In a few cases when environmental impact is too large, taxation may be the optimal choice for the government and the downstream firm will choose to monitor the supplier’s GHG emissions reduction investment.

Analysis of Factors that Determine Inclusion of LULUCF into Realisation of EU Climate Policy Objectives 2021–2030 in the Non-ETS Sectors

Starting in 2021, Poland's emission reduction target for 2030, in the sectors not covered by the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is −7% compared to the emissions level in the non-ETS sectors in 2005. This is a big change in comparison with the target for the period of 2013–2020, which assumed potential emissions increase relative to the same baseline and was +14% by 2020. In order to cope with the need to make a much greater reduction effort, Poland will likely need to use flexibility mechanisms to support achieving the more ambitious target. One the possible mechanism is the use of removals to cover likely excesses of annual non-ETS emissions through an additional individual limit on the number of removals generated in the land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector. However, this possibility is conditional on a range of factors associated with emission inventory and reporting, legal regulations and accounting procedures. The present study addresses these factors in detail and highlights the linkages between them. It provides a comprehensive cross-cutting analysis of the issue and gives an insight into the scattered legal regulations in relation to the discussed subject. In conceivably straightforward ways, there are described the specific concepts and processes depicting the inclusion of removals in accounting to meet the reduction target in the non-ETS. The article points out the potential opportunities for Poland to comply with the obligations imposed by EU regulations.

Analisis Implementasi Smart Society melalui Program Gerbang Hebat di Kota Semarang

Joint movement for poverty and unemployment reduction through harmonization of the economy, education, ecosystems and community ethos, or abbreviated Gerbang Hebat of the Semarang City Government, which was pursued in Semarang City has achieved a significant poverty reduction effort of at least 1.5% per year in accordance with the RJMD target of Semarang City in 2016-2021. The Semarang City Government in implementing the Gerbang Hebat Program joins hands with all stakeholders, namely BUMN, BUMD, Banking, Business, Private Sector, State and Private Universities, NGOs and community organizations to jointly make efforts to improve community welfare. Based on this, this study analyzes the implementation of the Gerbang Hebat program by observing the phenomenon of the implementation of program policies, namely the driving and inhibiting factors in the implementation of the Gerbang Hebat program in an effort to create an intelligent community in the city of Semarang. The approach used is a descriptive qualitative method where data collection uses interviews, observation, and documentation studies. The results of this study are the presentation of a valid, accurate, right on target, objective, and up to date database where name-based address and potential and area are still a challenge and monitoring and evaluation when the program is completed. In addition, community participation has an important role in realizing digital-based community governance. This is to ensure that activities are in accordance with the needs of the community, and ensure that these activities are sustainable activities and can lead the community towards independence.

Managing Cost Reduction Efforts in Supplier Encroachment

The extant literature has indicated that upstream supplier encroachment on the incumbent retailer could be beneficial to the supplier, the retailer, and the entire industry, when the supplier’s marketing disadvantage satisfies specific conditions. This study extends the previous investigations about supplier encroachment to the circumstance where the supplier is capable of managing and mitigating her marketing disadvantage, which further intensifies the retail competition and provides new managerial implications about the encroachment. We find that encroachment with cost reduction efforts does not necessarily hurt the retailer and the industry but always benefit the supplier and consumers. Compared to encroachment without the cost reduction effort, encroachment with cost reduction efforts does not necessarily benefit the supplier and the industry. Between encroachment with and without cost reduction efforts, the retailer and consumers always prefer the latter and the former, respectively. Our findings provide meaningful insights to manage cost reduction efforts in supply chain encroachment.

Information sharing in two-tier supply chains considering cost reduction effort and information leakage

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This study investigates information sharing in two-tier supply chai-ns considering cost reduction effort and information leakage, with either upstream competition (system SC) or downstream competition (system RC). Results show that in system SC without information leakage, the retailer shares information with one supplier when suppliers are efficient in cost reduction, shares information with neither supplier when suppliers are inefficient in cost reduction, and shares information with two suppliers when suppliers are intermediate in cost reduction efficiency. nformation leakage won't affect the information sharing decisions of the retailer. In system RC with or without information leakage, both retailers share information with the supplier when the supplier is efficient in cost reduction and neither retailer shares information with the supplier when the supplier is inefficient in cost reduction. However, the threshold of cost reduction efficiency without information leakage is always lower than that with information leakage, which demonstrates that it is less likely for retailers to share information with information leakage. What's more, the two retailers choose the same information sharing strategies without information leakage but the opposite information sharing strategies with information leakage when the cost reduction efficiency is intermediate.</p>

Decisions in Power Supply Chain with Emission Reduction Effort of Coal-Fired Power Plant under the Power Market Reform

Sustainability in power supply chain has been supported by emission reduction of coal-fired power generation and increasing renewable energy power generation. Under the power market reform of direct power purchase transactions, this paper focuses on the channel selection and emission reduction decisions of power supply chain. From the theoretical perspective, this paper develops the decision-making models of centralized and decentralized power supply chain, which consist of one renewable energy power generation enterprise, one coal-fired power plant and one power grid enterprise. The optimal strategies of power quantities and profits for power supply chain members and their corresponding numerical experiments are analyzed in different cases. The results show that there are qA1Nc*<qA1Lc* for renewable energy power generation enterprise A, qB1Nc*>qB1Lc* and eBNc*>eBLc* for coal-fired power plant B, which indicate that the direct power purchase channel in the centralized scenario is conducive to promoting the transaction quantity of renewable energy power generation, as well as the on-grid power quantity and emission reduction efforts of coal-fired power plant B. Furthermore, the profit of whole power supply chain could be enhanced by the increasing on-grid power preference coefficient of coal-fired power generation, subsidy for renewable energy power generation and preference coefficient for clean production, and by the decreasing emission reduction cost coefficient of coal-fired power plant. Additionally, the emission reduction effort of coal-fired power plant is positively relevant with preference coefficient for clean production, whereas it is negatively relevant with power grid wheeling charge, emission reduction cost coefficient and subsidy for renewable energy power generation. Our findings can provide useful managerial insights for policymakers and enterprises in the sustainability of power supply chain.

Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion

Many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with capital constraints often have no access or find it costly to obtain a loan from a bank; the retailer tends to borrow money from other enterprises in the supply chain by trade credit financing. We consider an emission-dependent supply chain with one emission-dependent manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer in need of financing to explore the optimal operational and environmental strategies of a low-carbon supply chain under trade credit financing. We use a Stackelberg game model to depict the low-carbon supply chain. We analyse the optimal carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity in the equilibrium state. The impacts of key parameters, such as the retailer’s internal working capital, the manufacturer’s risk-aversion degree, and the carbon-trading price on the supply chain operation, are analysed. The results show that the retailer’s capital constraint causes the carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity to improve synchronously. The supply chain achieves a win-win outcome for both the manufacturer and the retailer when the capital-constrained retailer is funded via trade credit from the manufacturer. The in-depth development of financing is beneficial to the manufacturer but is a disadvantage for the retailer. When the initial carbon-emission quota is low, the manufacturer benefits from a relatively lower carbon-trading price. Otherwise, a higher carbon-trading price is better for the manufacturer. The “carbon-trading price trap” ensures that the retailer’s profit is minimal. We further investigate the scenario in which the manufacturer is risk averse and find that the retailer will purchase fewer products and that the manufacturer will gain less profit to decrease the carbon-emission reduction effort. The manufacturer’s risk aversion is unfavourable to both the economic and environmental outcomes of the whole supply chain. This research provides strategic support for a low-carbon supply chain to carry out operational decisions in the context of enterprise capital constraint. To examine the theoretical results, the data used in the existing literature are further used to simulate the corresponding conclusions. Our research enriches the existing supply chain finance literature and provides decision support for the supply chain core enterprise.