Replies to Stephen Darwall, Richard Miller, David Cummiskey and Joshua Gert

2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-323
Author(s):  
James P. Sterba
Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert

This book is the first extended treatment of demand-rights, a class of rights apt to be considered rights par excellence. Centrally, to have a demand-right is to have the standing or authority to demand a particular action from another person, who has a correlative obligation to the right-holder. How are demand-rights possible? Linking its response to central themes and positions within rights theory, Rights and Demands argues for two main theses. First, joint commitment, in a sense that is explained, is a ground of demand-rights. Second, it may well be their only ground. The first thesis is developed with special reference to agreements and promises, generally understood to ground demand-rights. It argues that both of these phenomena are constituted by joint commitments, and that this is true of many other central social phenomena also. In relation to the second thesis it considers the possibility of demand-rights whose existence can be demonstrated by moral argument without appeal to any joint commitment, and the possibility of accruing demand-rights through the existence of a given legal system or other institution construed without any such appeal. The relevance of the book’s conclusions to our understanding of human rights is then explained. Classic and contemporary rights theorists whose work is discussed include Wesley Hohfeld, H. L. A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Scanlon, Judith Thomson, Joseph Raz, and Stephen Darwall.


Respect ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 192-204
Author(s):  
Stephen Darwall

In this essay, Stephen Darwall first develops a rich set of distinctions of different forms of respect that supplement the fundamental distinction of recognition and appraisal respect. He then applies it to Kant’s dictum from The Critique of Practical Reason that “before a common humble man … my spirit bows.” Darwall is particularly interested in what Kant says about the phenomenology of respect: how it occurs, how it feels, and the like. The framework Darwall developed earlier, allows him to show how respect as a moral feeling is not only a form of appraisal but also recognition respect, and how the moral feeling of respect relates to other forms, such as “social respect” and “honor respect.”


2011 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 203-212
Author(s):  
ROBERT E. GOODIN
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 51-68
Author(s):  
Peter de Marneffe

AbstractScanlon's distinction between well-being and other personal values cannot be made out clearly if well-being is understood, as it commonly is, to consist in whatever is intrinsically good for a person. Two other accounts of well-being, however, might be able to explain this distinction. One is a version of the rational care view proposed by Stephen Darwall; another is a rational sympathy view suggested by some of Brad Hooker's work.


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