The Role of Top–Down Inhibitory Control in Providing Flexibility to the Processes Underlying Recognition of an Emotional Facial Expression

2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. A. Kostandov
2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 464-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula M. Niedenthal ◽  
Martial Mermillod ◽  
Marcus Maringer ◽  
Ursula Hess

AbstractThe set of 30 stimulating commentaries on our target article helps to define the areas of our initial position that should be reiterated or else made clearer and, more importantly, the ways in which moderators of and extensions to the SIMS can be imagined. In our response, we divide the areas of discussion into (1) a clarification of our meaning of “functional,” (2) a consideration of our proposed categories of smiles, (3) a reminder about the role of top-down processes in the interpretation of smile meaning in SIMS, (4) an evaluation of the role of eye contact in the interpretation of facial expression of emotion, and (5) an assessment of the possible moderators of the core SIMS model. We end with an appreciation of the proposed extensions to the model, and note that the future of research on the problem of the smile appears to us to be assured.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
E Cheremushkin ◽  
N Petrenko

Top–down cognitive control was studied in students by the model of fixed set for facial expression. In subjects with errors in the set fixing, it is weakened to the greatest extent. The hypothesis about the influence on the top–down cognitive control of the functional state of subjects caused by signs of autonomic dysfunction, personal anxiety, depression and sleep quality is considered. Keywords: top–down cognitive control, emotional facial expression, errors recognition, EEG, alpha oscillations


2004 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 143-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred W. Mast ◽  
Charles M. Oman

The role of top-down processing on the horizontal-vertical line length illusion was examined by means of an ambiguous room with dual visual verticals. In one of the test conditions, the subjects were cued to one of the two verticals and were instructed to cognitively reassign the apparent vertical to the cued orientation. When they have mentally adjusted their perception, two lines in a plus sign configuration appeared and the subjects had to evaluate which line was longer. The results showed that the line length appeared longer when it was aligned with the direction of the vertical currently perceived by the subject. This study provides a demonstration that top-down processing influences lower level visual processing mechanisms. In another test condition, the subjects had all perceptual cues available and the influence was even stronger.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Robert Harrison Brown

Attention has long been characterised within prominent models as reflecting a competition between goal-driven and stimulus-driven processes. It remains unclear, however, how involuntary attentional capture by affective stimuli, such as threat-laden content, fits into such models. While such effects were traditionally held to reflect stimulus-driven processes, recent research has increasingly implicated a critical role of goal-driven processes. Here we test an alternative goal-driven account of involuntary attentional capture by threat, using an experimental manipulation of goal-driven attention. To this end we combined the classic ‘contingent capture’ and ‘emotion-induced blink’ (EIB) paradigms in an RSVP task with both positive or threatening target search goals. Across six experiments, positive and threat distractors were presented in peripheral, parafoveal, and central locations. Across all distractor locations, we found that involuntary attentional capture by irrelevant threatening distractors could be induced via the adoption of a search goal for a threatening category; adopting a goal for a positive category conversely led to capture only by positive stimuli. Our findings provide direct experimental evidence for a causal role of voluntary goals in involuntary capture by irrelevant threat stimuli, and hence demonstrate the plausibility of a top-down account of this phenomenon. We discuss the implications of these findings in relation to current cognitive models of attention and clinical disorders.


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